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Application of the Public-Trust Document
[S]o neither can the king intrude upon the common property, thus un-
derstood, and appropriate it to himself or the fiscal purposes of the
nation, the enjoyment of it is a natural right which cannot be infringed
or taken away, unless by arbitrary power, and that, in theory at least,
could not exist in a free government ....
-Arnold v. Mundy'
INTRODUCTION
The Electromagnetic spectrum is among our most valuable natural
resources. Yet while the past few decades have seen a rich body of envi-
ronmental law develop for other natural resources, this movement has
largely passed over the electromagnetic spectrum. This Article argues
that to remedy that situation, the public-trust doctrine, which is now a
cornerstone of modern environmental law,2 should be extended to the
electromagnetic spectrum. This extension would not be a leap: the pub-
lic-trust doctrine has already been used to guarantee the public access to
various bodies of water (not just navigable water),3 and to protect recrea-
tional lakes and beaches, wildlife preserves,5 and even the air.6
Electromagnetic spectrum is at least as valuable as these other resources,
so access to it should be similarly guaranteed in order for the public to
enjoy its full potential.
This Article will first show that there is a problem with the way that
the electromagnetic spectrum is regulated, that its regulation stifles inno-
vation and has favored incumbents by wrongly giving them exclusive
1. 6 N.J.L. 1, 50 (N.J. 1821).
2. See Joseph L. Sax, The Public-Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MIcH. L. REV. 471 (1970) (being one of the most influential and
most-cited law review articles ever written); see also Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, Methods on
Teaching Environmental Law: Some Thoughts on Providing Access to the Environmental Law
System, 23 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 237, 254-56 (1998) (describing Sax's influence on environ-
mental-law scholarship and discussing many of his proposals for teaching environmental law).
3. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988) (expanding the public-
trust doctrine's application from navigable water to any body of water regardless of its prox-
imity to navigable water).
4. Nat'l Audobon Soc'y v. Superior Court (Mono Lake), 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983)
(applying the public-trust doctrine to a lake's recreational and ecological public-trust values);
see also Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Association, 471 A.2d. 355 (N.J. 1984) (expand-
ing the public-trust doctrine to mandate access over dry land on private property to a public
intertidal zone).
5. Owsichek v. Alaska Licensing & Control Bd., 763 P.2d. 488, 493 (Alaska 1988)
(enlarging the public-trust doctrine's application to "wildlife" on the basis of an interpretation
of the public trust in the Alaska Constitution).
6. Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Envtl. Control Comm'n, 452 So. 2d 1152, 1154
(La. 1984) (acknowledging that all natural resources, including air, are potentially covered by
the public-trust doctrine).
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access to a natural resource at no charge, and that the situation has been
exacerbated by mistakenly assuming that auctions are a panacea for past
spectrum-allocation problems. The Article will then argue that the pub-
lic-trust doctrine, as well as other more general concepts borrowed from
environmental-law scholarship-such as sustainable consumption, elec-
tromagnetic pollution, and ecological imbalance-should be imported
into a new spectrum-management paradigm. Two technologies, Ultra-
Wideband and Software Defined Radio, may be well-suited for a new
regulatory paradigm that is freer than the one that the spectrum has al-
ways had, and that provides for access to the spectrum's being
guaranteed by the public-trust doctrine.
I. THE WAY THE SPECTRUM IS PRESENTLY REGULATED
AND WHAT IS WRONG WITH IT
The electromagnetic spectrum is regulated in a way that causes it to
be utilized inefficiently, and the only practical way to rectify that situa-
tion is for courts to apply the public-trust doctrine to the spectrum.
However, to realize why change is needed in the way the spectrum is
regulated, we must look first at the way that the spectrum is regulated,
then see how the present regulatory scheme developed historically and,
finally, evaluate whether that regulatory scheme is adequate for present-
day technologies. Only in that way will the defects in the present regula-
tory system, and the need to remedy the situation with the public-trust
doctrine, become apparent.
A. Command and Control
At present the FCC employs a command and control philosophy to
manage the electromagnetic spectrum.7 This means that the FCC cen-
trally controls the spectrum, that neither individuals nor companies may
broadcast on it without first getting the FCC's permission in the form of
a license, and that they must later go back to the FCC for permission to
make any changes in the way they use the license. FCC Chairman
Michael Powell has described this system of regulation as a paternalistic,
"mother may I" relationship:
While the wireless world has changed rapidly, government spec-
trum policy continues to be constrained by allocation and
licensing systems from a bygone era. Change is inhibited by the
,'mother may I" phenomenon-businesses must go to the FCC
7. See supra Section II for further elaboration on command and control and its histori-
cal roots.
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for permission before they can modify their spectrum plans to
respond to consumer demand.8
Under such a paternalistic, command and control regime, the gov-
ernment attempts to avoid market inefficiencies by centralized decision
making akin to a communist-style, centrally-planned program. In doing
so, the government truncates economic experimentation, stifles innova-
tion, and substitutes inefficient theoretical models for natural economic
progress. Under the current FCC system, nearly every activity is sepa-
rately licensed, and these licenses require individual, separate
amendments and approvals for any change to existing technology or use.
For example, an unused television channel in rural Wyoming could not
be used for bringing Internet services to a remote town because televi-
sion broadcasting channels must only be used for broadcasting television
content.9 Television broadcasters are commanded by the FCC to use the
frequency only for television broadcasting,0 and any change to an FCC
command is then controlled by complicated procedures under the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act ("APA")," which sets forth due-process
requirements for enacting most FCC rules.
1. Low-Power FM Radio
There are many examples of how FCC command and control stifles
innovation and even free speech; one case being the non-profit organiza-
tions such as schools, churches, and others who hoped to operate their
own low-power'2 FM radio stations. 3 The theory for allowing new low-
power radio stations was simple: now that most radio receivers have
digital "dials," making it possible for a user to precisely access, say, 89.5
FM on her radio instead of approximating a range in the vicinity of 89.5
(an older radio dial would cover a range of about 89.3 to 89.7 FM at any
given time), these new low-power FM broadcasters could send signals at
8. Michael K. Powell, Broadband Migration III: New Directions in Wireless Policy,
Remarks at the Silicon Flatirons Telecommunications Program, University of Colorado at
Boulder (October 30, 2002), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Powell/2002/
spmkp212.html.
9. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 73.609 (2002) (delineating specific television broadcast
zones); 47 C.ER. § 73.277 (2002) (specifying that all transmissions must comply with uses
specific to the applicable transmission license).
10. Ironically, broadcasters may also opt to simply leave the spectrum unused. See
discussion infra Section II.D.
11. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1993).
12. The FM stations are said to be "low power" because they transmit at low levels with
a limited reach. For example, a low-power station would only reach intended listeners within a
few miles radius, rather than the hundreds of miles that some standard (high-power) FM
broadcasters use.
13. DAVID BOLLIER, SILENT THEFr 152 (2002).
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low power over a very specific frequency and reach their intended listen-
ers without disturbing existing high-power broadcasters.
Like older trains whose tracks needed to be surrounded by open land
lest everything burn in their path from flying sparks,' 4 traditional high-
power broadcasters clumsily transmitted their signals over an unneces-
sarily wide range occupying multiple frequencies at once, burning the
surrounding spectrum. Now that digital tuning permits more precise "di-
aling" and digital displays have replaced most radio dials (just as diesel
motors have replaced coal burning trains, and as CDs and MP3s have
replaced analog tapes), more broadcasters can technically use the fre-
quencies that lie between the existing broadcasters by transmitting on
specific frequencies at low power. 5 Schools, churches and community
organizations loved the idea, and the FCC received more than 1,200 ap-
plications for the frequencies.' 6 However, the massive broadcasting lobby
intervened, and government decided instead to reduce the number of
low-power FM radio stations by 75 percent.' 7 While the epitaph for the
low-power FM initiative has not yet been written, circumstantial evi-
dence shows that the idea may already be dead or dying because the• 18
FCC restrictions have made many business plans unviable. As one
commentator stated, the FCC standards for low-power FM were such
that it would be impossible for even a toaster to comply with them.' 9
Consequently, the low-power broadcasters had to withdraw their applica-
tions from urban areas, where they would have been the most useful.
14. Much discussion about property rights and torts has arisen from this example. See
LeRoy Fibre Co., v. Chicago Milwaukee & St. Paul R.R., 232 U.S. 340 (1914), a famous rail-
road dispute where the plaintiff sued the railroad for sparks from a train which burned his
crops. The railroad said that the plaintiff unreasonably stacked his crops too close to the rail-
road's tracks, even though the crops were on plaintiff's own property. Although the plaintiff
won, in Justice Holmes' convincing dissent he suggested that the farmer may have been negli-
gent if other, more sensible stacking locations were available. See also Ronald H. Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 30-33 (1960). Coase essentially embraces Holmes'
dissent, applying what is known now as the "Coase Theorem," suggesting that the farmer
should be liable if he is the cheaper cost avoider of the damage.
15. See Heavenly Music, THE ECONOMIST, March 14, 2002, at 16, 20-21 (describing
the additional frequencies on either side of a broadcaster as "saddle bags on a horse" and not-
ing that incumbent broadcasters have much to lose by additional competitors, which would
threaten to cut into their advertising revenue).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See Michael Roberts, Frequency Free-for-All, WESTWORD, Oct. 11, 2001, available
at http://www.westword.com/issues/2001 -10-1 l/message.html (describing the complex rules
and stating that only a few remote stations will likely be operating).
19. Stuart M. Benjamin, The Logic of Scarcity: Idle Spectrum as a First Amendment
Violation, 52 DUKE L.J. 1, 14 (2002).
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2. One-Way Paging and Cordless Phones
Another example of how FCC regulations stifle innovation was seen
when it prohibited early cellular-phone operators from deploying certain
features, such as Short Messaging Services (SMS), 20 which had been
popular in Europe since wireless phones had first been launched there.2'
Perhaps unintentionally, the FCC policy protected competitors instead of
encouraging competition, since cellular companies not being allowed to
send alphanumeric text to their subscribers without FCC authorization
helped the pager companies, who did transmit such text. Then, however,
an amendment to the rules22 later allowed cell-phone companies to
transmit text, which hurt many paging companies that had deployed ex-
pensive networks in reliance upon the earlier regulations. Ultimately,
advanced cellular services and PCS licenses forced paging companies to
seek death embraces with former paging competitors through consolida-
tion, or go straight for Chapter 7 liquidation bankruptcy.24 Traditional
paging licenses still exist, but they only allow one-way signals, which do
not allow the receiving party to reply. This restriction will inevitably
die out in the coming years in favor of two-way communications,26 re-
quiring operators to obtain separate licenses for operating on different
20. It is technically possible for digital services, such as SMS and data to be sent over
any frequency, but uses were heavily regulated. Many cellular operators responded by selling
their licenses and buying PCS licenses instead. See Alex Markels and Joann Lublin, AT&T-
The Second Breakup, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 1995, at BI0 (discussing profitable cellular com-
panies' strategic decision to sell their businesses in order to buy PCS licenses and sell new
services).
21. See The Tortoise and the Hare, THE ECONOMIST, March 16, 2002 at 63. Note that in
Europe paging never really took off because consumers could both send and receive messages
from their mobile phones in addition to using them for voice services. See Connie Ling, Text-
Messaging System's Popularity Surges, WALL ST. J. EUROPE, Oct. 24, 2001, at 24 (attributing
the development of SMS to Europe's governmental coordination and standardization through
the GSM group and noting that it is extremely popular and very profitable).
22. See Amendment of Parts 2 & 22 of the Comm'n Rules to Permit Liberalization of
Tech. & Auxiliary Serv. Offerings in the Domestic Pub. Cellular Radio Telecomm. Serv., 5
F.C.C.R. 1138 (1990) (memorandum opinion and order).
23. See William Glanz, Beeper Rivals Combine in Bid to Diminish Debts, THE WASH.
TIMES, Apr. 3, 2001, at B9 (detailing struggling paging companies Metrocall's and Web Link
Wireless's plans to merge operations and then file for bankruptcy protection, because they
were over-saddled with debt in a shrinking market).
24. Yuki Noguchi, Pager Firm is Latest to Pull the Plug, THE WASH. POST, Dec. 7,
2000, at E5 (discussing the Chapter 7 liquidation filing of TSR paging, which was once the
U.S.'s sixth-largest paging company).
25. For a description of traditional paging definitions and licenses, see FCC Website on
Paging at http://wireless.fcc.gov/services/paging/.
26. See Yuki Noguchi, Paging Oblivion, THE WASH. POST, May 28, 2001, at El (ex-
plaining one-way paging's uncompetitiveness in the face of other services such as two-way
messaging and mobile phones).
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channels." The spectrum that has been allocated for one-way paging is a
confusing mixture of hundreds of individual site licenses and geographi-
cal licenses, 28 and as it dies off the frequencies will have to be reassigned
for other purposes lest they remain underused or idle.29 In essence, an
entire industry was created and then disassembled over the period of a
few years through government's central planning.
The foregoing example and others like it make the FCC an easy tar-
get for cynicism because it has long been a proponent of centralized
planning. Many readers will recall that it used to be strictly prohibited
for a US citizen to plug any device into a home telephone outlet that was
not produced and installed by a Bell company.3° Similarly, 1980s cord-
less-phone technology was not substantially different from that used in
children's walkie-talkies after the fifties, but centralized planning re-
quired private industry to wait several decades for a technological
matrimony between walkie-talkies and telephones.3'
The government is not blind to the quite obvious problem that FCC
regulations are needlessly complex, inhibit innovation, and lead to inef-
ficient spectrum allocation. This very fact has been openly
acknowledged by President George W. Bush in a Presidential Memoran-
dum:
The existing legal and policy framework for spectrum manage-
ment has not kept pace with the dramatic changes in technology
and spectrum use. Under the existing framework, the Government
27. Most forms of two-way communications require separate licenses, such as cellular,
PCS, ESMR, etc. Two-way paging also requires a different license than one-way paging. See
Charles P. B. Pinson, Inc. v. FCC., 321 F.2d 372, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (describing the sepa-
rate licenses required for one-way and two-way paging in the context of a license renewal
hearing).
28. Bennett Z. Kobb, WIRELESS SPECTRUM FINDER 21 (2001).
29. See In the Matter of Revision and Update of Part 22 of the Public Mobile Radio
Services Rules, 95 F.C.C.2d 769, § 107 (1983) (explaining that in the early 1980s paging was
seen as an important growth area, and many new channels were allocated to it by administra-
tive fiat: "in each community nationwide there are now a total of 73 paging channels available
where there used to be only 8.... Only in a handful of cities have we received more applica-
tions ... than there are frequencies available. To state the situation broadly, virtually all those
who want paging channels can apply for and receive them").
30. See In re Use of Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, 13 F.C.C.2d
420 (1968) (citing the then-applicable FCC regulation's prohibition on customer-connected
equipment ("[n]o equipment, apparatus, circuit or device not furnished by the telephone com-
pany shall be attached to or connected with the facilities furnished by the telephone company,
whether physically, by induction or otherwise"), and allowing users to install their own
equipment as long as it fit within certain guidelines).
31. See Steve Bickerstaff, Shackles on the Giant: How the Federal Government Created
Microsoft, Personal Computers, and the Internet, 78 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1999) (recounting the
history of the Bell companies' deregulation and the many battles that were needed to allow
users to connect terminal equipment not provided by the Bell system).
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generally reviews every change in spectrum use, a process that is
often slow and inflexible, and can discourage the introduction of
new technology. Some spectrum users, including Government
agencies, maintain that the existing spectrum process is insuffi-
ciently responsive ..."
Low-power FM, paging, and cordless phones are all examples of
past problems that validate President Bush's assertions. Although the
President has set up special committees to study the problem,3 3 it is
unlikely that change will take place quickly. Turning to the future, new
technologies such as Ultra-Wideband and Software Defined Radio (de-
scribed below in Section III) continue to be stifled by this command and
control system.
B. Is Command And Control Always Bad, Or
Is It A Matter of Application ?
Command and control, while perhaps too restrictive when applied to
the entire electromagnetic spectrum (as it is today),' 4 is not necessarily
wrong in all instances if it is narrowly applied to the devices and people
that access it. In environmental law, after all, command and control has
successfully created liability mechanisms that hold corporate officers
accountable for complying with emissions standards that govern the
toxic substances of their factories, machinery, and products.35 Here, regu-
lation threatens the company and its officers with fines and other forms
of liability, rather than hijacking the resources that they use; and it has
36had a direct effect on the devices that they employ in their businesses.
This can be a useful paradigm for wireless communications as the em-
phasis moves increasingly away from a regulatory bear-hug on the entire
resource, thereby opening it up to advances in science and technology.
The difference between regulating a resource and regulating devices
that gain access to it can be illustrated by a simple environmental
example: the government regulates automobile emissions not through
severe restrictions upon the natural resources involved in operating an
32. Memorandum on Spectrum Policy for the 21st Century, 39 PuB. PAPERS 23 (May
29, 2003) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Presidential Memo on Spectrum Policy].
33. See id.
34. With limited exceptions, such as some the 2.4 GHz used for "WiFi," garage door
openers, cordless phones, etc.
35. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Social Meaning of Command and Control, 20 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 191, 196 (2001) (describing two generations of "command and control," with the
first, of the 70s and 80s, attaching to the "low hanging fruit" of large, industrial polluters, and
the second generation (which is perhaps more relevant to the problem found in wireless) con-
sisting of "individuals" who are "diffuse," "small," and sometimes "non-point" sources").
36. See, e.g., United States v. Aceto Agr Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1375 (8th Cir.
1989) (attaching disposal liability to pesticide manufacturers).
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automobile (such as the land it drives upon), but instead by regulating
the motor's output characteristics 37 through its appurtenances (such as a
catalytic converter for the exhaust system),38 and measures compliance
by testing the exhaust fumes. Most state automotive-emissions programs
have a two or three-pronged approach that compare the motor's
characteristics to the manufacturer's specifications, 39 attach an exhaust
probe to see that output is within specifications 4 and regulate the
automobile's consumable (such as gasoline) to ensure that it burns
within specified standards without the draconian step of rationing fuel.4'
The natural resources themselves are left alone, but the devices that use
them (i.e., the automobiles and their motors) are regulated. The
electromagnetic spectrum, however, does not benefit from this type ofsensile • 42
sensible regulation.
With electromagnetic spectrum, the resource itself is regulated.
There are also device restrictions, but they are disproportionately applied
and antiquated. As FCC Chairman Powell has stated, there has been
much more emphasis on transmitters than receivers,43 more specifically
on who transmits." At least half the equation, consisting of the resource's
consumer and her receiver, is missing from the regulatory scheme, while
a sweeping overlay of regulation commands and controls the entire re-
45source.
37. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Regulating Commuters to Clear the Air.- Some Difficul-
ties in Implementing a National Program at the Local Level, 27 PAC. L.J. 1521, 1536-37
(1996) (discussing manufacturers' role in vehicle emissions, which was one of voluntary co-
operation in 1954 that became obligatory after Congress passed the Motor Vehicle Air
Pollution Control Act in 1965).
38. Id. (discussing catalytic converters and the role of other pollution-control devices).
39. Id. at 1528-30 (discussing the role of inspection-and-maintenance organizations to
verify compliance, including the visual-inspection component, with it being assumed that the
original manufacturer specifications complied with rules and regulations in force at the time of
the motor's release into the stream of commerce).
40. Id. (noting that relatively inexpensive equipment exists for tailpipe testing, and that
more expensive equipment is available to test emissions under simulated road conditions).
41. Id. at 1561 (discussing leaded gasoline's phase-out).
42. The preceding analogy is inspired by LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS:
THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 76-77 (2002). Lessig discusses the
highway system and notes that regulations control the devices that can be used on the highway
but they do not control who goes where.
43. Powell, supra note 8. Airwaves are first allocated into separate "licenses," and then
the licenses are given to "licensees." The license itself regulates the use, or purpose, and the
FCC exerts a double role to make sure that the licensees comply with the license. The FCC
can also change the terms of the license.
44. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Physical Scarcity, Rent Seeking, and the First Amendment,
97 COLUM. L. REV. 905, 926 (1997) (describing the "vacuity" of the notion of physical scar-
city, and noting that technological improvements in transmitters and receivers can
dramatically improve frequencies' use).
45. Lessig, Benkler, and Benjamin (and many others) have advanced convincing argu-
ments that this sweeping regulation is an unconstitutional breach of free speech. See
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C. A Cacophony of Competing Regulations
If one problem with FCC regulation of the electromagnetic spectrum
is its command and control philosophy applied to the natural resource
itself, another is the FCC regulations' vast complexity. Reading the FCC
regulations requires lots of post-its, bookmarks, paperclips, patience and,
quite often, highly-specialized legal advice. FCC Part 15,46 for example,
pertains to devices operating in unlicensed frequencies below a certain
power threshold, but Part 15 also includes certain spectrum areas that are
"prohibited" from any broadcast, such as the FAA and other frequencies
used for military or safety applications.
FCC Part 247 is a massive collection of technical data sprawling sev-
eral hundred pages. It covers international regulations, nomenclature and
assignment of frequencies, and the complete table of frequency alloca-
tions. FCC Part 68 regulates the connection of terminal equipment to the
telephone network 48 and any device that is regulated under Part 68, such
as the limits set for intentional and unintentional radiation, must also
comply with Part 15's provisions. Part 68 is important for future wireless
applications, because any change in FCC regulation or policy is likely to
affect all the interrelated FCC compliance regulations simultaneously.
Even the most banal wireless applications (such as cordless phones)
are regulated under Part 68 (for their connection to the network), Part 15
(for their radiation limitations in broadcasting capacity), and Part 2 (for
their placement in the frequency allocation zoning map). The trend sug-
gests that future technologies are likely to increase dramatically the
existing confusion in the FCC regulations. While regulators used to be
able to categorize transmitters and receivers with relative ease in a long-
gone era when television and radio were the primary subjects of regula-
tion, new technological advances are supplanting these categorizations
and creating hybrid applications that no longer fit neatly within any sin-
gle FCC provision. Examples of these re-categorizations include
frequencies originally intended for UHF television that have been reallo-
cated for cellular,49 and frequencies originally intended for garage-door
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 182 (1999); Yochai Benkler &
Lawrence Lessig, Net Gains, NEW REPUBLIC, December 14, 1998, at 12; Benjamin, supra
note 19.
46. 47 C.F.R. § 15 (1998).
47. Frequency Allocations and Radio Treaty Matters; General Rules and Regulations,
47 C.F.R. § 2 (1998).
48. Connection of Terminal Equipment to the Telephone Network, 47 C.F.R. § 68
(1998).
49. See In the Matter of an Inquiry Relative to the Future Use of the Frequency and
806-960 MHz; and Amendment of Parts 2, 18, 21, 73, 74, 89, 91 and 93 of the Rules Relative
to Operations in the Land Mobile Service Between 806 and 960 MHz, 46 F.C.C.2d 752 (1974)
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openers0 that are now used for cordless phones, wireless in-home LAN,
car alarms, and electronic dog fences. Categorization is quickly losing its
meaning, and future regulations will likely have to address purely tech-
nical criteria rather than application-specific criteria.
Practically every FCC chapter pertaining to one device has relevance
to a related broadcasting or receiving device, and little of the regulations
is wholly understandable. Also, the regulations as they are written today
accommodate legacy technologies and out-of-date references (not unlike
Microsoft Windows, which amazingly still takes several minutes to boot
because of a concept known as "backwards compatibility"). 5' Frustrated
with these complicated regulations, Mr. Frank Bums, a citizen respon-
dent, once filed a concise comment in response to the FCC's
Ultrawideband rulemaking procedure. His comment rings of the dissatis-
faction of many citizens:
I want to record my opinion that the widespread availability of
wireless spectra [sic] is in the best interests of our ecological
human aspirations. Please, in the future, make it possible for or-
dinary people to understand the issues and voice their
opinions-without having first to hire lawyers as translators. 2
What should be the work of scientists has been commandeered by
lawyers who must draft massive orders modifying dozens of separate
regulations at once.53 The emphasis that the FCC has historically placed
on law and lawyers over technology has created a highly unbalanced
organization. Almost 33 percent of the wireless division's staff is attor-
54neys, while only 14 percent have a background in the sciences.
(discussing the rulemaking procedure dealing with reallocation of UHF channels for cellular
telephone services).
50. The 2.4 GHz frequency band was originally designated for home devices but has
now blossomed to include everything from wireless networking to invisible dog fences. See
Kenneth R. Carter, Ahmed Lahjouji and Neal McNeil, Unlicensed and Unshackled: A Joint
OSP-OET White Paper on Unlicensed Devices and Their Regulatory Issues, Federal Commu-
nications Commission Office of Engineering Technology, OSP Working Paper No. 39, May
2003, available at http://www.fcc.gov/osp/workingp.html.
51. See Bill's Big Roll-Out, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 18, 1999, at 67 (discussing Win-
dows 2000's launch and the trade-offs between backward compatibility and system stability).
52. Comment of Frank Bums, filed in Revision of Part 15 of the Commission's Rules
Regarding Ultra-Wideband Transmission Systems, ET Docket, 98-153 F.C.C. (1998), available
at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or-pdf=pdf&id-document=6005940073.
53. For example, the authorizations for cellular required the modification of at least
eight different rules. See 46 EC.C.2d at 752.
54. Kalpana Srinivasan, FCC Workers Need Technical Training, AP ONLINE, Mar. 11,
2001. In the wireless division-at least in 2001-there were almost three times as many law-
yers as engineers (100 vs. 35), and almost 1/3 of the entire staff are lawyers (100 out of 315);
The article also notes that there was a time in the past when lawyers could "bluff' their way
through, but with new technologies this is probably no longer possible.
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Although it is far too early to suggest that organizations like the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency ("EPA") should manage electromagnetic
spectrum, it is instructive to note that 6 percent of the EPA staff are at-
torneys while 53 percent are scientists, engineers, or environmental
specialists. Intuitively, the balance of science and law at the EPA seems
to make much more sense than the one at the FCC.
D. Recent Redirection in FCC Policy
Happily, it is now the government's official position that the system
of command and control ovet the disposition of the electromagnetic
spectrum can no longer be reconciled with our modem understanding of
science and economics. The most obvious manifestation that this is now
the government's position can be seen on the FCC's website in a section
on spectrum policy.56 In the summer of 2002, the FCC founded this spe-
cial section, called the Spectrum Task Force,57 and it has committed itself
to providing "specific recommendations ... to evolve the current 'com-
mand and control' approach to spectrum policy into a more integrated,
market-oriented approach that provides greater regulatory certainty,
while minimizing regulatory intervention."58 Unfortunately, what is
needed is not an evolution, but instead a revolution if the FCC is to sur-
vive in the world of new technologies and to accommodate market
demands for products like Wi-Fi, that are growing at one of the most
amazing rates of any commercial product in recent history.59
The FCC has been forced to embrace new inventions, 6° and it has
openly acknowledged that its historical role of preventing chaos from
55. See Environmental Protection Agency Website, Human Resources and Organiza-
tional Services, EPA's Workforce-Major Occupations, at http://www.epa.gov/epahrist/
occupate.htm.
56. See FCC Spectrum Policy Task Force Website, at http://www.fcc.gov/sptf.
57. See FCC Chairman Michael K Powell Announces Formation of Spectrum Policy
Task Force, FCC Press Release (June 6, 2002), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/
edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-223142A1 .pdf.
58. See FCC Spectrum Policy Task Force Website, supra note 56 (emphasis added).
59. A booklet entitled THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE TO PUBLIC WLAN (BrainHeart Maga-
zine 2003) notes that so far more than 20 million Wi-Fi devices have been sold, and that the
integration of Wi-Fi into Intel's Centrino chip indicates that its proliferation is only at the
beginning.
60. See Remarks of Jonathan S. Adelstein, Commissioner, Federal Communications
Commission, Workshop on Cognitive Radio Technologies, Office of Engineering and Tech-
nology, Federal Communications Commission, Washington, DC (May 19, 2003), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-234658A1.pdf (holding a workshop
on cognitive radio technology, Commissioner Adelstein states "In the broader framework,
cognitive radio technologies offer the promise of helping us leave the world of command and
control behind and create an environment where a framework for innovation can leverage their
potential benefits. The potential of these technologies to 'do more with less' can help us make
room to accommodate both more users and the newest service offerings.").
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arising from unmanaged frequencies may be made unnecessary by new
technology.6' For today, a "cacophony of competing voices",62-the chaos
that the FCC was formed to prevent-may not be a problem arising from
there being too many speakers, but from the nature of the receivers. FCC
chairman Powell has explained that "interference is often more a product
of receivers; that is, receivers are too dumb or too sensitive or too cheap
to filter out unwanted signals. Yet, our decades-old rules have generally
ignored receivers., 63 This statement represents the early stages of a wel-
come policy shift from bear-hug regulation of the entire electromagnetic
spectrum to more surgical regulation of the devices that access it.
The new form of regulation may be able to take many forms, such as
"etiquette" standards. 64 The "etiquette" aspect is rather intuitive, it is a
sort of technical mandate for politeness and conversational efficiency.
Just as mayhem breaks out when many people try to speak to each other
at the same time at dinner or over coffee, spectrum etiquette proposals
impose a technical "listen-before-talking" rule that requires devices to
65monitor its transmissions in polite deference to other speakers. There
are hot technical debates about the details, such as how long one person
can speak (transmit), how loud they can speak (transmission power
level), etc., 66 but the basic framework is simply a listen-before-talking
61. See Powell, supra note 8. Clarifying the role of the Spectrum Policy Task Force,
Chairman Powell states:
[W]e are still living under a spectrum "management" regime that is 90 years old. It
needs a hard look, and in my opinion, a new direction. Historically, I believe there
have been four core assumptions underlying spectrum policy: (1) unregulated radio
interference will lead to chaos; (2) spectrum is scarce; (3) government command
and control of the scarce spectrum resource is the only way chaos can be avoided;
and (4) the public interest centers on government choosing the highest and best use
of the spectrum.... Today's environment has strained these assumptions to the
breaking point. Modem technology has fundamentally changed the nature and ex-
tent of spectrum use.
Id.
62. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FC.C., 395 U.S. 367, 376 (1969).
63. Powell, supra note 8
64. See Yochai Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia: Building the Commons of the Digi-
tally Networked Environment, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287, 334-35 (Winter 1998). Benkler
describes the FCC's consideration and abandonment of "mandated spectrum etiquette" that
preceded the U-NIl Order.
65. See, Durga P. Satapathy & Jon M. Peha, Performance of Unlicensed Devices With A
Spectrum Etiquette, PROCEEDINGS OF IEEE GLOBECOM, Vol. 1, Nov. 1997, at 414, available at
http://www.contrib.andrew.cmu.edu/usr/dsaq/globecom97.pdf.
66. See Panel Discussion of Pierre De Vries, Victor Bahl, Stuart Buck, Tim Shepard &
Michael Gallagher, Spectrum Etiquette: Two Proposals, Conference at Stanford University on
Spectrum Policy (March 2, 2003), video available at http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/
spectrum/schedule/.
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concept. The Internet functions to some extent this way, in the form of
de-facto agreements on protocols.67
E. A Short History of FCC Regulation of the Spectrum
A discussion of electromagnetic spectrum can never be fully under-
standable without a brief review of the history and logic behind the still-
operational (legacy) system. (Hazlett has advanced a masterful historical
recounting, 68 as have Benjamin et. al, 69 and Lessig. 70 ) Since the purpose
of this Article is to expand interest in the spectrum to specialists in other
fields (such as environmentalists), it will not be assumed that the reader
has knowledge of broadcasting history. The command and control phi-
losophy and the regulations' complexity will be better understood if one
comprehends the era that produced them.
1. Logic of the 1927 System
Relative to our interaction with nature, our interaction with wireless
technologies is of very recent vintage. It was not until 1897-just barely
over one century ago-that Guglielmo Marconi first transmitted a wire-
less signal,7 ' and it took another ten years (1907) for Lee de Forest to
develop a workable amplifier and oscillator for broadcast purposes. 2 A
few years later, Congress passed the 1927 Radio Act (which was done in
response to a broadcasting crisis), long before we really knew how ra-
dios worked, and long before mobile-phone technologies were even
considered viable.
The 1927 Act was subsumed into the Communications Act of 1934,
and the portions of these Acts relating to the electromagnetic spectrum
largely applied railroad regulations to communications.74 Even today,
many of the 1927 Radio Act's basic premises still govern,75 in spite of
the fact that groundbreaking progress in wireless technology has taken
67. See LESSIG, supra note 45, at 184 (noting the distinction between "dumb" and
"smart" receivers, and notes the similarities of protocol recognition in the InternetIntemet.
Just as different machines have different addresses, the Net sorts out and receives only those
packets intended for a given receiver).
68. Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, the Spec-
trum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase's "Big Joke": An Essay on
Airwave Allocation Policy, 14 HARV J.L. & TECH. 335 (2001).
69. STUART BENJAMIN, DOUGLAS LICHTMAN & HOWARD SHELANSKI, TELECOMMUNI-
CATIONS LAW AND POLICY (2001).
70. LEssIG, supra note 42, at 218-33.
71. See SUNGOOK HONG, WIRELESS: FROM MARCONI'S BLACK BOX TO THE AUDION
(2001).
72. Id.
73. Hazlett, supra note 68, at 367.
74. See Gerald Torres, Who Owns the Sky, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 515, 536 (2002).
75. HONG, supra note 71, at 18.
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place in the past 20 years. Although the mating of computer technology
to spectrum management dates back to the microprocessor's introduction
in about 1971, 76 the first (mass) commercial deployment of digital sig-
nalization (as opposed to analogue signalization) was the 1991 GSM
launch in Europe . Other digital standards were simultaneously being
developed in the United States, though the first United States commer-
cial mass deployment of a digital standard was the 1993 launch of the
Nextel Communications' network.8 Thus, since about 1991, a system
created to handle 1927 radio technology has been regulating digital radio
communications.
But long before digital technology, commentators questioned the ef-
ficacy of regulatory bodies such as the FCC. In 1959, economist R. H.
Coase was very critical of the FCC and its allocation-by-fiat methodolo-
gies,79 asking why electromagnetic spectrum should be centrally planned
when the rest of our economy was market-based. This critique has taken
several decades to emerge, but it has advanced rapidly in recent years,
particularly among economists.80
To explain the rationale behind the present (i.e. annum 1927) sys-
tem, Coase selected a quotation from Justice Frankfurter in the famous
1943 case, NBC v. United States:
76. See Intel Corporation web site, Celebrating 35 Years of Innovation, at
http://www.intel.com/labs/innovations/ (noting that the microprocessor was introduced in
1971 with the introduction of the 4004 "chip" on a computer).
77. See GSM World, History of GSM, at http://www.gsmworld.com/about/history. The
web page notes a July 1, 1991 launch date for GSM in Europe. The website also notes that
GSM uses a form of Time Division Multiple Access, or TDMA, digital processing and other
aspects of GSM.
78. See Fleet Call, Inc. Changes Name, WALL Sr. J., Mar. 24, 1993, at A5 (describing
the system launch planned for August, 1993); see also Gautam Naik & Dennis Kneale, Radio
Flier: Old Dispatch Systems Are Ticket to Riches For Former FCC Man, WALL ST. J., Aug. 31,
1994, at Al (noting Nextel's history, its acquisition of numerous dispatch licenses to convert
to digital use, and its plan for launching the U.S.'s first nationwide digital network).
79. R. H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, J.L. & EcoN. 1, 12-13
(Oct. 1959).
80. See, e.g., Comments of 37 Concerned Economists, Before the F.C.C., In the Matter
of Efficient Use of Spectrum Through Elimination of Barriers to the Development of Secon-
dary Markets, WT Docket No. 00-230 (Feb. 7, 2001), available at http://
www.aei.brookings.org/publications/related/fcc.pdf. (Accessed July 23, 2003) (enumerating
many reasons why the centralized spectrum-allocation system makes no sense). The list of
signatories: Martin Neil Baily, Jonathan Baker, Timothy Bresnahan, Ronald Coase, Peter
Cramton, Robert W. Crandall, Richard Gilbert, Shane Greenstein, Robert W. Hahn, Robert
Hall, Barry Harris, Robert Harris, Jerry A. Hausman, Thomas W. Hazlett, Andrew Joskow,
Alfred E. Kahn, Michael Katz, Robert E. Litan, Paul Milgrom, Roger G. Noll, Janusz Or-
dover, Bruce Owen, Michael Riordan, William Rogerson, Gregory Rosston, Daniel L.
Rubinfeld, David Salant, Richard L. Schmalensee, Marius Schwartz, Howard Shelanski, J.
Gregory Sidak, Pablo Spiller, David Teece, Michael Topper, Hal Varian, Leonard Waverman
and Lawrence J. White. Id. Coase's article is discussed in further detail infra Section 1I.
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The plight into which radio fell prior to 1927 was attributable to
certain basic facts about radio as a means of communication-
its facilities are limited; they are not available to all who may
wish to use them; the radio spectrum is not large enough to ac-
commodate everybody. There is a fixed natural limitation upon
the number of stations that can operate without interfering with
one another. Regulation of radio was therefore as vital to its de-
velopment as traffic control was to the development of the
automobile. In enacting the Radio Act of 1927, the first compre-
hensive scheme of control over radio communication, Congress
acted upon the knowledge that if the potentialities of radio were
not to be wasted, regulation was essential."1
Indeed, the "certain basic facts" and the "potentialities of radio"
were not truly known in 1927, when the Radio Act was passed. They
were clearly not known in 1943, when Justice Frankfurter wrote the
above passage, since this was years before the merger of Moore's Law82
and wireless.8 ' Even in 1959, at the time of Coase's article, mobile uses
were far from commercial deployment, and yet "[i]t was ... in the shad-
ows cast by a mysterious technology that our views on broadcasting
policy were formed.' 84 In 1959, too, the personal computer was still
about 20 years away from full commercialization.85 It was, therefore,
virtually inconceivable in 1943 that computer technology would be used
to create systems like agile radio, which has the ability to listen before
transmitting, to find an unused area of electromagnetic spectrum in
which to send a signal, and then to free up almost instantaneously the
frequency that it uses for use by other transmitters.
To be clear, Moore's Law and its application to wireless, the per-
sonal computer, and the development of agile radio are part of natural
progress, not new discoveries, and the Congress that passed the 1927
Radio Act didn't need to foresee the specific forms that progress would
take in order to understand what restrictions on radio broadcasting-as it
existed in 1927-were needed to prevent chaos. Still, the doubts about
the future of technology that existed in 1927 still exist today, and gov-
ernment should take responsibility for creating a flexible mechanism that
81. Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 213 (1943) (emphasis added).
82. See J. William Gurley, Digital Music: The Real Law Is Moore's Law, FORTUNE,
Oct. 2, 2000, at 268 (describing Moore's law's prediction that storage and processing capacity
will double every 18 months).
83. See Spread Betting, THE ECONOMIST, June 21, 2003, at 22-24 (discussing the
merger of computing technology, "Moore's Law," and wireless transmissions to create mas-
sive economies in spectrum usage through spread spectrum devices).
84. Coase, supra note 79, at 40.
85. See Intel Corp. web site, supra note 76.
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encourages progress. It is highly doubtful that even today we know and
fully understand Justice Frankfurter's "certain basic facts" and the "po-
tentialities of radio. 86 After all, we have been studying the environment
for decades, but we are still learning something new every day, and our
laws and policy systems are constantly evolving to accommodate scien-
tific advances. Indeed, two new technologies discussed below suggest
that the danger of broadcasting chaos (which exerted so strong an influ-
ence on the 1927 Act's form) may in the near future no longer be a
concern. The problem is, however, that two axioms have emerged with-
out a clearly identifiable regulatory system that can address them:
(a) analog transmissions will soon be dinosaurs, and (b) the "chaos" that
exists in broadcasting in 2003 is of a different nature than the chaos
which existed in 1927. In order to accommodate these axioms, a system-
atic overhaul is needed, not amendments to thousands of pages of
antiquated rules.
2. The Spectrum Giveaways
Two salient occurrences in the history of spectrum regulation are the
infamous "spectrum giveaways" that have taken place over the past 75
years. The first giveaway occurred during the pre-auction licensing pe-
riod spanning 1927 to 1992, when the government granted free exclusive
licenses for use of parts of the electromagnetic spectrum87 (with the FCC
usually holding hearings to determine who should receive a license
based on its interpretation of the "public interest").88 During this time,
licenses were granted to major broadcasters like NBC and CBS, 9 but the
hearing process proved long and difficult and many doubted its imparti-
ality. In response, the FCC started holding a lottery, beginning in 1982,
for awarding frequencies to private parties,90 reasoning that (a) lotteries
are impartial (assuming winners are randomly selected), (b) they are
86. See generally The Race to Computerise Biology, THE ECONOMIST TECH. Q., Dec.
14, 2002, at 16 (discussing the emergence of "bioinformatics" and the technological wonders
that come with it-suggesting that it is several generations away-but that it could be a quan-
tum leap in progress); see also Computing's New Lodestone, THE ECONOMIsr, Mar. 18, 2000,
at 81 (describing mergers of electromagnetics and microprocessor technology in future appli-
cations).
87. Initially, the Federal Radio Commission managed spectrum, and its activities were
subsumed and replaced in 1934 with the creation of the Federal Communications Commis-
sion. See BENJAMIN ET AL., supra note 69, at 31.
88. Some early hearings were little more than presentations by someone hoping to build
a broadcasting facility. See id. at 82-84.
89. NBC made its first network broadcast in 1926. The Broadcast Archive Website, at
http://oldradio.com/archives/prog/nbc.htm. CBS made its first broadcast in 1927. Id. at
http://oldradio.com/archives/prog/cbs.htm.
90. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(i)(1) (2000) (authorizing a "system of random selection"-a
lottery-in cases where more than one qualified applicant requests a license).
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more efficient and easier to administer than hearings, and (c) they allow
new technologies to enter the market quickly.' The lottery method ended
in disaster, however, because companies hired lawyers en masse to pro-
duce thousands of applications to increase their chances of winning. So
many applications were filed one year, for example, that the government
had to engage a structural engineer to make sure that a building's floor
would not collapse under the applications' weight.92 In 1992, after much
frustration, the FCC started moving towards an auction system with the
Personal Communications Services ("PCS") auctions. 9 In light of the
fact that it was only when the auctions commenced that the federal gov-
ernment began receiving money for use of the spectrum, the period from
1927 through 1992 is referred to here as the "first giveaway."
The "second giveaway," unlike the first, is marked more by a single
event. By the mid 1990s the television band consisted of 67 channels,94
and the second giveaway refers to the granting in 1997 of an additional
channel to each of the 1,472 licensed broadcasting stations in the United
States.9 Notwithstanding the fact that so many free channels were ob-
tained, at present broadcasters either under-use these channels or leave
them completely idle, and experts estimate that only 11 percent of the
electromagnetic spectrum that is allocated to television broadcasting is
used at any given time.96 This statistic should not be confused: it does not
show that there is a lack of demand for the range of the electromagnetic
spectrum allotted to television; it shows that there is a lack of demand
for broadcast TV, and only broadcast TV. Since the part of the spectrum
allocated to TV can only be used for TV because of command and con-
trol, the market is unable to use the spectrum for other purposes or test
demand for other uses (such as wireless communications, Internet, etc).
97
91. See Andrea M. Settanni, Competitive Bidding for the Airwaves: Meeting the Budget
and Maintaining Policy Goals in a Wireless World, 2 CoMMLAw CONSPECTUS 117 (1994).
92. Nicholas W. Allard, The New Spectrum Auction Law, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 13,
26(1993).
93. In the Matter of Redevelopment of Spectrum to Encourage Innovation in the Use of
New Telecommunications Technologies, 7 F.C.C. Rcd. 1542 (1992) (setting aside spectrum to
be auctioned to provide PCS services); see also BENJAMIN ET. AL., supra note 69, at 64-70.
94. A "channel" constitutes 6 MHz of electromagnetic spectrum.
95. See THOMAS W. HAZLETT, THE U.S. DIGITAL TV TRANSITION: TIME TO Toss THE
NEGROPONTE SWITCH 3 (AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper
01-15, 2001).
96. Id. at 3-5.
97. For a very simple example, the reader is asked to consider her own use of televi-
sion. In the most likely scenario, the reader uses cable or satellite to receiver her signal, which
is an example that broadcast television frequencies are completely useless to her. In the
unlikely event that the reader is one of the minority of television viewers that uses an antenna,
scrolling through the "VHF' channels and then through the "UHF' channels, the reader will
instantly see that only a small fraction are used, the rest is static.
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The FCC justified granting an extra channel to so many broadcasting
companies by saying that it helped provide a transition from analog to
digital technology, reasoning that a period would be required when both
analog and digital signals were transmitted.8 And so after some debate
and much political maneuvering," the FCC ultimately gave the channels
to the broadcasters in 1997 free of charge,' °° under the assumption that
the extra channels would be returned when 85 percent of the analog
broadcasts had been replaced by the digital standard.' °' According to the
FCC's decision,' 2 the digital switchover is supposed to take place by
2006; however, most authorities on the subject believe that the 2006 date
will not happen, and that the switchover could be delayed for at least
another decade beyond that. '03 Moreover, commentators have convinc-
ingly argued that in the near future, no electromagnetic spectrum should
be allocated to broadcasters, since most consumers receive their signals
via cable or satellite.'
Governmental giveaways on a massive scale are not unusual in
American history. In 1862, the government passed the Homestead Act' 5
and gave away thousands of acres to citizens, who would acquire prop-
erty rights by living on, using, and improving the land for a certain
amount of time. As author Thomas Donaldson noted in 1880:
[W]ithin the circle of a hundred years since the United States
acquired the first of her public lands, the homestead act stands as
98. See In the Matter of Advanced Television Sys. and Their Impact Upon the Existing
Television Broad. Service, Fourth Report and Order, 10 F.C.C. Rcd. 10541 (1995).
99. See Arthur E. Rowse, A Lobby the Media Won't Touch: How the Media Lobby
Wields Its Power in Washington-and How It Gets Away With It, WASH. MONTHLY, May 1,
1998, at 8 (discussing the impact of Dole's stepping down to run for president. Dole had pre-
viously insisted that the broadcasters pay for additional channels, but when he ran for
president Newt Gingrich and Trent Lott sent a letter to the FCC directing them to give the
channels to the broadcasters at no cost); see also Paul Taylor, Superhighway Robbery, NEW
REPUBLIC, May 5, 1997, at 20 (quoting Bob Dole as calling the second giveaway a "giant
corporate welfare program," and William Safire's labeling the giveaway a "rip-off on a scale
vaster than dreamed of by yesteryear's robber barons").
100. See In the Matter of Advanced Television Sys. and Their Impact Upon the Existing
Television Broad. Service, Fifth Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 12809 (1997).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. George Leopold, U.S. May Press for Spectrum Revenues as DTV Deadline Fades,
EE TIMES, Mar. 1, 2001 (noting that little has happened since the granting of the additional
channels and suggesting 2015 as a more realistic date).
104. HAZLETT, supra note 95. Hazlett's basic premise is that the target penetration level
for the switch over from analog to digital-85%-has already been met or exceeded by cable,
and satellite uses higher bands and is much more efficient. Hazlett suggests the possibility of
subsidizing some rural areas to assure universal service objectives.
105. See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, LAW IN AMERICA 41-43 (2002) (describ-
ing the Homestead Act and the granting of property to railroads as a mechanism to promote
growth).
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the concentrated wisdom of legislation for settlement of the pub-
lic lands. It protects the Government, it fills the States with
homes, it builds up communities, and lessens the chances of so-
cial and civil disorder by giving ownership of the soil, in small
tracts, to the occupants thereof. It was copied from no other na-
tion's system. It was originally and distinctively American, and
remains a monument to its originators.1°6
Based on a similar theory, to promote progress the government gave
at no cost approximately 130 million acres of land away to private rail-
road companies.'0 7 The ostensible purpose was to promote growth and
expansion of our young economy, and the prevailing view was that the
railroads would not do this alone.' 8 This giveaway made sense for a
time, but it had its limits. This limit was reached in 1869, when things
got a bit out of control and the Illinois legislature conveyed the entire
Chicago waterfront to the railroad.'O Happily, the courts stepped in to
correct this mistake in the landmark public-trust decision Illinois Cen-
tral."0 Elsewhere in the United States, railroad giveaways created public-
private land and access clashes which are still in place today."' The give-
aways that have taken place in the broadcast spectrum over the past 75
years have reached their limits, and action must be taken to reverse them.
It is unlikely that government will do it itself, so citizens must find a way
to do it themselves, and the public-trust doctrine may be a mechanism
for this change.
3. The Mistaken Focus on Lost Revenue from Giveaways:
Instead Focus Should Be on Lost Access
The giveaways were unfortunate, although the amount of revenue
that the government "lost" in giving away its licenses has recently over-
shadowed discussions of the core problem: access. Is it important to
review how much broadcasters paid or did not pay for an exclusive
broadcasting? Probably not, but many commentators seem to think so,
106. THOMAS DONALDSON, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ITS HISTORY WITH STATISTICS 350
(1884).
107. See Merry J. Chavez, Public Access to Landlocked Public Lands, 39 STAN. L. REV.
1373, 1376 (1987).
108. Id.
109. See discussion infra Parts I.E.3, IV.A. 1.
110. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
111. Chavez, supra note 107, at 1380-81. The Bureau of Land Management has inher-
ited the management of about 200 million acres of land in the U.S., and that access over
private lands to federal lands is a major problem. Private owners who benefited from free land
during the homestead years can and do charge access fees for people to cross their property in
order to access public lands.
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and since so much energy has been devoted to this topic it will be briefly
addressed here.
None of the giveaways granted property interests in the spectrum, '
but there is a presumption that the licenses will be renewed because that
is what has almost always been done in the past. '1 3 And in fact, only a
handful of licenses have ever been revoked in the past seven decades.'"
4
The frustration with the first series of "giveaways" stems from the belief
that the government should have auctioned licenses from the 1920s to
the 1990s instead of granting them at no cost, and the first giveaway has
been characterized as "the biggest handout of public assets since the land
grants to the railroads.""' 5 This analogy is perhaps a good one, for the
FCC has given away about 98 percent of the spectrum that it has as-
signed, and has only auctioned about 2 percent." 6 Although no prices
were put on the spectrum's value during the first giveaway, economists
have described this period as a time when "[t]axpayers literally squan-
dered billions of dollars.""7 This statement, although possibly true, is
based largely on extrapolations of value based on PCS auctions, and
since this form of mobile technology did not exist prior to the 1990s,
there really is no way to accurately value the spectrum during the first
giveaway. Therefore, the statement probably holds much more political
value than economic truth.
Because of the perception of revenue loss (now that auctioning had
become a norm), the second giveaway incited much more fury than the
first among citizens and policy makers, since it took place in the midst of
the PCS auctions. The most common price attached to the second give-
away is $70 billion, which has been calculated by applying the C-block 8
112. See 47 U.S.C. § 301 (2000).
It is the purpose of this chapter, among other things, to maintain the control of the
United States over all the channels of radio transmission; and to provide for the use
of such channels, but not the ownership thereof, by persons for limited periods of
time, under licenses granted by Federal authority, and no such license shall be con-
strued to create any right, beyond the terms, conditions, and periods of the license.
Id.
113. See BENJAMIN ET.AL, supra note 69, at 112 (suggesting that the expectation of
renewal is a product of large broadcasters' political clout).
114. BOLLIER, supra note 13, at 150 (stating that only half a dozen licenses have been
revoked in the past 68 years).
115. Scott Woolley, Dead Air, FORBES, November 25, 2002, at 138.
116. See J.H. SNIDER, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION, THE CITIZEN'S GUIDE To THE AIR-
WAVES 28 (2003), available at http://ilyagram.org/archives/airwaves.pdf.
117. See Hazlett, supra note 68, at 400.
118. During the Personal Communications Services (PCS) auctions, the FCC auctioned
off licenses in separate blocks. Frequency blocks C and F were designated as "entrepreneur's
blocks," and participation in these auctions required that the companies be entrepreneurs
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PCS auction prices to the television grant." 9 Former FCC Chairman
Reed Hundt has used another railroad analogy, declaring the second
spectrum giveaway to have been "the largest grant of public property to
an industry since the federal government gave about 10 percent of the
public domain to three dozen railroad companies in the late nineteenth
century."' 2 There have also been numerous political statements decrying
the second giveaway; John McCain, for example, has made it a central
platform for years, and has called it "one of the great rip-offs in Ameri-
can history."'2 ' McCain's political position as Senator and former
Presidential candidate has made his "great rip-off' statement one of the
most-repeated quotations in recent journalistic history on the topic.
However, as stated, commentators cannot seem to get away from the
lost revenue topic,122 and the problem with assessing a specific dollar
figure is that the costs from which it was extrapolated were based on the
first series of spectrum auctions in American history. It is therefore
difficult, if not impossible, to tell what the spectrum auctions would have
brought. The $70 billion of "lost revenue" from the second giveaway
assumes not only that the entrants would have paid $70 billion, but also
that they could have afforded another several billion for network capital
expenditures to build it.12 Not only is it a complete unknown what the
market entrants would have paid had the frequencies been auctioned, as
seen through experience with NextWave, GWI, and the European 3G
auctions (discussed below),' 24 there is some doubt that the spectrum
would have been used, even if it had been auctioned, for reasons other
than lack of demand. The massive additional deployment costs involved
in building a nationwide network designed to operate over an
without existing telephony operations. See Patrick S. Ryan, The Courts as Spectrum Regula-
tor, 4 GERMAN L.J. 2, 156 (2003).
119. See Romesh Ratnesar, A Bandwidth Bonanza: How the Networks Plan to Make
Even More From A $70 Billion Handout, TIME, Sept. 1, 1997, at 60; Deroy Murdock, Sell the
TV Spectrum, THE WASH. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1997, at A17; Norman Ornstein & Michael
Calabrese, Hey, Give Back Those Airwaves, or Pay Up, THE WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 2001, at
B1.
120. Reed Hundt, The Future of The Net-Comments on Lawrence Lessig's Code and
Other Laws of Cyberspace and The Future of Ideas, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 289, 306 (2002) (ex-
pressing the views of an author who was FCC Chairman from 1993-1997).
121. Christopher Stem, Mixed Signals: Broadcasters' Promise of a Digital TV Age Has
Not Been Met, and Now Congress Is Having Second Thoughts About Its Role, THE WASH.
POST, Dec. 17, 2000, at HI (quoting McCain as having added: "They used to rob trains in the
Old West, now we rob spectrum").
122. See BOLLIER, supra note 13, at 151. (discussing again the $70 billion figure, as well
as McCain's "rip-off' quotation, and criticizing the FCC for the move).
123. Deborah Orr, Get 'em While They're Cold, FORBES, Nov. 13, 2000, at 356 (estimat-
ing the cost of building Europe's 3G wireless networks at $175 billion).
124. See Ryan, supra note 118 (discussing the NextWave and GWI cases and the long
time that the frequencies went unused because of financial and legal problems).
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exclusively-licensed frequency range are in the range of multiple billions
of dollars.'25
As will be shown below in Section IV, the public-trust doctrine can
help reverse governmental conveyances to private entities if they meet
certain criteria. It is not unrealistic to suggest that the spectrum give-
aways have reached proportions that merit reversal by the public-trust
doctrine. If the statistic that only 11 percent of the broadcast spectrum is
in fact (on average) used for broadcasting ' is at all accurate, then the
governmental giveaway clearly is a serious misallocation problem. As
will be seen later, one of the reasons that the Supreme Court reversed
giveaways in other areas (such as when Illinois conveyed the entire Chi-
cago waterfront to a private entity) was a heavy reliance on the notion
that the private party would never make full and best use of the mass of
property that it was allocated. Therefore, it makes sense for the discus-
sion on the giveaway to include access and use, more than just focusing
on the lost revenue. Rents paid by holders of spectrum do not offset the
public's losses in the access and use of spectrum. By analogy, if the
Grand Canyon were privately owned and closed off to everyone, a one-
time fee from a private owner could never compensate the public for its
loss of access, regardless of the price paid.
4. Auctions Are Not a Panacea: Money Exchanges
Hands while Spectrum Remains Idle
The years 1996 to 2000 saw a worldwide race to auctions, and it is
in the wake of this craze that governments both in the United States and
in Europe lost their grip on their fiduciary responsibility to the natural
resources that they were entrusted to manage. Auctions were seen as a
panacea. For example, in Germany, former Finanzminister Hans Eichel
raved about the "unexpected revenues for the repayment of [national]
debt." 27 Everyone focused on the money and lost sight of the public:
even though the revenue received was ostensibly intended to benefit the
public, the public's access to the natural resource has so far been ad-
vanced little by the auctions. Both sides of the Atlantic walked in lock
step: just as the Europeans were amazed at the American success at the
PCS auctions, the Americans were equally amazed at the values attained
at the European 3G auctions.12 Those auctions were the next generation
125. See Orr, supra note 123.
126. See HAZLETT, supra note 95, at 3-5.
127. See Eichel: So viel Geld nicht erwartet, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG,
Aug. 18, 2000, Vol. 191, at 15.
128. See D. Daniel Sokol, The European Mobile 3G UMTS Process: Lessons from the
Spectrum Auctions and Beauty Contests, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 17 (2001) (discussing the auction
process for 3G and UMTS licenses in various European countries).
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of the US PCS auctions, and at them much more spectrum was sold for
many consumer uses (notably Internet)," 9 and for gold-rush valuations.
Former FCC Chairman William Kennard enthusiastically stated that
Europe has "unleashed the economic potential of 3G and the wireless
web, we in America will have to move quickly to stay ahead in the New
Economy."'"3 Kennard's "economic potential" comment must, then, be
based not on the "potential" that the wireless networks add to productiv-
ity-since the networks were all theoretical and not yet constructed-but
instead on the "potential" of extracting money for exclusive rights to
spectrum.
The European 3G auctions raised nearly $90 billion dollars in Ger-
many and England alone,13' but they have left a wake almost equally aslarge in " " " 132• 3
large in liquidations, possible bankruptcies,' and financial turmoil
among the many smaller companies;3 4 indeed, even very shortly after the
auctions it became clear that the debt taken on by the auction winners
was too much for them to bear.'35 The turmoil is not over, particularly for
non-diversified companies, and some commentators have predicted nu-
merous additional European bankruptcies or liquidations. For example,
in the case of German operator MobilCom, all deployment has been fro-
zen and most 3G assets sold,' while other companies, such as Sonera
and Quam, have been liquidated and have in some cases returned their
129. See Alan Zeichick, 3G Wireless Explained, RED HERRING, Oct. 2001, available at
http://www.redherring.com/mag/issue83/mag-3g-83.html (describing the differences in the
various wireless "generations"-e.g., 2G and 3G-and noting the services that 3G is expected to
offer, emphasizing data).
130. William E. Kennard, Remarks at the Museum of Television and Radio (Oct. 10,
2000), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Kennard/2000/spwek023.html.
131. See William Boston, Wireless Windfall Ignites Debate in Germany: License Auction
May Raise More Than $50 Billion; How to Spend the Money?, WALL ST. J., May 3, 2000, at
A18 (noting that licenses raised $50 billion in Germany and $40 billion in England, greatly
exceeding expectations).
132. Almar Latour, "Dunno Group" Does Know a Thing About Phones, WALL ST. J.
EUR., Nov. 22, 2002 at R 1 (discussing problems with 3G and stating that Quam, a joint ven-
ture between Telefonica and Sonera in Germany liquidated after investing $9 billion into their
venture).
133. See Almar Latour et al., Wireless Concerns in Europe Suspend '3G'Investments,
WALL ST. J., July 26, 2002 at A2 (discussing Telefonica and Sonera suspended joint ventures
in Germany, Italy, Austria in Switzerland. The article suggests that there would "likely be a
series of capitulations by the European mobile-phone operators").
134. Id.
135. See Axel Schnorbus, Das Schicksal der Mobilcom ist wieder ungewiss,
FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Jan. 1, 2003, Volume 8, at 22 (discussing the very
uncertain future of the UMTS branch of Mobilcom, one of the German 3G winners).
136. Almar Latour & Kevin J. Delaney, Companies: MobilCom May Fail in Germany,
WALL ST. J. EUR., Sept. 16, 2002, atA9.
137. Rhine or Shine, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 7, 2002, at 64.
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licenses to the government. 38 The European Commission's watchdog for
subsidies has already launched investigations into illegal state-aid that
may be keeping certain companies afloat,'39 and in fact Germany itself is
under investigation by the European Commission for preferences to its
own broadcast lobbies in violation of European law.'40 As it turns out, in
Europe only corporate giants who are able to write-off the billions that
they paid for the 3G licenses to zero and consider their payments total
losses are likely to survive.
4
1
Auctions are an alternative to hearings, "beauty contests," and lotter-
ies, but whether or not they are better-particularly in the case of the
European auctions-is untested. Even if auctions are proven to be a suc-
cessful market mechanism in general terms, 42 it does not necessarily
follow that they are the best method for enabling access to a natural re-
source whose optimum use and enjoyment depend on advances and
changes in technology. European governments, entrusted with manage-
ment of the electromagnetic-spectrum resource, have so far failed to
increase public access to it.'43
5. NextWave: Evaluating the Public Purpose of Auctions
As will be seen in Section IV, the public-trust doctrine can reverse
certain conveyances if the government grants too much property with too
little public purpose to private entities. In parallel, it is also possible for
138. Almar Latour & Buster Kantrow, Sonera Pushes Back 3G Launch Until the First
Quarter of 2003, WALL ST. J. EUR., Sept. 2, 2002, at A7.
139. See EC Press Release DN IP/03/92, EUR 50 million rescue aid for MobilCom
cleared in-depth probe into additional aid of EUR 112 million, Jan. 21, 2003, available at
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p-action.gettxt=gt&doc=IP/03/92101RAPID
&lg=EN&display= (discussing a European probe into German state-aid for troubled
Mobilcom).
140. See European Commission Press Release DN: IP/03/1103, Broadcasting services:
Commission refers Germany to Court over allocation of radio spectrum, July 24, 2003,
available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p-action.gettxt=gt&doc=IP/03/
1103OIRAPID&lg=EN&display.
141. Almar Latour et al., Wireless Firm's Troubles Jolt Europe's Telecom Industry,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 2002, at A14 (discussing the massive financial troubles of the companies
that bid for 3G licenses in Europe and predicting numerous bankruptcies).
142. See The Heyday of the Auction, THE ECONOMIST, July 24, 1999 at 67 (discussing
the advances of auctions in recent years).
143. See Vivendi Universal vende por un euro simb6lico su participacirn en Xfera al
resto de accionistas, EL MUNDo, Aug. 2, 2003, available at http://www.elmundo.es/
elmundo/2003/08/01/economia/1059762950.html (Vivendi once paid approximately $800
billion to own 25% of XFERA, a Spanish 3G operator which has frozen deployment because
of financial difficulties. Vivendi recently sold its participation for a symbolic price of one
euro); see also Xfera rompe el acuerdo con Vodafone, EL MUNDO, Jan. 9, 2003, available at
http://elmundodinero.elmundo.es/mundodinero/2003/01/151Noti20030l15134626.html (not-
ing that XYFERA, the fourth license winner in Spain, has completely frozen deployment and is
negotiating with the government and other investors regarding the license commitments).
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government to auction property and then, in case of sellers' remorse, at-
tempt to repossess it and resell it to entities willing to pay higher prices.
This is what happened with NextWave. The NextWave story shows that
auctions can cause inefficient allocation of the spectrum. Here, a com-
pany bid too much for the exclusive right to part of the spectrum just
before a market dip. When the government tried to repossess the license,
the market turned around. Hung up on construing a statute, due partially
to a basic struggle between strict interpretation, teleological interpreta-
tion, and liberal interpretation, the federal courts split on the how to
construe the words "debt" and "creditor."'" NextWave ultimately suc-
ceeded in retaining its licenses while going through bankruptcy, though
the electromagnetic spectrum that it had an exclusive right to use was not
deployed for over seven years, and the public was harmed because it was
prevented from gaining any access to a valuable national resource that
was tied up in a bankruptcy battle.
NextWave fought tenaciously to retain its licenses through bank-
ruptcy proceedings, but in the interim the FCC repossessed the
NextWave licenses and re-auctioned them. Through the re-auctioning, it
raised $16 billion in commitments from the auction winners, 145 over three
times the amount that NextWave had originally bid. Verizon Wireless,
for example, bid over $8 billion for its share of the re-auctioned li-
censes.146 The auction rules required that the winning bidders pay
deposits for their licenses, and the re-auction deposits amounted to
nearly $3 billion, which the FCC retained even after the NextWave case
was overturned by the Court of Appeals. 147 In March 2002 the FCC
agreed to return 85% of the money,148 but it held on to the rest until late
2002. 149 So billions of dollars changed hands, but the spectrum's use
went nowhere.
Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court decided in favor of
NextWave.5 The question that the Supreme Court reviewed was limited
to whether § 525 of the Bankruptcy Code "prohibits the FCC from re-
voking licenses held by a debtor in bankruptcy upon the debtor's failure
144. See Nicholas J. Patterson, The Nature and Scope of the FCC's Regulatory Power in
the Wake of the NextWave and GWI PCS Cases, 69 U. CI. L. REv. 1373 (Summer 2002)
(describing the split between the Second and Fifth Circuits).
145. Yochai J. Dreazen, FCC Ends Obligations from NextWave Auction, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 15, 2002, at B2.
146. Yochai J. Dreazen & Jesse Drucker, FCC to Ease Spectrum-Auction Snarl, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 12, 2003, atA3.
147. Nextwave Pers. Communications, Inc. v. FC.C., 254 F.3d. 130 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
148. Kathy Chen, FCC to Return 85% of Deposits in Wireless Sale, WALL ST. J., Mar.
28, 2002, at A3.
149. Dreazen, supra note 145, at B2.
150. NextWave v. FC.C., 123 S.Ct. 832, 836 (2003).
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to make timely payments owed to the Commission for purchase of the
licenses."'"' In a relatively concise opinion, Justice Scalia analyzed vari-
ous statutes, applying strict construction at several points and ultimately
concluding that "debt" expressly means "liability on a claim."'52 Scalia
then cited several cases supporting "plain meaning" interpretation and
ruled that "a debt is a debt, even when the obligation to pay is also a
regulatory condition."'53 Scalia's strict construction of the Bankruptcy
Code led to victory for NextWave, since their contention was that the
obligation to pay the government for their licenses-which was made as
an agreement to be paid in installments-should be tolled and treated
just like any other payment obligation in bankruptcy court.
In NextWave, the course that the FCC followed was probably based
on economic considerations rather than on legal interpretations, '4 and
while trying to keep billions of dollars, its actions kept a large amount of
electromagnetic spectrum unavailable to the public for years. Unfortu-
nately, there is not yet an alternative mechanism available to the public
to let it use the spectrum in situations like this. If, however, the public-
trust doctrine had been made available, the public could have theoreti-
cally used and enjoyed the valuable natural resource that was tied up in a
legal battle, with no harm to anyone.
II. THE RELATIONSHIP OF OTHER ASPECTS OF NATURAL RESOURCES
LAW TO ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM
As stated at the outset, a sub-theme of this Article deals with the re-
lationship of other topics of natural-resources law in connection with
electromagnetic spectrum in hopes of attracting the wisdom of others
who have helped initiate widespread change in regulation over the past
few decades. One of the hot topics today is that of "sustainable con-
sumption," which is a corollary to the established natural-resources
principle of "sustainable development."'' 55 Another area to be analyzed is
that of pollution, which was central to Coase's 1960 article where he
151. Id.
152. Id. at 834.
153. Id. 839.
154. This was the insinuation at oral argument of the case before the Supreme Court,
where Justice David Souter told lawyers representing the FCC that: "The FCC made an eco-
nomic decision, not a regulatory decision." See Tom Mauro, Supreme Court Appears
Receptive to NextWave's License Claim, AMERICAN LAWYER MEDIA (Oct. 9, 2002), available
at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1032128704447. Souter continued, "[w]hen the
value [of the licenses] went up, the FCC wanted to reauction them." Id.
155. See United Nations Website, Division for Sustainable Development, at http://
www.un.org/esa/sustdev/.
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used the example of factory smoke and the harmful effects that it has on
neighbors.156
A. Coase and Hardin: A Common Point of Departure for
Environmentalists and Spectrum Advocates Alike
Environmental law has passed over the electromagnetic spectrum,'
57
and that is somewhat unfortunate; there are in fact several common core
principles that form the point of departure for environmentalists, natural-
resource specialists, and spectrum advocates alike. As has been previ-
ously mentioned, one of the most famous of these principles is found in
the work of economist R.H. Coase. His 1959 article, The Federal Com-
munications Commission,' argued that the government's policy of
giving spectrum away for free could instead be replaced by auctions, and
expanding on this study, Coase's 1960 article, The Problem of Social
Cost,"9 argued that economists should consider transaction costs in their
theoretical modeling of pricing. Coase has told us repeatedly that both
articles are based on the same study on broadcasting, even though the
1960 article does not discuss broadcasting directly.6" Economist George
Stigler later labeled Coase's conclusions the "Coase Theorem" (Coase
did not initially call it that himself), 6' which was perhaps best summa-
rized by Coase in the 1991 lecture that he gave in Stockholm when he
received the Nobel Prize for it:
[t]he Coase Theorem demonstrates ... that government actions
(such as government operation, regulation or taxation, including
subsidies) could not produce a better result than relying on
156. Coase, supra note 14, at 1.
157. An important exception to this is standard setting in regard to EMF guidelines,
which is discussed separately in supra Section II.E.
158. Coase, supra note 79.
159. Coase, supra note 14.
160. The first footnote in The Problem of Social Cost states that "out of the study of...
[b]roadcasting which I am now conducting. The argument of the present article was implicit in
a previous article dealing with the problem of allocating radio and television frequencies ...."
Coase, supra note 14, at 1 n.1. Coase again reiterated this point in his short autobiography
which appears on the Nobel Prize Website: "The main points [of the Coase Theorem] were
already to be found in The Federal Communications Commission," and further explains that
"[h]ad it not been for the fact that... economists at the University of Chicago thought that I
had made an error in my article on The Federal Communications Commission, it is probably
that The Problem of Social Cost would never have been written." At http://
www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1991/coase-autobio.html.
161. Ronald H. Coase, 1991 Alfred Nobel Prize Lecture in Economic Sciences, The
Institutional Structure of Production, delivered 9 Dec. 1991, in R.H. COASE, ESSAYS ON Eco-
NOMICS AND ECONOMISTS 10 (1994) (discussing his article The Problem of Social Cost, supra
note 14, Coase says that the "Coase Theorem [was] named and formulated by George Stigler,
although it is based on work of mine... I do not disagree with Stigler").
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negotiations between individuals in the market. Whether this
would be so could be discovered not by studying imaginary
governments but what real governments actually do. My
conclusion: Let us study the world of positive transaction
costs.1
62
Coase's suggestion to study "what real governments actually do"
and to include positive transaction costs is a simple but profoundly use-
ful proposition. Spectrum advocates regularly cite Coase's studies as
central building blocks for their work, even if today they disagree with
certain aspects of it.' Likewise, environmentalists have analyzed
Coase's views from virtually every angle in application to natural re-
sources.' 6' There are frighteningly few safety valves available to citizens
to keep government action in check, and the government's actions favor
lobbies and antiquated systems.
In addition to Coase, another theoretical basis that is equally as im-
portant to environmentalists and natural-resource specialists is the
concept of the "commons," and the question of how government should
treat the commons. A commons is a resource open to all: the example
that Garrett Hardin gives in his famous essay, The Tragedy of the Com-
mons, is that of a pasture open to herdsmen. 165 The "tragedy" develops
when each herdsman, acting out of individual interest, continues to send
cattle to graze on the pasture and too many cattle graze, thereby ruining
the pasture for all. Environmentalists have called Hardin's essay
162. Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
163. See Yochai Benkler, Some Economics of Wireless Communications, 16 HARVARD
J.L. & TECH. 1, 48-49 (2002) (reviewing Coase's 1959 propertization proposition and then
suggesting that the 1960 article itself disproves it because of the high transaction costs that
would be involved in a propertization model); Hazlett, supra note 68, at 338 (citing both of
Coase's articles and discussing their importance as a starting point for allocation theory);
Thomas W. Hazlett, Assigning Property Rights to Radio Spectrum Users: Why Did FCC Li-
cense Auctions Take 67 Years?, 41 J.L. & ECON. 529 (1998) (discussing the history of
spectrum pricing focusing on the important historical contributions of Ronald Coase and Leo
Herzel. The article was written for a symposium which, in part, was a tribute to Ronald
Coase's important contributions to wireless spectrum management).
164. See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1244 (4th ed. 1994) (stating
that "all of the teaching materials on environmental law pay homage to the famous article by
Ronald Coase"); Daniel S. Levy & David Friedman, The Revenge of the Redwoods? Recon-
sidering Property Rights and the Economic Allocation of Natural Resources, 61 U. CHI. L.
REV. 493 (1994) (labeling the Coase Theorem as "one of the most influential" theories in law
and economics, and analyzing its application to natural resources).
165. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968); see also
Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Unmanaged Commons: Population and the Disguises of
Providence, in COMMONS WITHOUT TRAGEDY: PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT FROM OVER-
POPULATION-A NEW APPROACH 162, 168 (Robert V. Andelson ed., 1991) (saying, after years
of his article's having received scholarly attention and critiques, that "[t]he title of [the] 1968
paper should have been 'the Tragedy of the Unmanaged Commons' ").
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"[p]erhaps the most influential article ever written in the environmental
field,"'66 and likewise, nearly every spectrum advocate has discussed
Hardin's thesis at one point or another.6 6 For spectrum advocates, the
fear of a similar grazing tragedy develops if too many broadcasters are
allowed unbridled access to the same electromagnetic "pasture."
Although this Article will not focus extensively on Coase's alloca-
tion theories nor on Hardin's tragedy of the commons (many others have
done that with great success),'" acknowledging the importance of their
articles 69 to both environmentalists and spectrum advocates helps set the
stage for applying the public-trust doctrine to the environment (where
the doctrine has already been applied) and to the spectrum.
B. Sustainable Consumption
In a strict sense, a non-depletable resource like the electromagnetic
spectrum should not be consumed, but because of legacy technologies,
large parts of it are in fact "consumed" in the sense of being made un-
available to users.'70 Utilization of electromagnetic spectrum takes place
in seconds or nanoseconds (and that will be all the more true in a future
all-digital world), and a given frequency is only occupied for the precise
period that it is used to transmit or receive a signal. Electromagnetic
spectrum is finite in scope ' and limited by geographic range (a signal
can only transmit so far), 72 yet when a particular frequency is not used, it
remains in its natural state in exactly the same condition that it was be-
fore and after it was used. In this sense, unlike other natural resources,
166. RODGERS, supra note 164, at 39; see also Carol Rose, Scientific Innovation and
Environmental Protection: Some Ethical Considerations, 32 ENVTL. L. 755, 759 (2002) (stat-
ing that nearly all environmental-law textbooks include a selection from Hardin's article in the
introduction).
167. See LESSIG, supra note 42, at 229 (citing an excerpt from spectrum-propertization
advocate Thomas Hazlett's writings discussion of the "commons" problem and stressing that
Hazlett believes that there is a tragedy while Lessig does not).
168. See Stuart Buck, Replacing Spectrum Auctions with a Spectrum Commons, 2002
STAN. TECH. L. REv. 2 (presenting a recent and well-researched analysis of commons theory
as it applies to wireless-spectrum allocation).
169. But see LESSIG, supra note 42, at 22-23 (challenging Hardin's proposal and distin-
guishing "nonrivalrous goods," which are not subject to "tragedy" at all, and noting that there
is by no means a consensus that there is a "tragedy" even for all rivalrous goods).
170. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 312 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "consumption" as the
use of a thing in a way that exhausts it).
171. See NTIA U.S. Spectrum Allocation Chart, available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/
osmhome/allochrt.html (noting that the radio spectrum covers 3 KHz to 300 GHz).
172. Kevin Maney, 'Megahertz' Remains a Mega-Mystery to Most, USA TODAY, Feb. 13,
1997, at 4B. The article describes how airwaves are measured and the different properties that
they possess. Low frequency waves can travel far and curve with the Earth but can't carry
much information. High frequency waves can travel only a short distance before breaking up
and won't curve over the horizon, but they can carry much more information.
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electromagnetic spectrum cannot be depleted: its roots do not disappear
like a forest when it is cleared, nor can its value be exhausted like a coal
mine when it is emptied. Further, its exploitation does not have negative
externalities on other parts of the ecology, as clear-cutting a forest,
7
1
strip mining,1' and blast fishing near a coral reef do.'"
Nevertheless, even with these new technologies there is perhaps a
theoretical level at which spectrum's use can reach an equilibrium of
"sustainable consumption."'76 A full discussion of where this equilibrium
lies is better saved for electrical engineers, economists, and futurists,
although to the extent that regulations continue to allow legacy analog
technologies to operate, while simultaneously preventing the public from
using large swaths of frequencies (such as the unused broadcasting
channels), the public may never know what the electromagnetic
equivalent of sustainable consumption is. The public, which could
otherwise use all of the spectrum, is still relegated to limited areas of it
based on regulatory restrictions, which means that the frequencies not
being used by the public are de-facto "consumed" as much as a mine
that is emptied of its precious metal, or a tree that has been picked of its
fruitln a given frequency range, if a "dumb" analog device and a "smart"
device are operating simultaneously, it is the inefficient "dumb" one that
will be the de-facto occupier of that part of the spectrum. 77 Put another
way, analog transmissions are a form of consumption, and while this
consumption may be sustainable for a time, as more and more digital
devices enter the market there will be a point in the future when their
consumption of electromagnetic spectrum will become unsustainable. 7
This is because thousands of new wireless devices and uses will require
much more efficient use of the spectrum, and the present 4nalog monop-
173. See Federico Cheever, Four Failed Standards: What We Can Learn from the History
of the National Forest Management Act's Substantive imber Management Provisions, 77 OR.
L. REV. 601, 615-17 (1998) (defining "clearcutting," giving its historical interpretation, and
describing its application in the U.S. and the damage that it causes to the environment).
174. See Wendy B. Davis, Out of the Black Hole: Reclaiming the Crown of King Coal,
51 Am. U. L. REV. 905, 928 (2002) (detailing the long-term side effects of strip mining, par-
ticularly in Appalacia where resulting floods and mudslides still damage homes and crops).
175. See Robin Kundis Craig, Taking Steps Toward Marine Wilderness Protection? Fish-
ing and Coral Reef Marine Reserves in Florida and Hawaii, 34 McGEORGE L. REV. 155, 188-
89 (2003) (discussing the many threats to coral reefs, including blast fishing or fish poisoning
and removing coral reefs for jewelry).
176. See James Salzman, Sustainable Consumption and the Law, 27 ENVTL. LAW 1243,
1246-50 (1997) (analyzing "sustainable consumption" and noting that pollution and waste are
caused by the unsustainable consumption of goods and resources).
177. See Benkler, supra note 64, at 347 n.239 (describing the economic tradeoffs of
"smart" vs. "dumb" devices).
178. See Tony Hallett, 700 Million Wi-Fi Users By 2008, SILICON.COM, July 25, 2003, at
http://www.silicon.com/news/148-500001/l/5322.html (noting that Pyramid Consulting has
projected Wi-Fi growth to reach 700 Million users within 6 years).
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oly will not be acceptable over time. Old technology, old methods of
consumption will have to give way to new.
New environmental legislation, influenced by the public-trust doc-
trine, could theoretically provide some protection here. Environmental
law professor William Rodgers has told us that the language of the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") Subsection 101(b) 79 contains
public-trust based language which is "expansive and tantalizingly vague,
but it also is strongly prophetic,' 80 because it addresses resources which
are non-consumptive and renewable (like the electromagnetic spectrum):
[The public-trust doctrine] has given rise to a number of court-
inspired constraints on public-resource decisions, including
protecting current public uses, giving preferences to
nonconsumptive and renewable uses, and preventing the
subordination of public uses to private development decisions.'8
Whatever the angle used, as is the case with all natural resources, a
balance must be struck. If we assume that legacy analog technologies
unduly consume the electromagnetic spectrum, either today or 20 years
from now, a paradox becomes clear. In today's market, some of the
cheapest products available are those that exploit electromagnetic spec-
trum in the most inefficient way. Analog radios and televisions are still
much cheaper than digital ones; new businesses that broadcast using
digital technologies must subsidize customers' purchase of their newer,
more efficient digital devices in order to jump start the market.'8 2 In fact,
the exact opposite could take place: the producer could, and perhaps
should, reflect the total product cost in their devices,'83 including the
consumption cost associated with economic inefficient use and costs of
disposal.
Applied to today's wireless market, analog devices should be the
most expensive if they are to reflect (a) their truly inefficient
179. 42 U.S.C. § 433 1(b) (2000) (".. . it is the ... responsibility of the Federal Govern-
ment ... to improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources, to the
end that the Nation may (1) fulfill the responsibilities ... as trustee of the environment...
(emphasis added).
180. RODGERS, supra note 164, at 857.
181. Id. at 858 (citing Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892)).
182. See Brian Bergstein, Satellite Radio Set for Takeoff in U.S., AP ONLINE, June 1,
2003, available at http://www.rednova.comnews/stories/3/2003/O6/02/storyOOl.html (the
article notes that both XM and Sirius hope to be able to eliminate the manufacturer equipment
subsidy in a few years).
183. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some
Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1553-71 (1999). The authors
propose "enterprise liability" as a mechanism of incorporating risk into the price of products.
This is mostly an argument related to tort liability, however it could be extended to environ-
mental or as a way to price in a device's inefficient use or resources.
Spring 2004]
318 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 10:285
exploitation-their consumption-of electromagnetic spectrum and
(b) the fact that they will have to be recalled and destroyed at some time
in the future when they are replaced by a digital-generation device.
Many analog devices (such as analog cordless phones) have already
ended their useful life cycle or they soon will.
Convincing arguments have been advanced that the economic cost of
analog broadcast is so great (i.e. the cost of consumption), particularly in
broadcast television, that all analog broadcasts should simply be turned
off, thereby forcing the market to switch either to digital alternatives or
to cable. 1 4 However, the disposal and switch-over costs from analog to
digital are, today, not built into the products' price and it is questionable
how the market will sustain them.'
85
C. Can Electromagnetic Spectrum Pollute?
If electromagnetic spectrum is exploited at unacceptable levels, its
by-product can cause interference with other devices (a "cacophony of
competing voices"),16 and at very high power levels it can cause burning
injury to humans.8 7 Most studies do not indicate injury,88 but the Insti-
tute of Electrical & Electronics Engineers ("IEEE") and other
184. See HAZLETT, supra note 95, at 15 (suggesting that the analog TV spectrum, if
valued based on PCS rates, is far too valuable to keep active and it would probably make more
sense to switch as soon as practicable and use the money from auctioning for subsidizing the
"public interest," such as universal service).
185. See Salzman, supra note 176, at 1270-75 (suggesting that "extended producer re-
sponsibility" should apply to build in the price of the device's disposal into its manufacturing
cost).
186. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FC.C., 395 U.S. 367, 376 (1969) (setting forth the 1927
act's traditional justification: "It quickly became apparent that broadcast frequencies consti-
tuted a scarce resource whose use could be regulated and rationalized only by the
Government. Without government control, the medium would be of little use because of the
cacophony of competing voices, none of which could be clearly and predictably heard.").
187. See Kenneth R. Foster & John E. Moulder, Are Mobile Phones Safe? IEEE SPEC-
TRUM ONLINE, Vol. 37. No. 8 (Aug. 2000), available at http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/
publicfeature/aug00/prad.html (describing the tissue-heating phenomenon and dispelling spec-
trum links to cancer); David Black, Health Issues and the Role of Standards and Safety
Factors in Respect of Cellphone Technology in the Context of Public Requirements for a Pre-
cautionary Approach, IEEE Presentation in Dublin (Sept. 20, 2001), available at http://
grouper.ieee.org/groups/scc28/Summary%20of%20Black%20Presentation.pdf. Referring to
ICNIRP standards, the author states that "[it is widely accepted that current standards, such as
those published by IEEE and the Guidelines published by ICNIRP are referenced to thresh-
olds of observable and repeatable effects. Tissue heating predominates at high frequencies,
and so the onset of detectable disturbances to thermal homeostasis forms the basis of the low-
est observable effect threshold used by RF standards above 10MHz." Id.
188. See Howard Frumkin et al., Cellular Phones and Risk of Brain Tumors, 51 CANCER
J. CLIN. 137-41 (describing numerous epidemiological studies and concluding that there is no
definite link to cancerous tumors).
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international standards-setting bodies 89 have promulgated guidelines to
secure human safety by acknowledging that there are thresholds beyond
which electromagnetic exploitation can be a form of dangerous pollu-
tion. For this reason, many countries regulate transmission stations by
means of national laws,'90 and in the United States, it is regulated by a
comprehensive federal-guidelines document,' 9' although some states
have attempted to impose their own standards. 92 So far, court cases for
injuries supposedly caused by electromagnetic pollution-particularly at
the low levels of pollution to which mobile phones subject users-have
failed because their claims have lacked scientific legitimacy under the
standard of the Daubert decision;'93 but nonetheless, studies are always
being conducted on the effects of broadcast transmissions, and it is pos-
sible (although hopefully unlikely) that such an injury may be proved in
the future.
Communities across the world have also been very active in this
area, and so far the court of public opinion has been far more credulous,
through relying on junk science, than courts of law have been.' 94 Italian
mass hysteria, for instance, incited locals to attempt to shut down the
Pope's broadcast facilities due to fear of radiation, an event in which
thousands of protesters held up signs proclaiming that "Vatican Radio
preaches life but brings us death."'9' In Spain, four alleged school cancer
189. See IEEE International Committee for Electromagnetic Safety Website, at
http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/scc28/; see also Joint Website of the U.S. Food & Drug Admini-
stration and the Federal Communications Commission for Consumer Information on Wireless
Phones, at http://www.fda.gov/cellphones/ (providing exhaustive detail on thresholds and
noting numerous additional sources and literature); In re: Wireless, 216 F. Supp. 2d 474, 485-
87 (D. Md. 2002) (detailing the inter-agency collaboration between the FCC and the FDA in
setting RF exposure standards).
190. See WHO, International EMF Project, EMF Worldwide Standards Database, avail-
able at http://www.who.int/docstore/peh-emf/EMFStandards/who-0102/Worldmap5.htm.
191. See In The Matter of Guidelines for Evaluating the Environmental Effects of Ra-
diofrequency Radiation, 11 F.C.C.R. 15123 (August 1, 1996).
192. See New Jersey Radiation Protection Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 26:2D-1-88 (setting
extensive radiation limits for transmission devices); New Brunswick Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town-
ship of Edison Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 693 A.2d 180, 189 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1997)
(noting that the Federal Emissions Standards will pre-empt New Jersey regulation of emission
standards).
193. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (assigning trial judges a
"gatekeeping" role to determine as a preliminary matter whether the proposed scientific testi-
mony is both reliable and relevant, and in general replacing the test in Frye v. United States,
293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923)).
194. See Joseph Perkins, Payoffs for Junk Science, THE WASH. TiMEs, Aug. 3, 1999, at
A17 (noting that Robert P. Liburdy, a biologist at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
who concluded that electromagnetic effects can lead to leukemia, has been exposed as a scien-
tific fraud, and discussing the incentives, based on potential claims, for scientists' coming to
incorrect conclusions).
195. Yaroslav Trofimov, Italians Say Potent Vatican Radio Tower Emits Radiation That
Poses Cancer Risk, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2001, at B7A; Yaroslav Trofimov, 'Electrosmog'
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cases created nationwide paranoia, leading to several antennas' being
removed, and to the freezing of new broadcasting-site deployment for
months. 96 In the United States, hysteria over electromagnetic radiation is
localized but strong,197 sometimes being couched in terms of declining
property values due to unsightly tower placement,' 98 and other times be-
ing based on health concerns.' 99 Most United States lawsuits arising out
of electromagnetic waves' health hazard have failed,00 but network op-
erators are well aware that the public's fear can affect network
deployment.
For example, in spite of political maneuvers undertaken to facilitatenetwrk • 201
network construction, community hysteria incited companies like Om-
nipoint to try to build several hundred "stealth-antenna" sites without
municipal authorization during the 1990s. °2 One can assume that what
Splits Italian Officials, WALL ST. J. EUR., Apr. 10, 2001, at I (describing Italy's heated politics
regarding electromagnetic emissions and new legislation).
196. Giles Tremlett, Phone Masts Start Child Cancer Scare, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 12,
2002, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/intemational/story/0,3604,631542,00.html.
197. See David W. Hughes, When NIMBYs Attack: The Heights to Which Communities
Will Climb to Prevent the Sting of Wireless Towers, 23 J. CORP. L. 469 (1998) (discussing the
strategies of activist groups opposing cell-tower placement).
198. Id. at 496-98.
199. Id. at 492-96.
200. See Motorola, Inc. v. Ward, 478 S.E.2d 465 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (rejecting a claim
against a cell-phone manufacturer for causing or exacerbating cancer, due to lack of causation
and inconclusive evidence); see also In re Wireless Telephone Radio Frequency Emissions
Products Liability, 248 F. Supp. 2d 452 (D. Md. 2003) (preventing claims, brought by five
classes of phone purchasers who were not provided with headsets to guard against possible
danger, because federal law sets safety standards and preempts such claims); Newman v. Mo-
torola Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 769 (D. Md. 2002) (rejecting of claim against cell phone
manufacturer for cancer claim for failing the Daubert test); Reynard v. NEC Corp., 887 F.
Supp. 1500 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (rejecting a plaintiff's wrongful-death action for lack of causa-
tion and failing the Daubert test); Chernock v. United States, 718 F Supp. 900 (N.D. Fla.
1989) (ruling against several workers' claims against the government for injuries allegedly
caused by operating radar devices).
201. See H. R. REP. No. 104-204, at95 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10,61-
62. Congress's intent to achieve national uniformity over RF emissions standards, and the
interplay with local zoning laws: "The [Commerce] Committee has received substantial evi-
dence that local zoning decisions, while responsive to local concern about the potential effects
of radio frequency emission levels, are at times not supported by scientific and medical evi-
dence. A high quality national wireless telecommunications network cannot exist if each of its
component [sic] must meet different RF standards in each community. The Committee be-
lieves the [FCC] rulemaking on this issue (ET Docket 93-62) should contain adequate,
appropriate and necessary levels of protection to the public, and needs to be completed expe-
ditiously." Id.
202. See John Cichowski, Antenna Critics Demand Answers: Clifton Takes Omnipoint to
Task, THE REC. (NORTHERN N.J.), Sept. 4, 1997, at L3 (discussing an arrangement that Omni-
point made with the State of New Jersey to put up 122 sites without municipal approval, and
because of political pressure the New Jersey Governor stepped in to provide the municipalities
with a veto right. The article also discusses the "stealth" placement that Omnipoint erected in
a commercial zone without obtaining zoning approval); Leslie Haggin, Complaints Force
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motivated the company was its having concluded that the time and ex-
pense required for the antennas' authorization, along with the ensuing
public hysteria, would have prevented it from being competitive with
existing providers.
The fact that electromagnetic devices can be used in warfare to dam-
age other electric devices and to injure humans 3 shows that
electromagnetic spectrum is a natural resource whose exploitation must
be prudently monitored. Even though mobile-phone and other low-
power uses (such as WiFi) are unlikely to cause injury because FCC
standards place their spectrum usage a thousand times below the thresh-
old of human danger2 0 as with any other natural resource, there would
be zero potential for harm if the resource were left in its natural, unex-
ploited state. Probably no one supports complete abstinence from
wireless devices using the spectrum, however, just as no one can realisti-
cally suggest completely abstaining from using machinery that consumes
petroleum products, even as some cities are close to being rendered
"unlivable" from their extensive use of fossil fuels. 5
There are safe levels of exploitation in electromagnetic spectrum
that, according to our understanding of science, will never harm humans.
By way of example: a human can never become sunburned from
moonlight, even though moonlight is a reflection of the sun's light. This
is because moonlight transmits the sun's energy well below the threshold
of damage.2 6 By way of another example, a 100-watt light bulb will burn
someone who touches its surface, but if the same person sits several feet
away, the light bulb will not cause a burn. This is known as the
Down Cell Phone Antenna; Wayne Firm Seeks to Restore It, THE REC. (NORTHERN N.J.), May
9, 1997, at L3 (discussing an Omnipoint cellular phone antenna erected on the side of the
Newark Pompton Turnpike without any zoning approval and which was forced to come down
by municipal authorities).
203. See Come Fry With Me, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 1, 2003 at 68-69 (describing the
development of electromagnetic devices for various warfare tactics); Anne Marie Squeo, U.S.
Studies Using 'E-Bomb' in Iraq, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2003, at A3 (describing the "E-Bomb"
electromagnetic weaponry and its possible use in the war against Iraq).
204. See Federal Emissions Guidelines, supra note 191, at 15140 (discussing the emis-
sions standards for "low power devices).
205. See Bradley P. Miller, Obedezco, Pero No Cumplo: Law, Transportation, Politics
and Pollution in Mexico City, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 173, 226-28 (1991) (noting the terrible
environmental conditions and pollution, and attempts to alleviate them, in the world's most
populous city, including a "no-drive day" requiring one fifth of the population to refrain from
using their automobiles every day).
206. See Jim Gilbert, Exploring the Full Moon, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., July 18, 1997,
at 12C (noting that even at full-moon the moon's brightness is only 1/400,000th of the sun's
light).
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"threshold" (or "specific absorption rate"),20 7 and is summarized in
simple terms by a World Health Organization online publication:
There is no one level above which exposures [to electromagnetic
transmissions] become hazardous to health; instead, the potential
risk to human health gradually increases with higher exposure
levels. Guidelines indicate that, below a given threshold, elec-
tromagnetic field exposure is safe according to scientific
knowledge. However, it does not automatically follow that,
above the given limit, exposure is harmful .... [The Interna-
tional Commission for Non-ionizing Radiation Protection]
applies a safety factor of 10 to derive occupational exposure lim-
its, and a factor of 50 to obtain the guideline value for the
general public. Therefore, for example, in the radio frequency
and microwave frequency ranges, the maximum levels you
might experience in the environment or in your home are at least
50 times lower than the threshold level at which first behavioral
changes in animals become apparent.0 8
Just as a burn from a light bulb damages the skin, standing too close
to a high-power antenna or other electromagnetic-transmission source
can cause burns, 2 9 and for that reason, the risk of bums from electro-
magnetic pollution should be monitored as a risk element, just like
anything else in the environment. Thresholds must be determined, and
scientific care must be taken to make sure that they are not crossed.
Even most skeptics agree that a minimum threshold exists, a point
below which electromagnetic exposure causes no damage: "lt]here is a
big task ahead to define what the lowest level of safe exposure could be,"
says Ross Adley, a neurosurgeon who believes that the threshold is very
low, and he warns that "[i]ncreasingly, wherever we go, we will be im-
mersed in a sea of low-level, pulsed microwave signals. ''2'0 The debate
over how much electromagnetic exposure is dangerous will likely con-
207. See WHO Online Publication, EMF Primer: Specific Absorption Rate, at http://
www.wirc.org/primer/sar.shtml.
208. See WHO Online Publication, About Electromagnetic Fields, at http://
www.who.int/peh-emf/about/WhatisEMF/en/index4.html.
209. Federal Emissions Guidelines, supra note 191, at 15127, 15130-36, 15176 (noting
the occurrence of bums); see also Int'l Comm'n on Non-Ionizing Radiation Protection, Guide-
lines for Limiting Exposure to Time-Varying Electric, Magnetic, and Electromagnetic Fields
(Up 20 300 GHz), in HEALTH PHYsics, Apr. 1998, at 496 and 508, available at http://
www.icnirp.de/documents/emfgdl.pdf (advising that bums, including severe ones, can occur
from overexposure to non-ionizing radiation).
210. David Kirkpatrick, Ross Adey: "Wherever we go, we will be immersed in a sea of
low-level, pulsed microwave signals", FORTUNE, Oct. 9, 2000, at 266.
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tinue for years, and should evolve along with technology.2 ' In the words
of science writer Robert Pool,
[f]or better or worse, technology has changed. Our days of inno-
cence, when machines were solely a product of larger-than-life
inventors and hardworking engineers, are gone. Increasingly,
technology will be a joint effort, with its design shaped not only
by engineers and executives but also psychologists, political sci-
entists, management theorists, risk specialists, regulators and
courts, and the general public. It will not be a neat system. It is
probably not the best system. But, given the power and complex-
ity of modern technology, it is likely our only choice.1 2
Whether or not the system that Robert Pool has described is really
our "only choice" would likely be challenged by commentators like Jon
Hanson and Douglas Kysar, who have found the existence of
manufacturer manipulation of product-risk perceptions in all kinds of
industries, from food products' bogus low-fat claims to the promotional
efforts of pharmaceutical-drug manufacturers to obtain FDA approval.2 3
Hanson and Kysar would suggest that consumers do have choices and
that manufacturers should be held accountable in instances where they
misrepresent their products and incite consumers to make incorrect
choices based on their claims. In the meantime, however, the policy
decisions have been made by the FCC, and its discretion in this area has
been firmly upheld by the courts. 24 Happily, numerous independent
211. See Isobel Smith, Electromagnetic Radiation and Health Risks: Cell Phones and
Microwave Radiation in New Zealand, 59 ENVTL. HEALTH 20 (July-Aug. 1996).
There are a few studies of controlled exposure of human volunteers for brief peri-
ods. These studies have established thresholds for feeling warmth and pain due to
[radio frequency and microwave] radiation ... There is clear evidence of a range of
biological effects, including effects adverse to the health of exposed animals and
humans, resulting from radiation doses at levels high enough to cause tissue heating
(the so-called thermal threshold). However, there is disagreement among scientists
about whether there is conclusive evidence of adverse effects of doses below this
threshold.
Id.
212. ROBERT POOL, BEYOND ENGINEERING: How SOCIETY SHAPES TECHNOLOGY 305
(1997).
213. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 183, at 1451-62.
214. See Cellular Phone Taskforce v. EC.C., 205 E3d 82, 91-92 (2d Cir. 2000). This
case upholds FCC health guidelines: "[tihe argument that the FCC should create greater safety
margins in its guidelines to account for uncertain data is a policy question, not a legal one. As
a policy matter, an agency confronted with scientific uncertainty has some leeway to resolve
that uncertainty by means of more regulation or less .... The FCC concluded that requiring
exposure to be kept as low as reasonably achievable in the face of scientific uncertainty would
be inconsistent with its mandate to "balance between the need to protect the public and work-
ers from exposure to potentially harmful RF electromagnetic fields and the requirement that
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scientific studies also indicate a well-founded basis for our modem
understanding of the risks of the various transmission products that use
the electromagnetic spectrum.25
D. Ecological Imbalances and Harm Caused by Under
Exploitation and Overexploitation of Electromagnetic Spectrum
We have seen that FCC regulations constrain users of electromag-
netic spectrum to operate within very limited frequency allocations,
which can cause overexploitation: AT&T Wireless, for example, must
operate only within its allocated license area, which may theoretically be
oversubscribed in Denver or any market where sales are very strong,
while the same frequencies may be under-subscribed in Austin. Thus,
there is a possibility of overexploitation (i.e., unsustainable consump-
tion) in Denver that will leave consumers unable to maintain phone calls,
and that will incur social costs and resource inefficiencies, while the
theoretical corollary of under exploitation in Austin will also be harmful
because valuable wireless frequencies will not be able to be used by oth-
ers.
Underused spectrum does not necessarily reflect a lack of demand: it
proves only that there is a lack of demand for a particular part of the
spectrum as it is being used by the company's product that the FCC has
authorized. Under the centrally planned command and control system
that has been described above, entrepreneurs cannot use the spectrum for
any purpose other than the one that it is authorized. Thus, although only
11 percent of the television spectrum is in use at any given time, this
does not mean that there is a lack of demand for the remaining 89 per-
cent. Although it may be true that there is a lack of demand for the
remaining 89 percent of television broadcast spectrum, since existing
rules only allow television broadcasts over that spectrum, other possible
uses of it, such as mobile technologies, wireless Internet, and other ser-
vices, are prohibited from occupying this valuable resource. And
although market mechanisms are beginning to open up and encourage
industry be allowed to provide telecommunications services to the public in the most efficient
and practical manner possible." This policy conclusion is neither irrational, arbitrary nor ca-
pricious and we decline to disturb it.
215. See, e.g., FED. COMM. COMM'N OFFICE OF ENG'G & TECH., OET BULLETIN No. 56,
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT THE BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS AND POTENTIAL HAZARDS OF
RADIOFREQUENCY ELECTROMAGNETIC FIELDS (Aug. 1999), available at http://www.fcc.gov/
Bureaus/EngineeringTechnology/Documentsbulletins/oet56/oet56e4.pdf. Also, there are
several additional sources on a dedicated website that the FCC has set up regarding electro-
magnetic safety. See http://www.fcc.gov/oet/rfsafety/.
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216
subleasing of excess spectrum, 6 there is to date no evidence that this
system will work.
In addition to harm caused by high-pollution transmission levels that
can theoretically cause damage to humans (described in the preceding
section), overexploitation can cause electromagnetic pollution in two
additional forms: (a) in the form of overcrowding and interference in
frequencies that are over subscribed,2 7 and (b) in the form of a (small but
growing) number of "pirate" users who are frustrated with regulations
and therefore build sites to operate with unconventional antennas for ac-
cess or transmission of wireless Internet (for example, modified booster
antennas crafted from soup cans, called "cantennas").2 8 Federal regula-
tions do not solve pirate-radio problems that are exacerbated by the
systematic underuse of spectrum that is not yet available for access.2 1 9
Overexploitation in certain frequency bands can be the product of pent-
up demand, which is manifested by the thousands of applications for
low-power FM radio stations that have been made, and the presence of
many pirate radio stations.2
°
Under exploitation of a natural resource can be as problematic as
overconsumption of it, and Hazlett sets this idea up as the opposite of the
"tragedy of the commons" by calling it the "tragedy of the uncommons,"
216. See Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Regarding Spec-
trum Subleasing Rules (FCC 03-113), May 15, 2003, available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/
edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-234562A1 .pdf.
217. Alan S. Kay, WiFi Promise Vs. Reality: The Wireless Technology Gets Put to the
Speed Test, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 2003, at H9 (explaining that other devices that operate
within WiFi's 2.4 GHz frequency band, such as microwave ovens and cordless phones, can
"pollute" the WiFi frequencies and impede performance).
218. See John Patrick, Are You a WiFi Pirate?, ZDNET.CoM, Aug. 21, 2002, at
http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1107-954659.html (reporting that antennas made from potato-chip
cans may increase the reception of WiFi signals from a few feet to several miles); Desa Phila-
delphia, Global Briefing, TIME, Oct. 28, 2002, at A5 (describing home-made "cantennas"
made from soup or potato-chip cans); see also The Super Cantenna Product Website, at
http://www.cantenna.com.
219. A concept called "warchalking" and "wardriving" is a movement of users who drive
around urban areas and pinpoint locations for free access to wireless networks. This is a form
of piracy. See, e.g., http://www.warchalking.org; http://www.warchalking.us (many other web-
sites can be found through a Google search).
220. See Jesse Walker, The FCC's Absurd New Crusade: REBEL RADIO, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, Mar. 9, 1998 (noting that the many pirate radio stations cause little harm against
broadcasters, but that the FCC goes after them because of broadcaster power in government);
see also Blacks Protest FCCfor 'Pirate'Radio, NEW PITTSBURGH COURIER, Oct. 14, 1998, at
Al (describing a large group of protesters who operate pirate radio stations and declare them-
selves to be "organized and broadcasting as ... several thousand free radio stations ... as a
form of civil disobedience" in protest of the FCC, large corporations, and government con-
trol); Pirate Radio Central Website, at http://www.blackcatsystems.com/radio/pirate.htnil;
Christian Pirate Radio Website, at http://www.mycpr.conl/; Seton Hall's Pirate Radio Station
Website, at http://www.wsou.net/.
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in which severe access restrictions leave socially valuable uses untappa-
ble.22
Overconsumption and underconsumption of electromagnetic spec-
trum are not unlike the traditional resource-allocation problems found in
other areas of economics, because the government does not allow the
consumption of electromagnetic spectrum to be allocated by market
forces. Resistance to change in the existing system is great, not unlike
the resistance seen in the 1980s when Europe was criticized for poorly
planned agricultural production that induced farmers to produce millions
of gallons of excess wine and butter, metaphorically known as "wine
lakes" and "butter mountains" because of their mammoth proportions.
Farmers had become used to comfortable subsidies, and when govern-
ment set out to change them, for years the farmers blocked plazas and
freeways by dumping tons of excess fruit and vegetables and creating
social mayhem.22' The policymakers' flawed theory was that it was better
to have a cycle of production and destruction of excess wine and butter
rather than to let the market figure things out. Ultimately modem eco-
nomic-allocation theory prevailed over centralized planning. Except, that
is, in the area of wireless spectrum allocation.
In the electromagnetic spectrum there are wine lakes and butter
mountains: broadcasting frequencies are underused, not because of de-
mand problems, but because government will not allow them to be used
for anything but television broadcasting when they could be used for
other purposes. Massive growth in Wi-Fi, for example, can be seen by its
presence in Starbucks coffee shops and on university campuses,"' and
some cities are offering access for free at airports and other public ar-
226 227eas. And WiFi's growth is just beginning. Interestingly, numerous
221. Hazlett, supra note 68, at 382.
222. See Thomas Moore, Of Wine and Lakes, FORTUNE, Jan. 7, 1985, at 8 (noting that
Europe spent $800 million in 1984 to get rid of excess wine that was created by subsidies);
William R. Doemer, The European Community's 'Butter Mountain' and 'Wine Lake', TiME
INT'L, Oct. 1, 1990, at 24 (describing the wine lakes and butter mountains and excessive over-
production of the 1980's stemming from subsidies).
223. Id. (describing the many protests in the South of France).
224. See VoiceStream Expands Wireless Web Access in Starbucks Outlets, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 21, 2002 at C9 (noting that as of August, 2002, 500 Starbucks outlets had been installed
and more than 2,000 outlets would be outfitted with Wi-Fi wireless access by the end of the
year).
225. Michelle Kessler, Public Wi-Fi Networks Growing Rapidly, USA TODAY, June 2,
2003, at I E (noting the rapid expansion of Wi-Fi networks at university campuses and many
other public and semi-public locations).
226. Jesse Drucker, AT&T Wireless to Add Wi-Fi Service, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2003, at
D2 (discussing a plan by AT&T to set up Wi-Fi service at 475 hotels and at many airports and
other public places).
227. The White House has specifically denoted Wi-Fi as one of the major growth areas
in an annex to the Presidential Memo on Spectrum Policy, supra note 32. The Annex states
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companies (such as AT&T, T-Mobile and others who also hold exclusive
licenses for cellular, PCS and other uses) 228 are scrambling to use the
limited-but-open 2.4 GHz frequencies. Just as occurred with the cen-
trally-planned production of butter and wine, the centralized plan which
(happily) created a new market in 2.4 GHz risks creating overconsump-
tion in the limited open spectrum, while causing underconsumption of
other areas of electromagnetic spectrum (such as television channels,
which are prohibited from offering Internet). Ultimately, this can create
an ecological imbalance and lead to consumer harm. Broadcasters, em-
powered by government regulations are, like the European farmers of the
1980s, consuming electromagnetic spectrum, creating electromagnetic
butter mountains, while their sister telecommunications companies are
scrambling to build-out a limited area of open Wi-Fi spectrum. In the
case of butter and wine, many of these excesses were destroyed causing
unnecessary ecological waste, and it was not until the European coun-
tries formed a Common Agricultural Policy that directly attacked
inefficient waste created by centralized planning that anything was done
about it."' If governments do not come up with a solution on their own,
a separate mechanism must be found to allay these problems and let con-
sumers set an ecological balance of the electromagnetic spectrum.
III. THE NEW TECHNOLOGIES UWB AND SDR: THE HIGH-TECH
NAVIGATORS OF ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM
One of the main reasons that the way the electromagnetic spectrum
is presently regulated is inadequate is that two new technologies work by
using much of the spectrum nearly simultaneously, yet they do not com-
pete with other broadcasters. If these technologies become widely used,
they will not create a cacophony of competing voices, and so it will not
be necessary to confine each broadcaster to a narrow band of spectrum.
that there is massive demand for wireless services, noting that there are over 140 million wire-
less phone customers and that WiFi systems are becoming ubiquitous. See Press Release, The
White House, Fact Sheet on Spectrum Management (June 5, 2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/06/20030605-5.html. Unfortunately, the gov-
ernment proposes freeing up additional "commons" Wi-Fi-type frequencies in the 5 GHz
range. Id. While it is good to have more commons-type frequencies available, the characteris-
tics of the 5 GHz frequencies are such that they can not penetrate obstacles and will therefore
be of little use indoors or for any mobile services.
228. See id.
229. See Robert P. Cooper, The European Community's Prodigal Son-the Common
Agricultural Policy Undergoes Reform: Will Multilateral Trading Schemes Fostered by the
GATT Blossom or Wither and Die?, 1 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 233, 282 (1995) (discussing the
butter mountains and wine lakes of the 1980s and the effect that the Common Agricultural
Policy had on their reduction).
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Ultra Wideband ("UWB") and Software Defined Radio ("SDR"), are
two powerful new ways of using wireless spectrum, and both can poten-
tially use the spectrum as a commons, changing the way wireless works
and making electromagnetic spectrum like an ocean that is so vast that it
does not need to be parceled out into individual properties.230 The prob-
lem is that under existing FCC rules, these new methods of broadcasting
are effectively prohibited or highly restricted, because owners of the new
technologies would need to obtain large numbers of broadcasting li-
censes to acquire the right to use the many different frequencies that
their technologies require.
Although UWB and SDR technologies are different, they both allow
thousands of users to occupy the same bandwidth without interfering
with one another.3 ' UWB devices operate at extremely low power levels,
below the noise floor that disturbs the operation of other devices func-
tioning within electromagnetic spectrum, like a soft whisper heard only
by the intended listener. SDR, on the other hand, can operate at higher
levels through a technique known as "interweaving, ' ' 12 occupying fre-
quencies only when a priority user (such as the owner) is not using them.
Also known as "agile radio," it deploys "smart" navigators that seek only
23unused spectrum. As the science writer George Gilder has put it, these
two technologies should change our paradigm of the electromagnetic
spectrum's vastness after their use becomes commonplace, for, he writes,
"[y]ou can no more lease electromagnetic waves than you can lease
ocean waves."
234
230. See Freeing the Airwaves, THE ECONOMIST, May 31, 2003, at 26 (discussing the
property vs. commons debate and noting that technologies such as UWB and SDR make pow-
erful arguments that the spectrum should be treated as a commons).
231. See Buck, supra note 168, at 6 (discussing the advantages of a commons regime,
particularly in light of UWB and technologies that use etiquette standards-such as spread
spectrum technologies); see also David Reed, The Sky's No Longer the Limit,
CONTEXT MAG., Dec. 2002, available at http://www.contextmag.con/archives/200212/
Insight2TheSkysNoLonger.asp (presenting an overview of new technologies and arguing that
the spectrum is potentially limitless); David Reed's website, at www.reed.com/OpenSpectrum
(containing a full source of academic literature and argumentation for open spectrum).
232. See Benkler, supra note 163, at 10.
233. See Dale N. Hatfield, Software Defined Radio: A Regulator's Perspective, Keynote
Address at the SDR Forum 19th Meeting (June 20, 2000), available at http://www.fcc.gov/
oet/speeches/sdrforumsph.html.
234. GEORGE GILDER, TELECOSM 163 (2000). But see Torres, supra note 74, at 537-38.
Torres notes that there have been conflicts between fishermen and petroleum interests on the
outer shelf. The Fishermen's Contingency Fund was created to address competing interests
and to provide compensation for injured fishermen.
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A. Ultra Wideband
UWB technology broadcasts at extremely high capacity, at very low
power, and across all frequency bands. It broadcasts at the "noise floor"
where it does not interfere with concurrent transmitters, and proponents
of UWB technology claim that it can eliminate wireless airwave conges-
tion, reduce power consumption requirements to a minimum, and
improve the safety applications of wireless in many dramatic ways.2 3 5
Operationally, the technology is said to be useable in wireless Local
Area Network applications within buildings, 236 secure military communi-
cations, and through-the-wall radar and underground imaging used to
rescue people buried in natural disasters (like earthquakes) .2 " For years
the rights to UWB's intellectual property were tied up in a battle be-
tween private industry and the federal government that private industry
eventually won,238 notwithstanding the fact that the technology has nu-
merous military applications, such as covert communications, radar
detection, missile-guidance systems,2 39 and usages that employ its unique
ability to depict size and distance accurately. UWB is being developed to
replace current automobile collision-avoidance systems,2"° and many of
235. See Cutting the Ties That Bind, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 19, 2002, at 6 (discussing
UWB technology and the chipsets that are under development by various companies).
236. See Ultra-Wideband Backers Say They're Next Wave, TR DAILY, Sept. 28, 1999,
available at http://www.time-domain.comlnews/articles/archive.html (mentioning the applica-
tion of the devices in wireless LANs).
237. See David G. Leeper, Wireless Data Buster, Sci. AM., May 2002, at 64 (providing
an excellent overview of the history of radio and development history of UWB); see also
Amara D. Angelica, Powered by Pulse, TECH WEEK, May 3, 1999, at http://
www.timedomain.com/Files/PDF/news/TechWeek.pdf (giving a summary of future applica-
tions of UWB technology in communications systems).
238. See Peter Eisler, Did The U.S. 'Rip Off' An Invention That Could Change The
World?, USA TODAY, Apr. 9, 1999, at IA. The article discusses the history of an intellectual-
property dispute between Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Time Domain. Id.
The U.S. Government also disclosed security concerns about the technology. Ultimately, the
dispute was resolved in most counts in favor of Time Domain. Id.
239. See Ira W. Merritt, Proliferation and Significance of Radio Frequency Weapons
Technology, Testimony before the Joint Economic Committee (Feb. 25, 1992) (document
available in the Congressional Testimony by Federal Document Clearing House for Wednes-
day, Feb. 25, 1998) (furnishing extensive testimony of Dr. Merritt on several applications of
UWB in weapons systems); see also Solicitation re: Engineering Services and Development,
in the Federal Information & News Dispatch (Solicitation No. N00178-98-Q-0043, Mar. 31,
1998), reprinted in Commerce Business Daily, PSA#2063, Mar. 31, 1998, available at
http://www.fbodaily.comlcbd/archive/1998/03(March)/3 1-Mar-i 998/59so1O35.htm (recount-
ing the government's awarding a contract to an engineering firm to deploy UWB technology
for use in the Hummingbird unmanned aerial vehicle).
240. Dawn Stover, Radar on a Chip: 101 Uses in Your Life, POPULAR Sci., Mar. 1995, at
107 (discussing ultra wideband's potential contribution to collision-avoidance technology).
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its other applications appear to be interchangeable with existing wireless
technologies, such as wireless telephony.'
As early as 1998 and 1999, UWB technology received lots of favor-
able press.242 In an attempt to expedite the regulatory process, in 1998 a
loose coalition of more than fifty companies, scholars, and organizations
formed the Ultra Wideband Working Group,243 and UWB technology
quickly gained support because of its potential to revolutionize the way
that wireless spectrum is used.2 4
The technical characteristics of a UWB radio include (a) ultra short-
duration pulses yielding ultrawide bandwidth signals, (b) extremely low-
power spectral densities, (c) multi-mile ranges with sub-milliwatt aver-
age-power levels, and (d) excellent immunity to jamming and
interference from other radio systems.245 UWB does not operate within
any single band, and because it operates with "pulses" at a very low en-
ergy levels, it could open up the capacity for radio communication and
conceivably eliminate the need for spectrum allocation altogether. For its
pulses do not have a tendency to interfere with each other or with other
radio waves, making its widespread application capable of opening up a
nearly infinite amount of "new radio real estate. 246 Spectrum is often
described as a "pipe," "a freeway," or, perhaps most famously, a "tunnel
241. Bruce Schoenfeld, Welcome to Idea Town, YOUR COMPANY, May/June 1999, at 56
(giving a detailed history of Time Domain, the pioneer firm that developed UWB technology,
and an overview of tested applications and future applications).
242. See Georgie Raik-Allen, Radical Wireless Technology May Have Its lime, RED
HERRING, May 25, 1999 (discussing UWB's many potential applications and the hurdles that
it faced at the FCC).
243. See The Ultra Wideband Industry Website, at http://www.uwb.org.
244. See Kevin Maney, Pulsing with Promise New Digital Technology Likely to Revolu-
tionize How We Live, USA TODAY, Apr. 9, 1999, at lB.
Certainly the technology could have a profound-maybe devastating-effect on
several existing industries. Companies in TV, radio and telecommunications have
spent billions of dollars buying rights to slots on the radio spectrum and billions
more developing products to use on those slots. It might take decades, but Time
Domain's technology could make those rights far less valuable and the products ob-
solete. 'This is really a paradigm buster' says Bennett Kobb, author of
SpectrumGuide, which keeps tabs on radio spectrum.
Id.; see also Heather Forsgren Weaver, FCC to Start Ultra-wideband Rule Making, RCR, Oct.
11, 1999, at 14, available at http://www.timedomain.com/Files/PDF/news/RCR.pdf (discuss-
ing the inventors' statements about the profound effect that the technology could have on the
economy).
245. See Timothy J. Shepard, A Channel Access Scheme for Large Dense Packet Radio
Networks, 26 COMPUTER COMM. REV. 219 (Oct. 1996), available at http://
wireless.oldcolo.com/course/shepard.pdf. This is an excerpt of Shepard's often quoted thesis
demonstrating that millions of radios can co-exist in the same space without interfering with
others and is considered to be a seminal study for the FCC Issues of new UWB Rules.
246. Maney, supra note 244.
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without any edges,' 24 7 and UWB's operation within spectrum is said to
be the same as "background noise," which already exists in the spectrum
through the operation of any number of devices. (For example, a light
bulb or a fan emits a certain amount of radio waves, constituting radio
"background noise.") UWB is said to operate within the low thresholds
of background noise,24' and a UWB device is therefore capable of enter-
ing the commons, and navigating within it ("fishing" and "hunting" for
its intended listener) without disturbing the other users. With UWB,
there is no need for a pipe, a freeway or a tunnel.
In 2002, UWB received limited FCC approval, but its operation is
severely constrained by a "mask," which is a sort of rev-limiter249 that
handicaps its power transmission to the point where it is almost useless
exactly where it would be the most valuable: within the wall-penetrating
frequencies below 3 GHz.25° Created even though industry provided
overwhelming evidence showing that interference is not a concern, the
FCC mask places severe limitations on efficiency, effectively forcing
UWB to constrain most of its broadcasting to frequencies above 3.1
GHz. The Commission has promised to review the interference levels
within "the next six to 12 months, 251 ' but as of the date this Article was
written, the topic has not been revisited and lobbying efforts by industry,
who paid millions for exclusive PCS licenses, and television broadcast-
ers, who see enormous value in the unused frequencies which they
12possess, will probably continue for some time.
247. Coase, supra note 79 (discussing the difficulty of finding an appropriate metaphor
for spectrum, and noting the irony of calling it a "tunnel" since it is a "tunnel without any
edges" and is therefore "something that does not exist").
248. PUBLIC SAFETY WIRELESS NETWORK, EMERGING WIRELESS TECHNOLOGIES: ULTRA
WIDEBAND TECHNOLOGY AND ITS EFFECTS ON GPS 6 (May 2002), available at http://
www.pswn.gov/admin/librarydocsl0/uwb__gps-final.pdf (describing a Johns Hopkins study
which concluded that UWB transmissions can operate in the same background noise as other
electronic devices without causing interference).
249. A "rev-limiter" is a device which is installed on an engine to prevent the user from
operating it at too high of a rate and damaging the motor.
250. Ultra-Wideband Transmission Systems, ET Docket No. 98-153, First Report and
Order, FCC 02-48 (Apr. 22, 2002) [hereinafter FCC 02-48], available at http://
hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-02-48A 1 .pdf.
251. Id. at$ 273.
252. See Yuki Noguchi, 3G, or Not to Be?; Wireless Technologies Forge Ahead Despite
Uncertainties, THE WASH. POST, Apr. 5, 2002, at El (noting that companies like Verizon and
Voice Stream that paid billions for licenses are threatened by new technologies like UWB that
do not require licenses); see also Ultra-Wideband: FCC Stresses Market Needs, GLOBAL PO-
SITIONING & NAVIGATION NEWS, Apr. 4, 2001, at 1 (noting that GPS users are among the
greatest opponents of UWB because GPS operates in such a low power basis).
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The justification for the operational-restrictions mask-a temporary
measure to be used while the new technology is tried out-was ex-
plained in the FCC's First Report and Order:
253
The limits we are adopting in this proceeding are considerably
lower in some frequency ranges than the current Part 15 levels.
While these limits may prove to be lower than what is necessary,
we believe that such caution is needed in the early stages of
UWB implementation. Once additional experience is gained
with this equipment and a better understanding develops regard-
ing operating frequency and allowable emissions levels, we may
be able to revisit these limits.
The mask has been widely criticized, for as Stuart Benjamin has
pointed out, it is perhaps even unconstitutional to restrict UWB uses to
the extent that (a) the technology offers an alternative medium for First
Amendment expression and (b) UWB operation in no way detracts from
251the existing uses that license holders make of the spectrum.
The FCC's decision, however, resulted from struggling to balance
the goal of promoting new technologies with the concerns of industry,
and it is saddled with rulemaking procedures that make it difficult to
please everyone. The resulting "mask" system does allow UWB technol-
ogy to be introduced, to obtain private funding, and to get products
utilizing it out into the marketplace, 56 and so some commentators believe
257that the "mask" was a good compromise. UWB pioneer Time Domain,
for instance, seems happy with it for the time being,258 and producers are
already announcing special chipset radios designed to operate within the
253. FCC 02-48, supra note 250, at 223.
254. See generally Selected FCC Docket Summaries, Winter 2002, 11 CoMMLAw CON-
SPECTUS 223, 229 (2003) (summarizing the Report and Order, and noting that the emission
limits adopted for UWB devices are significantly more stringent than those imposed on other
Part 15 devices).
255. Benjamin, supra note 19, at 91.
256. For an overview of UWB and products on the market, see http://
www.ultrawidebandplanet.com.
257. See The FCC's UWB Proceeding: An Examination of the Government's Spectrum
Management Process, Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet (June 5, 2002),
available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/107/hearings/06052002Hearing569/print.htm
(The report states that "[wie are dealing with a new technology and feel the masks are a good
compromise between allowing the technology into the spectrum on a nonlicensed basis and
the need to protect vital current-and future federal and civil spectrum dependent services that
have a good chance to be in the same operating area).
258. See Patrick Mannion, Ultrawideband Radio Set to Redefine Wireless Signaling, EE
TIMES, Sept. 12, 2002, at http://www.eetimes.com/story/OEG20020911S0072. For a discus-
sion of the "mask" and noting that industry, on the whole, is agreeable to this compromise so
long as the topic is in fact revisited as promised by the FCC.
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mask. Amazingly, these sell for as little as $19.95 per unit,219 which is
relatively inexpensive, even if double the price predicted in industry
forecasts.26
B. Software-Defined Radio
Unlike UWB, which operates to some extent across the entire fre-
quency band at very low levels at all times, Software-Defined Radio
operates in specific frequencies, at specific times, at varying levels. As
George Gilder writes, "[s]mart radios suggest not a beach but the endless
waves of the ocean itself, 26' for SDR is a "smart" product made smart by
software that controls it and steers it through the spectrum.262 SDR is also
"cognitive" in that its software analyzes the spectrum and determines
which band to use for transmission. Inputs are programmable and flexi-
ble enough to include split-second review based on network loading (the
number of speakers and listeners using a given frequency range), inter-
ference level (the problems that pre-existing speakers and listeners are
having understanding each other), and cost of airtime (some frequencies
may cost more to use than others, like frequencies below 3 GHz that
penetrate walls and obstructions to reach their receiver). SDR selects the
service that it will utilize in terms of both the carrier and the bandwidth
occupied.263
SDR has benefited from great interest in it by the FCC, and a Notice
of Inquiry ("NOI") was initiated in 2000.26 Former FCC Chairman
William Kennard has expressed enthusiasm for the technology in his
published statement at the opening of the NOI:
[T]his proceeding on Software Defined Radio is another critical
step in the development of a more fluid spectrum market.
Software defined radios are smart devices that can make good
use of underused spectrum. They can operate as a cell phone one
259. See Patrick Mannion, UWB Chip Set Meets FCC Spectral Mask, EE TIMES, Aug. 1,
2002, at www.commsdesign.com/story/OEG20020801S0014.
260. See Ultra-Wideband Market Awaits Regulatory Approval, WIRELESS TODAY, Sept.
28, 1999, at http://www.time-domain.comnews/articles/archive.html. The Chief Technology
officer of Time Domain Corporation, founder of the technology, predicts the production costs
of the chip to be $8.00. Id. Licensing costs and other costs associated with the patented tech-
nology are not included in this figure. Id.
261. Gilder, supra note 234,at 163.
262. See Watch This Airspace, THE ECONOMIST, June 22, 2002, at 14 (discussing "smart
antennas" and "smart radios" and noting that it is a result of processing power's plunging
prices that software has become integrated with what used to be considered "dumb" devices).
263. Dan Sweeney, Shape Changer: Software Defined Radio and the Indefinite Future,
AMERICA'S NETWORK, Dec. 1, 2000, at 75 (discussing the general concept of SDR and its
cognitive derivatives).
264. Comm'n Action, Mar. 17, 2000, by Notice of Inquiry (FCC 00-103).
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minute, a PCS phone the next, a taxi dispatch radio later on and
a two-way pager after that. They can literally bridge the gaps
created by differences in frequency and transmission standards.
In this way, they can make all spectrum users from average
consumers to police, fire, and EMS workers who need to talk to
each other more productive and efficient.265
The regulatory problem that SDR would have faced under the previ-
ous rules was that a manufacturer would have had to seek new approval
and a new identification number for any piece of equipment that broad-
cast at a new frequency, power, or type of modulation. This framework
would have been fundamentally incompatible with SDR, since radios
employing it change frequency, power, or modulation type constantly in
the field. Fortunately the FCC amended Part 2 to allow SDR devices to
operate without the burdensome requirements of legacy regulations,26
but the amendments affect mainly equipment and transmitters. These
changes will be useless unless many other regulations are relaxed
enough to allow SDR devices to operate within frequency ranges that are
presently under the control of commercial broadcasters and others with
exclusive rights.
IV. THE PUBLIC TRUST
A. Why the Public-Trust Doctrine Is Needed to Remedy the
Present System of Regulating the Spectrum
Sweeping reform of the spectrum's regulatory scheme is not likely,
but, rather, modernization will proceed piecemeal in response to new
technologies, new ideas, academic criticism, political pressure, etc. The
public-trust doctrine, which has long been successfully applied to other
natural resources, is a legal means that is at hand to remedy some of the
immediate problems that have been identified in the previous section. In
this section, an overview of the public-trust doctrine will be provided.
Since the idea of applying the public-trust doctrine to the electromag-
netic spectrum is quite new, this Article will lead the reader through
many examples of its application. Some thoughts on procedural mecha-
nisms for application to the electromagnetic spectrum will be explored in
Section VI.
265. Statement of FCC Chairman William E. Kennard, Notice of Inquiry on Software
Defined Radio, OET Docket No. 00-47 (Dec. 7, 2000), available at http://www.fcc.gov/
Speeches/Kennard/Statements/2000/stwek02O.html.
266. FCC First Report and Order, In the Matter of Authorization and Use of Software
Defined Radios, ET Docket No. 00-47 (adopted Sept. 13, 2001, released Sept. 14, 2001),
available at http://ftp.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Engineering-Technology/Orders/2001/fcc01264.txt.
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The public-trust doctrine relates to the ownership, protection, and
use of essential natural and cultural resources, and acts as a sort of com-
mon-law check-and-balance against governmental allocation mistakes
with regard to public natural resources. The public-trust doctrine has
proved useful in the past to correct government misallocations, and it can
also do so with the regulation of the electromagnetic spectrum. The pub-
lic-trust doctrine can-and has-"reached back" and corrected
governmental natural-resources-allocation mistakes made long ago (not
unlike the spectrum giveaways). For example, the 1983 California Su-
preme Court decision Mono Lake267 reached back to state water
allocation decisions made over forty years before and reversed them,
holding that California's government has an "affirmative duty to take the
public trust into account" when it makes decisions affecting natural re-
sources, and that it also has a duty of continuing supervision over these
resources which allows and may require modification of such decisions
whenever they were made.268 In other states, courts have held that the
public-trust doctrine has "emerged from the watery depths [of navigable
waterways] to embrace the dry sand area of a beach, rural parklands, a
historic battlefield, wildlife, archeological remains, and even a down-
town area.' 269 Courts have done this by relying on academic opinions and
270recommendations for extension of the public trust to natural resources,
and this Article hopes to make a first step in a similar extension of the
public-trust doctrine to the electromagnetic spectrum.
The public-trust doctrine has been used both to prevent government
from conveying public resources to private enterprises,27 ' and to guaran-
tee the public access to natural resources after the resources have been
conveyed to private interests 272 (particularly for purposes of "fishing,
fowling and navigation"). 273 This Article asks the reader to take faith that
the new technologies that have been described in Section III will allow
the public to gain access to electromagnetic spectrum as modern techno-
logical fishers, fowlers, and navigators of this natural resource. Indeed,
267. Nat'l Audobon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d. 709 (Cal. 1983).
268. Id. at 728.
269. State v. Sorensen, 436 N.W.2d 358, 362 (Iowa, 1989).
270. The Iowa court cited Richard Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and
Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IoWA L. REV.
631, 649 (1986).
271. See Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
272. Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 53, 67-68 (1851) (holding that intertidal waters
are impressed with public rights via the Public-Trust Doctrine-even if the property owner's
title reaches to the low-tide line-preserving the public's right to "fishing, fowling and naviga-
tion").
273. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 9 (N.J. 1821) (involving oysters, but also applying to
fishing, fowling and navigation rights, this was the first United States public-trust-doctrine
case).
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the electromagnetic spectrum is used to move information from one
place to another just as intertidal waters are used to move goods, and so
"navigation" within the spectrum should be a protected public right just
as navigation within intertidal waters is protected.274
If the doctrine, which already affords people access to certain natural
resources, is to be applied to electromagnetic spectrum, then the first
question must be whether the spectrum is legally a natural resource.
Supporting the conclusion that it is, the United States Supreme Court has
stated that electromagnetic spectrum is a "scarce
27s "natural resource.276
President Bush has also told us that the electromagnetic spectrum is "a
vital and limited national resource. 277
Given that the electromagnetic spectrum is a natural resource-the
easy part-the next question is whether the public-trust doctrine should
be applied to it. Commentators have argued convincingly that the public-
trust doctrine should be extended to all natural resources,78 and a few
wise advocates have suggested that electromagnetic spectrum should be
included in the public trust as a subset of "all natural resources., 279 A
smaller number of authorities have flirted with the direct possibility of
marrying electromagnetic spectrum and the public-trust doctrine.2 0 The
274. Navigation on the oceans is of course already a protected public right, but since the
oceans have not been subject to private law-unlike intertidal waters, which are sometimes
transferred to private ownership-the analogy of intertidal waters to the spectrum is a better
argument than the analogy of the ocean.
275. See Red Lion Broad Co. v. FCC., 395 U.S. 367, 376 (1969) (calling electromag-
netic spectrum a "scarce resource"); FCC. v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 377
(1984) ("The fundamental distinguishing characteristic of the new medium of broadcasting
... is that [b]roadcast frequencies are a scarce resource.").
276. See Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l. Comm'n., 412 U.S. 94, 173-74
(1973) (making a direct link between electromagnetic spectrum and natural resources: "At the
outset, it should be noted that both radio and television broadcasting utilize a natural re-
source-electromagnetic spectrum... [a]nd, although broadcasters are granted the temporary
use of this valuable resource for terminable three-year periods, 'ownership' and ultimate con-
trol remain vested in the people of the United States.").
277. Presidential Memo on Spectrum Policy, supra note 32.
278. Sax, supra note 2, at 557.
279. See MICHAEL CALABRESE, PRINCIPLES FOR SPECTRUM POLICY REFORM 5-6 (New
Am. Found. Working Paper, Oct. 2001), available at http://www.newamericafoundation.org/
DownloadDocs/pdfs/Pub File_610_1 .pdf.
280. See Torres, supra note 74, 528-32, 536-38, 560-62 (discussing separately the pub-
lic-trust doctrine, public ownership of electromagnetic spectrum, and the Coase theorem);
Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Prop-
erty, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 711 (1986). (although Carol Rose's insightful article was written
before Internet and spectrum were hot topics, it is often cited by pundits for its descriptions of
"inherently public property." Even though she does not deal with electromagnetic spectrum
her article is quickly gaining momentum as a point of departure for electromagnetic spectrum
allocation); LEssiG, supra note 42, at 86-88 (describing Carol Rose's analysis of public roads,
navigable waterways, and other commons and acknowledging its utility in "modem" com-
mons, such as the Internet and computer networks); Philip J. Weiser, The Internet, Innovation,
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New America Foundation, for example, has argued in a creative
amicus brief2 2 (filed in connection with a Federal Communications
Commission Notice of Inquiry related to spectrum policies8 3) that the
public-trust doctrine deprives Congress of the authority to sell off the
public airwaves:
The more fundamental underpinning for common ownership and
democratic control of the airwaves is that like other natural sys-
tems-including the oceans, navigable waterways and the
atmosphere-spectrum is inherently a common asset....
Throughout history, both law and tradition have recognized that
certain assets are inherently public and not subject to owner-
ship-not by private parties, or even by the state. The classic
examples from Roman law were roads, harbors, ports and navi-
gable waterways. The Romans called this third category of
property, res publicae, which has been ... incorporated into ...
American law as the "public-trust doctrine." The doctrine holds
that, because of their unique characteristics, certain natural re-
sources and systems are held in trust by the sovereign on behalf
of all citizens.2 4
This reasoning is in line with the public-trust doctrine's history,2 85 but
it addresses only about half the doctrine's potential. For the public-trust
doctrine operates as a superior right guaranteeing qualified access to all
kinds of property, whether it is owned privately, held by the state, or
unownable, like the air and the sea. So the New America Foundation has
and Intellectual Property Policy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 534, 584-87 (2003) (extending Carol
Rose's public property analogy to intellectual property, the Internet and implicitly to wireless
communications).
281. The New America Foundation is a public policy institute which lobbies on various
topics of public interest. See www.newamericafoundation.org; see also The New America
Foundation's Spectrum Policy Program Homepage, at www.spectrumpolicy.org.
282. See Comments of The New America Foundation, The Consumer Federation of
America, Consumers Union, The Association of Independent Video and Filmmakers, The
National Alliance for Media Arts and Culture, the Benton Foundation, the Center For Digital
Democracy, United Church of Christ, Office of Communication, Inc, and the Media Access
Project, , DA 02-1311, ET Docket No. 02-135 (July 8, 2002), at 14, available at
http://www.newamerica.net/DownloadDocs/pdfs/PubFile_9001 .pdf (Accessed July 18,
2003).
283. See FCC Spectrum Policy Task Force Website, at www.fcc.gov/sptf; see also Press
Release: Spectrum Policy Task Force Seeks Public Comment on Issues Related to Commis-
sion's Spectrum Policies, DA 02-1311, ET Docket No. 02-135 (released June 6, 2002),
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DA-02-131 1A 1.pdf.
284. See New America Foundation Amicus Brief, supra note 282, at 14.
285. Carol Rose, Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creators: Traditions of Public Property
in the Information Age, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 97-100 (2003) (describing the his-
tory of the public-trust doctrine and its Roman-law res publicae roots).
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combined a powerful common-law doctrine with a relatively new idea,
but it has only considered the doctrine's application to the government's
selling of public property to private interests, while ignoring one of the
doctrine's most powerful (and often controversial) aspects: its ability to
preserve certain rights in a natural resource for the public even if the
286government has conveyed the resource to a private party.
Thus, applying the public-trust doctrine to the spectrum has been
proposed before, but only to remedy one of the spectrum's problems
(namely, the problem of much of it being essentially privately owned
through exclusive licenses to large broadcasting companies). And it has
been proposed to utilize only one characteristic of the public-trust doc-
trine, namely, its ability to defeat private ownership of natural resources.
We will now look at how the doctrine's other capability (that is, its abil-
ity to place restrictions on the private ownership of a resource) can be
used to address the other problems that the spectrum has.
1. The "Prohibition on Conveyance" and Illinois Central
There is a rich body of literature describing the public-trust doc-
trine's long history in Roman law, but that writing is only of general
interest, because to understand the doctrine as it is employed today, one
must note the contemporary distinction between the two different char-
acteristics of the public-trust doctrine as it has developed in the past
century. One category of doctrine, most often propounded by the "high-
tide states, 2 88 asserts that public-trust property may not be conveyed to
private ownership. Another set of doctrines, usually emanating from the
"low-tide states,' 289 says that the public trust lets the state make certain
private conveyances, but the property remains impressed with certain
reservations that are held for the public trust. I will call the first interpre-
tation of the public-trust doctrine "prohibition on conveyance," and the
second "conveyance with impression." These categories can be seen as
two different paradigms: states that allow property ownership to the
high-tide line, which lean towards prohibition on conveyance; and the
minority of coastal states, which extend property ownership all the way
286. This article addresses in detail the various facets of the protection that the public-
trust doctrine affords in Section II.
287. Almost every written comment on the public-trust doctrine begins with the follow-
ing citation of Roman law and The Institutes of Justinian: "all of these things are by natural
law common to all: air, flowing water, the sea and, consequently, the shores of the sea." See
Patrick Deveney, Title, Jus Publicum, and the Public Trust: An Historical Analysis, 1 SEA
GRANT L.J. 13, 23 (1976) (quoting The Institutes of Justinian); Rose, supra note 285 (discuss-
ing various Roman law property traditions).
288. See discussion infra at Section V.B.
289. See discussion infra at Section V.A.
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to the low-tide line and which follow the conveyance-with-impression
model.
The most cited United States case for the prohibition-on-conveyance
interpretation of the public-trust doctrine is Illinois Central Railroad v.
Illinois.29 In that decision, the state legislature had transferred owner-
ship of the submerged area of nearly the entire waterfront of Chicago
(over 1,000 acres) to the railroad,29' and four years later a new legislature
sought to revoke the transfer but the railroad challenged the revocation.
The United States Supreme Court upheld the revocation and returned the
waterfront to the state, famously describing title to the land as:
different in character from that which the state holds in lands in-
tended for sale. It is different from the title which the United
States holds in public lands which are open to preemption and
sale. It is a title held in trust for the people of the State that they
may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over
them, and have the liberty of fishing therein freed from the ob-
struction or interference of private parties.292
Submerged lands, therefore, possess a different character than other
forms of property, and they carry with them an implied trust for the pub-
lic's benefit. Here the presence of water altered the character of the land,
so the state's use and disposition of that land had to be consistent with a
different standard.
The public-trust doctrine does not mean that a state may never con-
vey submerged lands to a private party. To the contrary, the Supreme
Court in Illinois Central noted that conveyance is permissible, so long as
it furthers the public trust interest, and so long as
[t]he control of the State for the purposes of the trust can never
be lost, except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the in-
terests of the public therein, or can be disposed of without any
substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands and wa-
293
ters remaining.
The problem in Illinois Central was that the state gave away too
much land with too little public purpose. It was a matter of degree: the
court weighed the public's interest in the waterfront against the public
gain from conveying title to private parties. The outcome is not surpris-
ing, because even if the railroad had built certain facilities from which
290. 146 U.S. 387 (1892). Professor Sax calls Illinois Central "the Lodestar in American
public trust law." Sax, supra note 2, at 489.
291. 146 U.S. at 454.
292. Id. at 452 (emphasis added).
293. Id. at 453.
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the public had benefited, it is doubtful that the railroad would have
needed the entire waterfront.9
Discussion of Illinois Central is helped when framed in the inverse,
i.e., from a governmental-takings context, and here it is evident that the
Court's questioning whether it makes sense for a railroad to operate a
waterfront is well placed.295 Asking such a practical question is precisely
what courts do in takings cases, for there is no well-defined rule or fixed
formula for determining when government should compensate a private
party for a taking.2 96 Courts consider several factors,2 97 but they engage in
essentially "ad hoc, factual inquiries, 29 just as the Court did in Illinois
Central.
Nonetheless, the decision is unusual in two respects. One is that al-
though it is a Supreme Court case, state law is at issue. To be fair, there
are conflicting views on whether the public-trust doctrine is a matter of
state or federal law, though it seems to tend most towards state law. The
Supreme Court has said, perhaps most convincingly in Appelby vs. City
of New York, 99 that the Illinois Central decision was based on state law
but that its general principle has been recognized throughout the coun-
try.3°  The second way in which the case is unusual is that Illinois
Central never really addresses how the public-trust doctrine squares with
the Constitution.0 Some scholars have attempted to read the doctrine
294. Id. at 438. The railroad intended to build a railway and to build numerous ware-
houses, piers, wharves, and other structures along the waterway on the border between the
lake and the city.
295. Id. at 451 (wondering why "[a] corporation created for one purpose, the construc-
tion and operation of a railroad between designated points ... [could] manage and practically
control the harbor of Chicago, not simply ... as a railroad corporation, but for its own profit
generally").
296. Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (noting
that the court "has been unable to develop any 'set formula' for determining when 'justice and
fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the gov-
ernment, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons") (internal
citations omitted).
297. See generally Gilbert L. Finnell, Jr., Public Access to Coastal Public Property:
Judicial Theories and the Taking Issue, 67 N.C. L. REV. 627, 654-56 (1989) (outlining five
considerations applied by the court, and citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhatten CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), as a leading per-se takings case).
298. Id.
299. 271 U.S. 364 (1926).
300. 271 U.S. at 395. Illinois Central reached the United States Supreme Court because
the railroad removed to federal court based on the case's constitutional issues arising out of
the Contracts Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S.
387, 433 (1892).
301. See Richard Epstein, The Public-Trust Doctrine, 7 CATO J. 411 (1987). Epstein
criticizes the case because it "contains no citations to particular constitutional provision, and
the opinion reads like an essay that runs for 20 pages without case citation." Id. at 427. Epstein
seems to have somewhat of a love/hate relationship with the Illinois Central. While he criti-
cizes it for a dearth of constitutional grounding, he appears to praise it for its representing a
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into the Constitution through the Commerce Clause,02 but this argument
has been met with criticism.3 3
At least two more cases involving Lake Michigan and the public-
trust doctrine have been heard in the courts, with similar results.' 4 After
Illinois Central, however, the public-trust doctrine continued its applica-
tion at the state level (where it began),3"' principally in states affected by
tidal waters, although it has "evolved in tandem with the public percep-
tion of the values and uses of waterways."306 But then the doctrine
enjoyed an almost wholesale rejuvenation in the late 1960s and early
1970s in the setting of environmental law and civil rights.3 7
Illinois Central is a good example of a prohibition-on-conveyance
case: conveyance was revoked, or prohibited, under the public-trust
theory of limited government in which limitations are placed on public officials that do not
apply in private life. See id. at 425; see also James R. Rasband, The Disregarded Common
Parentage of the Equal Footing and Public-Trust Doctrines, 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1, 65
(1997) (noting that the majority made "no attempt to locate the Constitution" and instead
based the decision entirely on common law).
302. See Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on
the Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425 (1989). The article dis-
cusses the historical relevance of how rivers and lakes facilitated trade and established
communication among the states, noting that the need for one central governing body to over-
see water traffic was a key impetus for Congress' primacy under the Constitution's Commerce
Clause. Id. at 437. The author advances the argument that it is logical to view the public trust
as an implied condition of statehood and as "a key adjunct of Congress' general purpose of
keeping those watercourses 'forever free,'" and consequently to be read into the Commerce
Clause. Id. at 458-59; see also Michael C. Blumm, Public Property and the Democratization
of Western Water Law: A Modern View of the Public-Trust Doctrine, 18 ENVTL. L. 573, 587-
89 (1989) (stating that with respect to Western water rights, "the public trust seems especially
likely to be a complete answer to constitutional challenges, given (1) long-established Su-
preme Court authority recognizing the inapplicability of rigid private-property concepts to
water, and (2) the nearly universal declaration in western states of the public nature of the
water resource").
303. See Rasband, supra note 301, at n.271 (criticizing Professor Blum's constitutional
application of the public-trust doctrine).
304. See Milwaukee v. State, 214 N.W. 820 (Wis. 1927) (applying the public-trust doc-
trine to void the transfer by the State of Wisconsin of part of Lake Michigan to a steel
company); see also Lake Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 742 F Supp. 441 (N.D.
Ill. 1990) (enjoining, based on the public-trust doctrine, the conveyance and filling of 20 acres
of Lake Michigan to expand Chicago's Loyola University).
305. The first reported case in the U.S. is the New Jersey case Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L.
1 (1821), discussed infra at Section IV.A.
306. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal.
1983).
307. See Marc R. Poirier, Environmental Justice and the Beach Access Movements of the
1970's in Connecticut and New Jersey: Stories of Property and Civil Rights, 28 CONN. L. REV.
719, 723-26 (1996). This article notes several historical factors that tie a 1970s movement to
increase public access to the beach with some other social movements, including the emer-
gence of environmental law, the social protest movements' reaching their peak, and various
other challenges to the status quo. The author shows convincingly how these phenomena
merged and can be studied in beach-access decisions from the East Coast states.
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doctrine. We will now turn to the other interpretation of the doctrine, in
which conveyance of natural resources to private parties is permitted but
the grantee takes the land subject to certain restrictions.
2. The Conveyance-with-Impression Cases and the
Jus Privatum Versus Jus Publicum Dichotomy
The conveyance-with-impression cases are also well known within
the jus publicum/jus privatum dichotomy, 0 which is simply the clash
between private interests and public interests that has been seen not only
in public-trust cases but also in more "traditional" property cases (where
it is well settled that superior public interests can supersede private-
property interests). Public interests' superiority to private ones can be
seen in the deference that has been given to the public's environmental
interests, 3°9 aesthetic tastes," ° administrative ease in delivering public• 311312
services,"' and zoning. The phenomenon is apparent in both general
property-rights cases and public-trust cases. In the early Massachusetts
public-trust decision of Commonwealth v. Alger,33 Justice Shaw de-
clared:
[I]t is a settled principle, growing out of the nature of well or-
dered civil society, that every holder of property, however
absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the im-
plied liability that his use of it may be so regulated, that it shall
not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal
308. See Torres, supra note 74, 530 n.43. The article explains that at common law, the
jus privatum/jus publicum dichotomy has two components. The first is the jus publicum,
which is the dominant estate and encapsulates the public's trust rights, ranging from fishing,
fowling, and navigation to other broader rights like recreation. The second component is the
jus privatum, which encompasses the proprietary rights for use and possession of property.
Naturally, the owners of the jus privatum may not use the property of the jus publicum to the
exclusion of the public's rights.
309. See, e.g., Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Colo. Water Conserv. Bd., 901 P.2d
1251, 1257 (Colo. 1995) (restricting a ski resort's use of its private property so that the court
could protect instream flows); Selkirk-Priest Basin Ass'n v. Idaho ex rel. Andrus, 899 P.2d
949, 953 (Idaho 1995) (granting standing to an environmental group to challenge the sale of
timber on state forest lands, which, allegedly, harmed fish in an adjacent creek).
310. For example, signs on private property are a protected form of free speech, but the
state may regulate signs' physical characteristics because they take up space and may some-
times obstruct views, distract motorists, displace alternative uses of land, and pose other
problems that justify state regulation under municipal police powers. See City of Ladue v.
Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994).
311. See Chicago B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 561, 587 (1906) (noting that pub-
lic utilities are "quasi-public" organizations that may take property (with compensation) under
eminent domain for the greater public interest).
312. Miller v. Bd. of Public Works, 234 P. 381 (1925), appeal dismissed, 273 U.S. 781
(1926).
313. 61 Mass. 53 (1851).
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right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the
rights of the community.
14
While Shaw's opinion imposed restrictions upon private-property
rights through the public-trust doctrine, he also embraced private prop-
erty in general by calling upon the common law for an established
principle, the sic utere doctrine, and then distinguishing it.3"5 The jus
publicum/jus privatum principle underlies many traditional property-law
(i.e. non-public trust) cases, particularly in zoning matters.
Compare Justice Shaw's declaration in the public-trust case Alger
with that of Justice Owen in the Wisconsin zoning case, Carter v.
Harper."6 Justice Owen used language inspired by the United States Su-
preme Court in Chicago, B. & Q. v. People of State of Illinois,317 which
has since become a cornerstone of California law through its integration
into Miller v. Board of Public Works318 and at least a half dozen subse-
quent cases.31 9 Justice Owen observed:
It is thoroughly established in this country that the rights pre-
served to the individual by these constitutional protections are
held in subordination to the rights of society. Although one owns
property, he may not do with it as he pleases, any more that he
may act in accordance with his personal desires. As the interest
of society justifies restraints upon individual conduct, so also
does it justify restraints upon the uses to which property may be
devoted. It was not intended by these constitutional provisions to
so far protect the individual in the use of his property as to en-
able him to use it to the detriment of society. By thus protecting
individual rights, society did not part with the power to protect
itself or to promote its general well-being. Where the interest of
the individual conflicts with the interest of society, such individ-
ual interest is subordinated to the general welfare.
314. Id. at 84-85.
315. Id. at 63. The full phrase is: "sic utere tuo ut alenum non ladas." See 16A AM. JUR.
2D. Constitutional Law § 321 (2003) (discussing the sic utere maxim in relation to nuisance
law, and stating that it stands for the proposition that "every person has the right to the free use
of his or her property so long as the rights of another are not injured").
316. 196 N.W. 451 (Wis. 1923).
317. Id. at 453 (citing Chicago B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 561 (1906)).
318. 234 P. 381, 385 (Cal. 1925), appeal dismissed, 273 U.S. 781 (1926).
319. See Kelly v. Mahoney, 8 Cal. Rptr. 521, 523 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960); HFH, Ltd. v.
Superior Court, 542 P.2d 237, 242 (Cal. 1975); Agric. Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court,
546 P.2d 687, 694 (Cal. 1976); Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 344-45 (Cal.
1979); Viso v. California, 154 Cal. Rptr. 580, 583 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); Judlo, Inc. v. Vons
Cos., 259 Cal. Rptr. 624, 626 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
320. Carter, 196 N.W. at 453.
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In a sense, the public-trust doctrine does the same thing as the prin-
ciple outlined in Miller. it affirms that private ownership and rights
reserved for the general public are compatible with each other, but it
holds that private rights are subordinate to public rights. This has tre-
mendous upside potential for spectrum advocates, even if it may repulse
absolutist property-rights proponents, because it could mean that regula-
tors do not have to decide today whether privatization or the commons is
the better model, i.e. whether spectrum should be allowed to be owned
321and traded like property, or whether (as this Article advocates) it
should instead be open to all, like other natural resources. 2 If the jus
privatum/jus publicum dichotomy is applied to electromagnetic spec-
trum, the conveyance-with-impression interpretation of the public-trust
doctrine will make it possible to reserve certain rights for the public and
apply them to both the privatization and the commons models. Specifi-
cally, this could manifest itself in the right of UWB and SDR users to
navigate within the spectrum of others, as long as they do not interfere
with the principal use of the spectrum.
Some commentators, perhaps most famously Richard Epstein, sup-
port the prohibition-on-conveyance construction of the public-trust
doctrine. Epstein's property-law theory allows for a mix of public and
private rights, and the public-trust doctrine is most useful when alloca-
tive mistakes occur between public rights and private rights.323 While he
supports the public trust in the form of prohibition on conveyance,
Epstein rejects conveyance-with-impression, labeling it a development
from "more recent times" that is "another unfortunate effort to create
instability in private rights. 324 Professor Epstein has argued that the Fifth
Amendment protections should act to require government to pay for the
value that they see in private property before government takes it from
private hands,3 2 and he believes, unsurprisingly, that governments should
provide compensation for many partial takings, (as well as, of course, for
full takings), including cases where value is diminished in small incre-
ments.326 Epstein emphasizes that the distinction between total and
partial takings is absent in other areas of the law, such as restrictive
covenants, and asks "[w]hy then should the understanding or reasonable
321. See Hazlett, supra note 68.
322. LESSIG, supra note 42, at 77-79.
323. Epstein, supra note 301.
324. Id. at 412 n.1.
325. . See Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of
Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1369 (1993).
326. See id. at 1377, 1387-88, 1392.
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expectations shift so dramatically when we move into the public
sphere?,
327
Others have echoed Epstein's frustration with the "impression"
cases. Professor Huffman (who has also been called the "Darth Vader of
Public Trust")328 has said:
Historically the doctrine was reasonably clearly defined as to
geographic scope and as to uses. It was a very narrow doctrine
compared to the ambitions that people have had for it since Sax
wrote his piece. I have problems with that, thinking in resource
allocation terms, because of the uncertainties that the rapid,
modem evolution of the doctrine have introduced into the lives
329of public and private resource managers.
It is unclear why public-trust critics believe that the conveyance-
with-impression cases are "recent" (Epstein) and part of a "modem evo-
lution" (Huffman), for in fact they are among the oldest public-trust
cases in the United States. As far back as 1842, the United States
Supreme Court held, in Martin v. Waddell,33 ° that title transfers and
grants may not divorce themselves from the public trust: "[g]rants ...
are, therefore, construed strictly; and it will not be presumed, that [the
grantor] intended to part from any portion of the public domain."33' This
principle, often referred to as the "impression" principle,332 is fundamen-
tal in "low-tide states" such as Massachusetts, where private owners hold
limited property rights under common-law principles that have existed
since the Magna Carta.333
It could be argued that for Epstein (and for Huffman to a lesser ex-
tent), the public-trust doctrine acts as a corollary to the Constitutional
takings clause, and that any other form of taking besides complete tak-
ing, such as the partial-taking form, should not exist unless it is
compensated. The low-tide-state examples apparently are ignored in fa-
vor of a theoretical property-ownership paradigm. This theoretical
proposition is that "[a]ll regulations, all taxes, and all modifications of
327. Id. at 1388.
328. Blumm, supra note 302, at 716 n.108.
329. JIM BURLING ET AL., CENTER FOR PRIVATE CONSERVATION, CONSERVATION
AND THE PUBLIC-TRUST DOCTRINE (Mar. 1999), available at http://www.
privateconservation.org/pubs/roundtables/625conservationpublic.pdf.
330. 41 U.S. 367 (1842).
331. Id. at 411.
332. See, e.g., Hope M. Babcock, Has the United States Supreme Court Finally Drained
the Swamp of Takings Jurisprudence, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 42 (1995) (discussing Phil-
lips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988), in which the Court impressed upon
tidelands a trust obligation to be exercised on behalf of the public).
333. See discussion infra Section V.
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liability rules are takings of private property prima-facie compensable by
the state,"'34 and if the state wants to allow the public trust to transfer
property from public to private ownership but reserve certain rights un-
der the conveyance-with-impression theory, then according to Epstein
the state should pay compensation for a partial taking.
The public-trust doctrine is a common-law doctrine, so it evolves
with the common law.335 As Justice Hall stated in the New Jersey case
Neptune City, the public-trust doctrine "should not be considered fixed
or static, but should be molded and extended to meet changing condi-
tions and needs of the public it was created to benefit. 336 Both
categories, the prohibition-on-conveyance and the conveyance-with-
impression aspects, are important to electromagnetic spectrum. The first
can be used to make an argument that both the first and second spectrum
giveaways (described above) should be revoked, while the second can be
used to assert public-trust interests in spectrum grants in which broad-
casters or others maintain a monopoly, but to which new technologies
like UWB and SDR need to gain access without disturbing the primary
user.
B. The Sax Principles
Advocates of expanding the public-trust doctrine point to Joseph
Sax's 1970 article, The Public-Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law:
Effective Judicial Intervention, in which he convincingly argued that the
public trust is an important citizens' tool to protect public rights in all
natural resources, not just tidal waters.337 The Sax article has been said to
be "every law professor's dream: a law review that not only revived a
dormant area of the law but continues to be relied upon by courts some
two decades later,33 8 and his article has survived as one of the most cited
law-review articles of all time.339
Professor Sax advances three principles as bases for expanding the
doctrine. First, that "certain interests are so intrinsically important to
every citizen that their free availability tends to mark the society as one
of citizens rather than of serfs. 3 40 These interests have traditionally em-
334. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 95 (1985).
335. Sax, supra note 2, at 528.
336. Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-By-The-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J.
1972).
337. Sax, supra note 2.
338. Blumm, supra note 302, at 574.
339. Fred R. Shapiro, The Most Cited Law Review Articles, CAL. L. REv. 1540, 1551-53
(1985) (cataloguing the top law-review articles from the previous 40 years, Sax's 1970 public-
trust article was ranked 31 st).
340. Id. at 484.
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phasized the public right to fish in water and navigate upon it. Sax cites
U.S. v. Chandler-Dunbar Co.341 for the proposition that it is "'inconceiv-
able' that any person should claim a private property interest in the
navigable waters of the United States.34 2 Second, that these protected
public interests (again, principally fishing, fowling, and navigation)
4 3
"are so particularly the gifts of Nature's bounty, that they ought to be
reserved for the whole of the populace."3" Third, Sax underlines the spe-
cial character of certain natural resources-the shores, great ponds,
national parks, and national museums-and declares that these "interests
are so peculiarly public [in] nature that ... their adaptation to private use
[is] inappropriate. '3 4' These three principles have had the result of em-
powering citizens, particularly environmentalists and, in some cases,
civil-rights advocates, 34 6 to expand the application of the public-trust
doctrine beyond fishing, fowling, and navigation.
The public-trust argument has found its way into many different ar-
eas of law and policy, including the preservation of culture,"3 where the
American Association of Museums has declared that the country's mu-
seums "are organized as public trusts, holding their collections and
information as a benefit for those they were established to serve. '348 And
in New York, courts have held that state parks are "impressed with a
public trust. ' 349 Although an effort to extend public-trust thinking to
copyright was not successful,3 ° the attempt was indicative of the appli-
cability of the concept to additional areas.
C. Eldred v. Reno
Whether the public-trust doctrine should apply to copyright law was
recently fought over in a district-court decision involving a challenge to
the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,3 ' a law extending
341. 229 U.S. 53, 69 (1913).
342. Sax, supra note 2, at 484.
343. Although "fowling" was not mentioned earlier, he presumably considers it to be a
basic right since he supports the others that accompany it (i.e. fishing and navigation).
344. Sax, supra note 2, at 484
345. Id. at 485.
346. See Poirier, supra note 307.
347. See, Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property: The Protection of Cultural
Property in the United States, 73 B.U. L. REV. 559, 646-55 (1995) (arguing for an extension
of the public-trust doctrine to include national cultural identity and archaeology).
348. American Association of Museums Code of Ethics, 2000, available at
http://www.aam-us.org/aamcoe.cfm.
349. Grayson v. Town of Huntington, 160 A.D.2d 835, 837 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
350. See discussion infra Section JV.C.
351. Pub. L. No. 105-298, 11 Stat. 2827 (1998).
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existing and future copyrights by 20 years. In the case, Eldred v. Reno,352
the plaintiffs argued:
While copyright creates a present interest in the copyright
holder, it simultaneously creates a future interest in the public.
The Public Trust Doctrine holds that government may not trans-
fer the public property of a commons into private hands in the
absence of any public benefit in exchange. While this doctrine
has traditionally been applied in the context of public lands, the
same principle should apply to the reallocation of public rights
in intangible property, such as copyright."'
Citing Illinois Central for the public-trust doctrine's basic premise
5 4
and United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land355 for the proposition that the
doctrine restricts the federal government's conveying of public-trust
property,356 the plaintiffs said that copyrighted works should be consid-
ered public-trust property as a matter of logic: "every grant of a
copyright necessarily guarantees the public right to use the copyrighted
work after the term's expiration ... [and] the public has a vested re-
mainder interest in copyrighted works.33 7 The plaintiffs called on the
court to consider the flexible aspects of the public-trust doctrine, noting
that it has addressed "diverse modern needs" including recreational areas
and environmental resources.358 While acknowledging that much of the
doctrine's history is connected with navigable waters, the Eldred plain-
tiffs nevertheless emphasized that this should be an "illustrative, and not
an exclusive application. '
Citing two cases and summarily dismissing the argument, the district
court's memorandum opinion showed no willingness to extend the pub-
lic-trust doctrine to copyright, declaring that "the public-trust doctrine
352. Eldred v. Reno, 74 F Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 1999), aff'd, Eldred v. Reno, 239 E3d 372
(D.C. Cir. 2001), aff'd sub nom. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). Note that all briefs
cited herein are available on the Eldred v. Ashcroft Legal Archive at www.eldred.cc.
353. Pl.'s First Am. Compl. at 69a, Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999)(No.
1:99CV00065).
354. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or, in
the Alternative, for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Judg-
ment on the Pleadings at 55-58, Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d I (D.C.C. 1999)(No.
1:99CV00065).
355. 523 F. Supp. 120, 124-25 (D. Mass. 1981).
356. Pl.'s Resp. I, at 59, Eldred v. Reno, 74 F Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 1999)(No.
1:99CV00065).
357. Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum In Support of Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment, at 24, Eldred v. Reno 74 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C.
1999) (No. 1:99CV00065).
358. See Pl.'s Resp. I, at 58.
359. See Pl.'s Resp. I, at 57.
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applies to navigable waters and not copyrights.' '36 It is apparent, how-
ever, that the court was result-oriented and chose the easiest ground for
refusing to apply the public-trust doctrine to copyright, rather than dis-
cussing the possibility of so applying it. Upon appeal to the Supreme
Court, the plaintiffs apparently abandoned the public-trust argument. 6
The arguments advanced in the Eldred plaintiffs' district-court briefs
are useful, for they not only argue persuasively for extending the public-
trust doctrine to another realm, but also make a conceptual distinction
that can be usefully applied to the electromagnetic spectrum. The reason
that intellectual property is unique is because it does not "technically
compete," and that "[o]ne person's use of intangible work does not pre-
clude the use by another.'362 The plaintiffs could have been writing about
the spectrum for, as has been shown, with two new technologies users
will not need to compete with one another to speak or listen.
V. SOME EXAMPLES OF PUBLIC-TRUST JURISPRUDENCE
The United States coastal region is only about 11% of the total land
area, yet 110 million people occupy it. It is expected to grow in
population by 60 percent by 2010,363 and it is the most densely populated
and rapidly growing part of the country." Much of the coast is privately
owned-87 percent of the coastal area from Virginia to Maine, for
example, is private365-and not surprisingly, this corridor includes many
of the nation's low-tide states:366 Massachusetts, Maine, Delaware,
Pennsylvania and Virginia. In spite of private ownership to the low-tide
line, three states' courts (those of Massachusetts, Maine and Delaware)
have guaranteed a minimum right of fishing, fowling, and navigation in
the zone between high and low tide (the "intertidal zone"), while the
high-tide states (like New Jersey and California) have been much more
360. 74 F. Supp. 2d at 3-4 (citing Phillips Petroleum Co., v. Miss., 484 U.S. 469 (1988)
and District of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc. 750 F.2d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
361. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
362. Pl.'s Resp. I, at 58.
363. Pamela Pogue & Virginia Lee, Providing Public Access to the Shore: The Role of
Coastal Zone Management Programs 27 COASTAL MANAGEMENT 219, 220 (1999). The calcu-
lation excludes Alaska and the U.S. Territories.
364. Id. (citing T.J. Culliton et al., 50 Years of Population Change Along the Nation's
Coasts: 1960-2010, in NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC COMMISSION, COASTAL
TRENDS SERIES, REPORT 2 (1988)).
365. Id. at 223.
366. SURFRIDER FOUNDATION, STATE OF THE BEACH (2003) (noting that Massachusetts,
Delaware, Maine, Pennsylvania, Virginia are low-tide states, as well as the non-coastal state
Wisconsin).
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expansive with beach-access rights, finding in some instances a public
trust right up to dry sand, in order to let people use the beach.
A. Examples of Low- Tide Jurisprudence:
Massachusetts and Maine
Many low-tide states have attempted through legislation to change
beach-ownership rules to increase public access, with these attempts in-
cluding proposals to change private beaches' boundaries from the low to
the high-tide line. But these movements have often been struck down as
unconstitutional takings in courts' advisory opinions." Some legislatures
have, in response, attempted to purchase private areas in order to in-
crease the public's beach-access rights, but because of the high cost of
coastal property, only very limited public purchases have in fact taken
place.368 In spite of the low-tide states' guarantee of access to the inter-
tidal zone, events there illustrate the problems that can arise when
private-property rights are extended to a natural resource's outer limits.
With about 75 percent of its beaches privately owned, 69 Massachu-
setts is the original low-tide state, having conveyed private-property
rights to intertidal waters in land grants during 1641-1647 (the "1641
Grants").37° Maine, as a former component of the Massachusetts Com-
monwealth, was also subject to these grants.37' Massachusetts's and
Maine's private interests in intertidal waters are perhaps the most exten-
sive of the low-tide states, though public rights in fishing, fowling, and
navigation are still protected there.372 Both the Massachusetts and Maine
legislatures have attempted to change the rule and expand the public
trust through legislation, but with only limited success: they have not
367, See, e.g., In re Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561 (Mass. 1974) (responding to
legislation passed to increase beach access in Massachusetts).
368. Andrew Blake, Beach Rights: A Question of Access, BOSTON GLOBE, June 11,
1995, at I (noting that the legislature passed a bill authorizing the taking of beaches by emi-
nent domain and then allowing the courts to determine what the compensatory amount would
be, hoping that it would be low, but that the government has since decided to work coopera-
tively with the private beach owners, which has resulted in a long and expensive process).
369. See John H. Boit, Beach Access Under Scrutiny, THE PATRIOT LEDGER, Dec. 3,
1998, at 1.
370. Matthew J. Kiefer, The Public Trust Doctrine: State Limitations on Private Water-
front Development, 16 REAL EST. L.J. 146, 148 (1987) (noting that the first enactment was the
Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1641-1647); see also In Re Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d
561, 565 (Mass. 1974) (observing that the grants are also found in a 1649 Massachusetts codi-
fication entitled "The Book of the General Lawes and Libertyes").
371. See Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mass. (I Tyng) 435, 438 (1810) (involving land in Cape
Elizabeth in the District of Maine, and noting that the rule of law governing titles to the inter-
tidal zone had its origin in the Colonial Ordinance of 1641-47 of the Massachusetts Bay
Colony, long before the separation of Maine was received into the common law of Massachu-
setts by long usage and practice throughout the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth).
372. See Crocker v. Champlin, 202 Mass. 437, 441 (1909).
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been able to change the permanently engraved "impression" aspect of
the low-tide policy.3 3 Though Massachusetts and Maine stem from a
common land grant, in recent years Maine has shown more sympathy for
expanding the public-trust doctrine into the intertidal zone, much as its
high-tide counterpart New Jersey has done.374
1. The "Massachusetts Rule"
One of the first and most famous cases in this regard is the 1851 de-
cision of Commonwealth v. Alger, which arose after Massachusetts
legislation passed between 1837 and 1847 prevented construction be-
yond a certain point so as to protect harbors.376 The Supreme Judicial
Court upheld the legislation's constitutionality, with Chief Justice Shaw
explaining that the Court was "deeply impressed with the importance of
the principles which [the case] involves, and the magnitude and extent of
the great public interests, and the importance and value of the private
rights" involved in the intertidal zone.37' Alger stands firmly for the two
principles that (a) the 1641 grant created private-property rights down to
the low-tide line,37  and (b) the property right between the high-tide and
low-tide lines is subject to the public-trust doctrine, which reserves to
the public rights to fishing, fowling and navigation.379
Residents of Cape Cod would undoubtedly note few actual "fowl" in
the intertidal zone, since the only fowl available in this area are seagulls.
Likewise, there is probably very little navigation, except in harbors,
since water is too shallow to safely sail, and fishing in the intertidal zone
is confined to the rare beach caster or pier fisherperson. Nevertheless,
373. See Kiefer, supra note 370 (describing Massachusetts's unusual jurisprudence and
distinguishing it as the "Massachusetts Theory").
374. See discussion infra Section V.
375. 61 Mass. (1 Cush.) 53 (1851).
376. Id. at 83-84. The case discusses five related acts of legislation: (1) "an act to pre-
serve the harbor of Boston, and to prevent encroachments therein," passed on April 19, 1837;
(2) another similar act passed on March 17th, 1840; (3) another similar act passed on March 6,
1841; (4) another similar act passed on April 26, 1847; and (5) another similar act passed on
May 10, 1848. All were part of the same series of legislation--divided into separate sec-
tions-but intended to set limits and lines for the construction of wharves and piers so as to
preserve the waters for navigation. Id. at 54.
377. Id. at 64.
378. Id. at 71 (carefully describing the purpose and intent of the 1641 Grant, and finding
that it created "a legal right and vested interest in the soil, and not a mere permissive indul-
gence, or gratuitous license, given without consideration, and to be revoked and annulled at
the pleasure of those who gave it").
379. Id. at 67-68. The court cites Section 2 of the 1641 Grant, which provides that the
public "shall have free fishing and fowling in any great ponds, bays, coves and rivers, so far as
the sea ebbs and flows within the precincts of the town where they dwell." Id. The Court later
goes on to explain that "the great purpose ... was to declare a great principle of public right
... and to make them all free." Id.
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though few persons may exercise their public-trust rights in Massachu-
setts (and elsewhere), they are still an important part of the law, and they
have moved Massachusetts citizens to highlight them in a brochure enti-
tled "Public Rights/Private Property."
380
2. The 1974 and 1991 Massachusetts Legislation
In 1974, Massachusetts attempted to pass a bill expanding the prin-
ciples found in Commonwealth v. Alger to give the public a walking right
on beaches. In the "interest of the public," the proposed bill38" ' attempted
to create an "on-foot free right of passage along the shore ... between
the mean high water line and the extreme low water line ... .""' In an
advisory opinion3 8 1 on the proposed 1974 legislation entitled Opinion of
the Justices,38 however, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court re-
jected the proposal as against the Massachusetts and United States
Constitution's Takings Clauses. The Court reviewed the Massachusetts
case law and found the "on-foot" right of passage (which allowed pas-
sage over dry land) to be inconsistent with the "traditional" rights that
were reserved for the public. 8 ' Declaring that they were "unable to find
any authority that the rights of the public include a right to walk on the
beach, 386 the court invalidated the bill as an improper taking under both
the Massachusetts Constitution and the United States Constitution's 14th
Amendment.3 7
But despite the 1974 opinion, a determined legislator kept the matter
alive for decades and in 1991 finally amended the original 1974 bill388 to
authorize389 the state to seize a privately-owned beach by eminent do-
380. Brochure available on the Massachusetts State Website at http://
www.ago.state.ma.us/pubs/beachacc.pdf.
381. 313 N.E.2d 561, 563 (Mass. 1974) (citing H.R. 481 (Mass. 1974).
382. Id. at 563 n.1.
383. See Mel A. Topf, The Jurisprudence of the Advisory Opinion Process in Rhode
Island, 2 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 207 (Spring 1997) (noting that many states have re-
pealed the advisory opinion procedure as a violation of the separation-of-powers doctrine but
that it is particularly active in Massachusetts).
384. 313 N.E.2d at 561.
385. Id. at 566 (noting that the "traditional" rights that were reserved include "fishing,
fowling, and navigation").
386. Id. at 567.
387. Id. at 568.
388. See Andrew Blake, Beach Rights: a Question of Access, BOSTON GLOBE, June 11,
1995, at I ("The [1991] Beach Access Law was sponsored by Senate President William
Bulger ... who had been proposing that legislation since 1974 when he and several of his
children were walking across a Cape Cod beach and were told to remove themselves-that the
beach was private.").
389. 1991 Mass. Acts. Ch. 176, Section 4; see also Sharon M.P. Nicholls, Public Right
Of Passage Along the Massachusetts Coast: An Argument For Implementation Without Com-
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main. The intent of the bill was to force a lawsuit so that the state could
determine "just compensation" and set a precedent on the merits,3 90 with
the amount of compensation being set by the courts.3 9' After considering
the matter for several years, however, the state never acted on the plan,
fearing the negative precedent that could result. 92 Instead, it decided to
educate people about their rights under the public-trust doctrine,393 and
the attorney general has published a brochure entitled "Public
Rights/Private Property"394 explaining the fishing, fowling, and naviga-
tion rights still reserved for the public,3 95 while the Massachusetts Office
of Coastal Zone Management maintains a website explaining the public-
trust doctrine's application to the Massachusetts coast.396
Massachusetts's decision to educate the public about the scope of the
public-trust doctrine shows that valuable rights are retained for the
public, which should be enjoyed by them. Cases now make clear, for
example, that "bathing" is not a derivative of "navigation" but that there
is indeed a right to "swim or float, 397 and that collecting shellfish is a
derivative right of the public-trust right to fishing,398 (though one may not
take the dirt surrounding the shellfish, just the shellfish themselves).
399
The public right to "fishing" does not include the right to "aquaculture,"
however, which is placing boxes or other apparatus to catch fish.4
pensation, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 113, 125 n.73 (1994), (noting that the amendment "was
passed as a section of the 1991 appropriations bill and not as an independent resolution").
390. See Teresa M. Hanafin, Budget Vote Funds General Relief Broadens Test for Beach
Access, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 13, 1991, at 19.
391. Nicholls, supra note 389, at 126 (advocating that the matter should be pursued and
that compensation would be de minimis).
392. See Alexander Reid, Access to Beach Hinges on Old Path, THE BOSTON GLOBE,
July 18, 1999, at 1.
393. Id.
394. Brochure available on the Massachusetts State Website at http://
www.ago.state.ma.us/pubs/beachacc.pdf.
395. Id. (noting that "fishing, fowling and navigation" and its "natural derivatives" are
protected uses). The brochure says that the Attorney General takes the (untested) position that
birdwatching is a derivative of "fowling," and that "swimming" is a derivative of "navigation"
so long as the swimmer's feet do not touch the bottom.
396. Massachusetts Office of Coastal Zone Management Website, at http://
www.state.ma.us/czm/shorelinepublicaccess.htm.
397. Butler v. Attorney Gen., 195 Mass. 79, 83 (1907) ("We think that there is a right to
swim or float in [the intertidal zone] ... [b]ut we do not think that this includes a right to use
for bathing purposes, as these words are commonly understood... ").
398. Weston v. Sampson, 62 Mass. 347, 355 (1851) (stating that a derivative right to
"fishing" includes the right to take clams from intertidal waters).
399. Porter v. Shehan, 73 Mass. 435, 436 (1856) (defendant, who entered plaintiff's
intertidal waters and took five cords of muscles, dead fish, and soil for fertilizer, was guilty of
trespass).
400. Wellfleet v. Glaze, 525 N.E.2d. 1298, 1304 (Mass. 1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("Aquaculture is not fishing, nor can it legitimately be considered a 'natural derivative' of the
right to fish.").
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Future lawsuits should further clarify what rights are derived from the
public's entitlement to fishing, fowling, and navigation.
3. Maine-Breaking with Tradition?
Only 27 miles of Maine's beautiful 3,500-mile coastline are pub-
licly-owned sandy beaches,4' and this has created a long-standing battle
between residents and nonresidents for access to beach space. °2 In 1984,
therefore, several private homeowners in the Town of Wells brought a
quiet-title action against the township to quell the public use of the
beaches near their property. Their first lawsuit, known as Bell J,403 was
initially dismissed by the lower court, but the Supreme Court reversed
and remanded after citing the longstanding common-law traditions of
both Maineo'° and MassachusettsY9 After the remand, however, the ac-
tion was affected by political turbulence from the state legislature, which
had in the meantime (in 1986) passed expansionist, public trust-
influenced legislation similar to that proposed in Massachusetts in
1974.4' 6 Maine's Public Trust in the Intertidal Land Act47 declared that
intertidal lands were impressed with a "public trust," and that the public
had a "right to use intertidal land for recreation.
A Maine court heard the matter in 1987 and concluded that the Pub-
lic Trust Intertidal Land Act was an unconstitutional taking,4° with the
court at the same time refusing to expand the public-trust doctrine be-
yond its traditional scope of "fishing, fowling, and navigation. 4 '0 The
same case went back to the Supreme Court (commonly known as Bell
II),411 who upheld the superior court's decision in language echoingMassachusetts's Opinion of the Justices. The court said, in fact, that their
401. See Public Shoreline Access and the Moody Beach Case, Marine Law Institute, Sea
Grant Communications Office, available at www.mli.usm.maine.edu/onemoody.pdf.
402. See Jeff Strout, Access to Islands Not Guaranteed, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Oct. 5,
2002, at D6 (discussing Maine beach-access disputes' history and concluding that they are still
dealt with on a case-by-case basis).
403. Bell v. Town of Wells (Bell I), 510 A.2d. 509 (Me. 1986).
404. Id. at 511 (citing Moulton v. Libbey, 37 Me. 472, 485-88 (1854), and a Maine advi-
sory opinion, Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d. 597 (Me. 1981)).
405. Id. at 513 (citing Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mass. 435, 438 (1810), and Barker v. Bates,
30 Mass. 255 (1832)).
406. 12 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 571-573 (Supp. 1988) (enacted during the pendency of
Bell I by P.L. 1985, ch. 782 (eff. July 16, 1986)).
407. Id.
408. Id. § 573(l)(B).
409. Bell v. Town of Wall (Bell I), 557 A.2d. 168, 177 (Me. 1989).
410. Id. at 169; see also id. at 174 (noting that rights derived from the right to "fishing,"
such as taking shellfish, are already allowed, but that taking "sea manure" or leaving "scrap-
ings of snow and ice" in the intertidal zone are not allowed, citing Marshall v. Walker, 45 A.
497, 536 (Me. 1900)).
411. Id. 168.
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"answer is the same as the unanimous opinion of the Massachusetts jus-
tices," noting that "[n]o decision of either the Maine or the
Massachusetts court supports any such open-ended interpretation of the
public uses to which privately owned intertidal land may be subjected"
'4 12
Private rights to the intertidal zone were revisited by the Supreme
Court in 2000 in Eaton v. Wells, 4"3 but this time they were addressed dif-
ferently: at stake was a small strip of beach (2,200 linear feet) for which
the township (Wells) put up ample testimony of prescriptive use under a
prescriptive-easement theory for public recreation. Before the trial be-
gan, the township offered to purchase an easement from the property
owners for $3,000, but when they countered with $1.2 million, the offi-
cials took the case to court.4 4 The claim was successful and ultimately
accomplished the same thing, on a smaller scale, that the township had
attempted in the Bell cases by way of the public-trust doctrine. The ma-
jority limited its decision to the prescription question and did not discuss
the public-trust doctrine, 45 but the press and some academics have inter-
preted Eaton as an opportunity for expanding the public-trust doctrine in
416subsequent cases.
Much excitement about Eaton v. Wells has been aroused by its con-
curring and dissenting opinions, in which two justices stated that they
did not agree with the prescription approach. Justice Saufley, concurring,
stated that she would have used Eaton v. Wells as an opportunity to over-
rule Bell II, thereby expanding the public-trust doctrine's scope:
By our unduly narrow judicial construction of the time-honored
public-trust doctrine, our holding in [Bell II] restricted the pub-
lic's right to peaceful enjoyment of one of this state's major
resources, the intertidal zones. Pursuant to our holding in [Bell
I/], a citizen of the state may walk along a beach carrying a fish-
ing rod [for "fishing"] or a gun [for "fowling"], but may not
walk along that same beach empty-handed or carrying a surf-
board. This interpretation of the public-trust doctrine is clearly
flawed.417
412. Id. at 174.
413. 760 A.2d. 232 (Me. 2000).
414. See Ted Cohen, Who Owns Wells Beach?, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (MAINE), Jan.
6, 1997, at IC.
415. 760 A.2d. at 248 ( "Because we affirm the trial court's decision that the public and
the Town have an easement by prescription to use both the dry sand portion of the beach and
the accompanying intertidal zone, we need not reach the State's contention that we expand the
public-trust doctrine established in Bell.").
416. See John Duff, Who Owns the Beaches?, at http://www.mli.usm.maine.edu/
Beachlaw101/sId001 .htm.
417. Eaton, 760 A.2d at 248-49 (Saufley, J., concurring).
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The Eaton decision has been criticized by other commentators, too,
who believe that expanding the public-trust doctrine with easements by
prescription may spur massive litigation over little pieces of the Maine
coast.1 8
The Maine Supreme Court, however, has shown restraint since
Eaton, distinguishing at least one case from it because the evidence of
prescription was insufficient; 4'9 but this has not stopped calls to testEaton's limits, and litigation will likely continue.42°
B. High-Tide Examples: New Jersey and California
The states of New Jersey and California provide some examples of
high-tide jurisprudence, because the cases that have arisen there are
among the oldest and most influential in this category.
1. New Jersey
New Jersey's case of Arnold v. Mundy42' is the first reported decision
involving the public-trust doctrine in the United States, and it was heav-
ily relied upon as persuasive authority in Illinois Central.422 Arnold v.
Mundy is also one of the more expansive applications of the public-trust
doctrine. Arnold claimed that Mundy had trespassed onto his oyster bed,
which was located in intertidal waters, and stolen oysters that Arnold had
"planted" there. 3 Arnold believed that he had title to the oyster bed on
424the basis of conveyances from a 17th century royal charter from
Charles II, King of England, who had granted them to the Duke of York
(his brother). 425 The court ruled in favor of Mundy and said that Arnold's
title was invalid because the public-trust doctrine forbade the conveyance
418. See Orlando E. Delogu, Eaton v. Town of Wells: A Critical Comment, 6 OCEAN &
COASTAL L.J. 225, 230 (2001).
419. Lyons v. Babtist Sch. of Christian Training, 804 A.2d 364, 373 (Me. 2002) (finding
overwhelming evidence in Eaton that owners had notice of a public easement and their prop-
erty rights being in jeopardy, but that in Lyons such evidence was lacking).
420. See Editorial, Maine's Private Beaches, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Sept. 19, 2002, at
A10 ("Justice Saufley's words may be taken as an invitation to bring suit to overthrow the
outmoded colonial law ... [t]he opportunity to free Maine's beaches is here, and the time
seems right.").
421. 6 N.J.L. 1 (N.J. 1821).
422. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 456 (1892) (per Fields, J.) (noting that
Mundy should be "entitled to great weight, and in which the decision was made 'with great
deliberation and research"').
423. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. at 8 (observing that oysters may be referred to as "planted"-i.e.,
"planted" for nurturing-when they are taken from one location to another); see BONNIE J.
MCCAY, OYSTER WARS AND THE PUBLIC TRUST (1998).
424. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. at 32 (referring to "mesne" conveyances, which are intermediate
conveyances in the chain of title between two grantees).
425. Id. at 14.
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of submerged land. 426 The court reviewed the public-trust doctrine in
English law and said that New Jersey was under the same obligation to
honor the doctrine, because holding otherwise would be tantamount to
ruling that the "Magna Carta was a farce. 427
The Mundy court went to great lengths to tie the public-trust doctrine
to New Jersey common law, speaking of "the law of nature, which is the
only true foundation of all the social rights,, 42' and saying that the Magna
Carta was a restoration of these social rights. The court then ruled that
the state "cannot make a direct and absolute grant of the waters of the
state, divesting all the citizens of their common right,'"429 for doing so
"never could be long borne by a free people.430 Most important, Mundy
expanded the original right of fishing, fowling, and navigation to include
"purposes of passing and repassing, navigation, fishing, fowling, suste-
nance and all other uses of the water and its products.43'
Many of the court's utterances rang of citizenship empowerment, cit-
ing from the "law of nature" and grievances "which could never be long
borne by a free people," the court explained:
[I]t is the public property; [no one, not even the King may] in-
trude upon the common property ... and appropriate it to
himself, or to the fiscal purposes of the nation, the enjoyment of
it is a natural right which cannot be infringed or taken away,
unless by arbitrary power; and that, in theory at least, could not
exist in a free government .... The sovereign power itself,
therefore, cannot, consistently with the principles of the law of
nature and the constitution of a well ordered society, make a di-
rect and absolute grant of the waters of the state, divesting all the
citizens of their common right. It would be a grievance which
never could be long borne by a free people.32
Mundy's expansion of the public-trust doctrine was upheld in the
modern case of Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-
Sea,433 in which beach access was not limited to the "ancient" right to
fish and navigate, but was held to include recreational uses such as
"bathing, swimming and other shore activities.' '34 Using equal-protection
426. Id. at 50 (noting that no grant is valid that fences in or shuts fisheries against the
common use).
427. Id. at 62.
428. Id. at 52.
429. Id. at 53.
430. Id.
431. Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
432. Id. at 50, 53.
433. 294 A.2d 47 (N.J. 1972).
434. Id. at 54.
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phraseology but holding on the basis of property law rather than consti-
tutional law,435 the court said that "a modem court must take the view
that the public-trust doctrine dictates that the beach and the ocean waters
must be open to all on equal terms and without preference and that any
contrary state or municipal action is impermissible"
436
One of the most recent New Jersey public-trust cases, Matthews v.
Bay Head Improvement Association43 1 is, like Mundy, one of the most
expansive beach-access cases to come from an East Coast state. In Mat-
thews, the plaintiff brought suit against an organization that owned six
parcels of land adjacent to a beach, but that refused to allow beach ac-
cess over its property. The New Jersey Supreme Court found that the
public-trust doctrine, which allows swimming and bathing below the
high-tide line, depends on access to the beach, because the public would
be unable to take advantage of its benefits unless access over private
property were guaranteed. 438 "To say that the public-trust doctrine entitles
the public to swim in the ocean and to use the foreshore... without as-
suring the public of a feasible access route would seriously impinge
upon, if not effectively eliminate, the rights of the public-trust doc-
trine.''439 To a certain extent, the Matthews ruling effectively read a new
right into the public-trust doctrine by using it to draw property lines be-
yond the high-tide line and include dry sand for access. The court
declared that "[aIrchaic judicial responses are not an answer to a modem
social problem. Rather, we perceive the public-trust doctrine not to be
'fixed or static,' but [as] one to 'be molded and extended to meet chang-
ing conditions and needs of the public it was created to benefit.'""'
2. California
The most important public-trust-doctrine case in California is Mono
Lake,4"' which held that the state has "an affirmative duty to take the pub-
lic trust into account in the planning and allocation of water resources,
and to protect public trust uses whenever feasible."" 2 The case allows for
an earlier administrative decision to be reconsidered at any time, even if
the deadline for challenging a permit has passed, and in Mono Lake the
435. See Poirier, supra note 307, at 776-77. The case was strongly pursued by the New
Jersey Civil Liberties Union. While the lower court's decision in Neptune City was based on
the Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme Court found enough basis in the common-law pub-
lic-trust doctrine that it did not decide the case on constitutional grounds.
436. 294 A.2d. at 54 (emphasis added).
437. 471 A.2d. 355 (N.J. 1984).
438. Id. at 364.
439. Id.
440. Id. at 365.
441. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d. 709 (Cal. 1983).
442. Id. at 728.
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public-trust suit occurred over forty years after the state had begun di-
verting water from a lake."3 After determining that the lake had lost one
third of its surface area, and would lose much more over the coming
years due to water diversion,4" the court held that the state had a duty to
reexamine old water rights that were initially granted without consider-
ing the public trust and to modify those rights if necessary to protect
trust values. The court noted the impression of the public trust as fol-
lows:
[T]he grantee holds subject to the trust, and while he may assert
a vested right to the servient estate (the right of use subject to the
trust) and to any improvements he erects, he can claim no vested
right to bar recognition of the trust or state action to carry out its
purposes.
The court held that state or municipal agencies (here, the City of Los
Angeles) have no "vested right to-harm the public trust.""' 5 The Mono
Lake decision means that the state must manage water resources by
weighing yesterday's traditions against today's values found in the pub-
lic trust, 46 and the case has influenced water-rights decisions in Idaho,
North Dakota, Washington, and elsewhere."7
With regard to beaches, public access is guaranteed by the California
State Constitution, which states that no one "[s]hall be permitted to ex-
clude the right of way to such water whenever it is required for any
public purpose ... and the Legislature shall enact such laws as will give
the most liberal construction to this provision so that access to the navi-
gable water of this State shall always be attainable for the people
thereof."4'8 The 1976 California Coastal Act further clarifies that "[t]he
basic goals of the State for the coastal zone are to .... (c) Maximize
public access to and along the coast .... 44' Private owners' right to ac-
cess below the high-water mark has been protected in San Francisco Say.
Union v. R.G.R. Petroleum & Mining Co.,5 0 where a private owner of
land abutting a beach was blocked as a private nuisance, prevented the
construction of platforms that would have barred his access to the
451
ocean.
443. Id. at 711.
444. Id.
445. Id. at 732.
446. See Michael C. Blumm & Thea Schwartz, Mono Lake and the Evolving Public
Trust in Western Water, 37 ARIZ. L. REv. 701,703 (1995).
447. Id. at 720.
448. Constitution of the State of California 1879, Cal. Const. Art. 10, § 4 (1996).
449. California Coastal Act, Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 30001.5 (2004).
450. 77 P. 823 (Cal. 1904).
451. Id.
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The rights of private owners up to 1976 had generally been weak as
against the public, although a deal struck with homeowners in 1976 as
part of the California Coastal Act expanded private owners' rights with a
quid-pro-quo: private owners must grant new access routes to beaches in
areas where no public access exists, in exchange for the right of planning
approval of any new developments on their property. This practice was in
place for about ten years, but was ruled an unconstitutional taking by the
United States Supreme Court in Nollan v. California Coastal Commis-
412sion . A heated debate between private and public interests continues to
this day, 55 an example of which is the controversy caused by the Nollan
case's failure to clarify the status of past offers, i.e. those made before
1987. 454 That has been contested in a highly-publicized lawsuit launched
by David Geffen based on an easement that was pledged in 1983 but that
Geffen later refused to honor. 5 The United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari to two similar cases regarding pledges made prior to 1987,
456which was held to be a victory by some, and the discussion is likely to
continue for some time into the future.457
VI. SOME PRACTICAL THOUGHTS ON APPLYING THE PUBLIC-TRUST
DOCTRINE TO THE ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM
In order for the public-trust doctrine to be applied to the electromag-
netic spectrum, a conceptual bridge is needed between the natural
resources that the doctrine already protects and the spectrum. The basis
for this bridge has been explained in this Article. We have seen that the
electromagnetic spectrum is a natural resource (at least the United States
Supreme Court has said so), and like any other one-a lake, a mountain,
a forest-it is finite, geographically bound, and subject to exploitation
and enjoyment by a mixture of public, private, and governmental uses.
452. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
453. Timothy Egan, Owners of Malibu Mansions Cry, 'This Sand Is My Sand', N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 25, 2002, at Al (reporting the existence of a heated political debate between
wealthy Malibu homeowners and the public).
454. See David G. Savage & Kenneth R. Weiss, Justices Bolster Beach Access, L.A.
T MES, Oct. 22, 2002, at Al.
455. Id.
456. Ann Daniel and Leonard Hill v. County of Santa Barbara, 288 F.3d 375 (9th Cir.
2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 973 (2002); Cole v. County of Santa Barbara, No. B147339,
2001 WL 1613856 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 973 (2002) (both
cases dealing with easement pledges in exchange for planning approvals made prior to 1987);
see also Community Rights Council Website, Cert. Petitions Denied in Significant Regulatory
Takings Cases, at http://www.communityrights.org/legalresources/PetitionsForCertiorari/
SCtCertDenied.asp.
457. See California Coastal Coalition, at www.califomiacoastline.org; see also Califor-
nia State's Website for Local Coastal Programs, at http://www.coastal.ca.gov/recap/rctop.html.
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And like many of the world's largest natural resources, the electromag-
netic spectrum provides its greatest value to the public not by being
improved, but by being left alone: developing the Grand Canyon, for
example, would destroy its value, as would developing the San Francisco
Bay (which .almost happened but was stopped by public-trust lawmak-
ing).45 ' Therefore, instead of trying to assert regulatory control over the
spectrum, government should, in a sense, leave the spectrum alone, and
regulate only the manner in which devices access it, including creating
liability for manufacturers and distributors of devices that offend the
public's access rights.
Yet history has shown that government will not do this alone, that
the present system of overarching regulation of the electromagnetic
spectrum must be curtailed by some other means; and this Article has
shown that the public-trust doctrine is such a means. Detailing how to
apply the doctrine is a tall order, but some guidelines can be provided
here.
A. The Federal Courts Have Held That Ownership of the
Electromagnetic Spectrum Is Vested in the Citizens
The public-trust doctrine can only be applied to the electromagnetic
spectrum if the spectrum is owned by the public. Yet this hurdle is a
fairly easy one to surmount, for, as previously stated, the United States
Supreme Court has found that the electromagnetic spectrum is a natural
resource that is owned by the people of the United States:
"At the outset, it should be noted that both radio and television
broadcasting utilize a natural resource--electromagnetic spectrum ...
[a]nd, although broadcasters are granted the temporary use of this valu-
able resource for terminable three-year periods, 'ownership' and ultimate
control remain vested in the people of the United States.'"59 Since it is
owned by the people, the spectrum passes a threshold test for public-
trust-doctrine treatment.
B. The Public Trust Has Evolved Into Federal Law
In order for electromagnetic spectrum to receive the benefits of the
public-trust doctrine, the doctrine must be able to be applied by the fed-
eral courts. And though most of the cases discussed in the preceding
458. See Alison Reiser, Ecological Preservation as a Public Property Right: An Emerg-
ing Doctrine in Search of a Theory, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L.R. 393, 396-97 (1991) (recounting
the San Francisco Bay being filled in and the legislation and citizens' movements that stopped
it, an outcome that might not have happened had the public-trust doctrine not been adopted in
California legislation and case law).
459. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l. Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 173-74
(1973).
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sections have been state-law applications, the doctrine has also found its
way into at least two federal decisions.
1. U.S. v. 1.58 Acres of Land and In re
Steuart Transportation Company
In U.S. v. 1.58 Acres of Land, the Federal District Court of Massa-
chusetts applied the public-trust doctrine to the federal condemnation of
property owned by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts that the Com-
monwealth declared to be "public."46 The district court agreed, and
stated emphatically that it accepted the policy that "no developed west-
ern civilization has recognized absolute rights of private ownership in
• . . land as a means of allocating [a] scarce and precious resource among
competing public demands.'4 6' The court turned to the public-trust doc-
trine and said that the "trust devolving upon the State (or federal
government) for the public ... cannot be relinquished by a transfer of
the property, 462 and the court went on to discuss the nature of publicly
owned property: "[s]ince the trust impressed upon this property is gov-
ernmental and administered jointly by the state and federal governments
by virtue of their sovereignty, neither sovereign may alienate this land
free and clear of the public truSt.
463
Similarly, the federal court in In re Steuart Transportation Com-
pany46 applied the public-trust doctrine, ruling that "[u]nder the public
trust doctrine, the State of Virginia and the United States have the right
and the duty to preserve the public's interest in natural wildlife re-
sources. Such right does not derive from ownership of the resources but
from a duty owing to the people.
'4 65
Such court decisions underline the importance of protecting a public
resource, even if it is not beachfront property. The electromagnetic spec-
trum, as a public and natural resource, should be protected under the
public-trust doctrine just as the public property in 1.58 Acres of Land
was. Furthermore, the electromagnetic spectrum is nominally owned by
the people like the federal property that was the subject of In re Steuart
Transportation Company.
As a matter of persuasive authority, federal courts should also be in-
fluenced by other cases discussed or footnoted in this Article, including:
(a) Illinois Central,466 a United States Supreme Court case that (applying
460. 523 F Supp. 120 (D.C. Mass. 1981).
461. Id. at 123.
462. Id. at 124.
463. Id. (emphasis added).
464. 495 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Va. 1980).
465. Id. at 40 (emphasis added).
466. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
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state law) prevented a state from granting public-trust property to a pri-
vately owned railroad (recall here that the Supreme Court said in
Appelby v. City of New York, 467 that the Illinois Central decision was
based on state law but that its general principle has been recognized
throughout the country);4 61 (b) Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi,4 69 a
United States Supreme Court case that also applied state law in expand-
ing the public-trust doctrine to include all waters, not just navigable
water; (c) Save Ourselves Inc., v. Louisiana,470 a state-law case which
recognized that potentially all natural resources are protected by the pub-
lic-trust doctrine, including the air; and (d) Mono Lake,4 1' a case that
made California authorities go back and apply the public trust to re-
source-allocation decisions that had been made over forty years earlier.
2. Reaching Through the Property Clause
The public-trust doctrine can also be seen through the window of
federal cases that have applied the United States Constitution's Property
Clause.472 In Kleppe v. New Mexico,473 for example, the United States Su-
preme Court stated that the United States Constitution's Property Clause
permits federal law to "exercise . .. complete power over particular pub-
lic property entrusted to it,"'4 74 and held that the Property Clause gives
Congress the power to protect wildlife on public lands, notwithstanding
state authority.475 If we assume, as this Article has argued, that the elec-
tromagnetic spectrum is held by the government on behalf of the people,
it is reasonable to assume that the Property Clause allows federal courts
to extend the public-trust doctrine to the electromagnetic spectrum. In-
deed, in United States v. Ruby Co.,4 6 which involved a patent dispute
between the United States and a patentee's successors, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals embraced the Property Clause and said that it is "the
constitutional precept that public lands are held in trust by the federal
government for all of the people. 477 Therefore, if one believes that the
electromagnetic spectrum is held in trust like federal lands, the Property
clause is another mechanism for extending the public-trust doctrine's
reach to the electromagnetic spectrum.
467. 271 U.S. 364 (1926).
468. Id. at 395.
469. 484 U.S. 469 (1988).
470. 452 So. 2d. 1152 (La. 1984).
471. Nat'l Audubon Socy v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
472. U.S. Const. Art. IV, § 3.
473. 426 U.S. 529 (1976.
474. Id. at 540 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
475. Id. at 546 (citations omitted).
476. 588 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1978.
477. Id. at 704 (citations omitted).
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C. Is the Timing Right for a Public-Trust Lawsuit, and If So,
Who Would Be the Plaintiff and What Relief Would She Seek?
The FCC has indicated some interest in changing the electromag-
netic-spectrum management process, and attempting to influence the
FCC is certainly one way to try to bring about regulatory reform in this
area. The mechanics of the FCC rulemaking process may make it possi-
ble to integrate the public-trust doctrine into the Code of Federal
Regulations by submitting comments to the FCC in an open rulemaking
procedure.478 It may also be possible to make changes in electromag-
netic-spectrum regulation through President Bush's initiative on
spectrum policy.479 Yet both of these approaches are unlikely to succeed,
since the history of spectrum regulation detailed in this Article shows
that the federal government is reluctant to make large-scale revisions in
the regulatory process. This Article argues, therefore, that instead of lob-
bying the executive branch to reform spectrum regulation, citizens and
entrepreneurs should take an activist role and effect change through the
courts by applying the public-trust doctrine, just as they did after Joseph
Sax's article was published in 1970, when they used the public-trust doc-
trine to defend the environment.
The influence of Sax's public-trust article shows that paradigm shifts
in science can happen quickly. Certainly, the changes in environmental
law that the public-trust doctrine accomplished took place in a context in
which many other developments were occurring to cause a paradigm
shift. For example, while it may now be axiomatic that we can cause se-
rious damage to the environment and to humans by using
Polychlorinated Biphenyls ("PCBs"), this was not obvious in the mid
1900s. At that time PCBs were a new technology that seemed to bring
great benefits to the public, and they were enthusiastically built into all
facets of our developing industrial infrastructure.4 0 This was particularly
true in the utility industry, where the technology's nonconductive and
fire-resistant qualities made it ideal for transformers and capacitors. The
discovery that PCBs caused liver toxicity, poisoning, and other carcino-
genic effects (particularly in animals) 48' changed that perception, and
although it was perhaps impossible to fully repair all the damage that
478. Comments are filed for all spectrum initiatives in accordance with the Administra-
tive Procedure Act through the FCC's website at www.fcc.gov.
479. Presidential Memo on Spectrum Policy, supra note 32.
480. Lauren MacLanahan, Polychlorinated Biphenyls and the "Mega Rule"-Will It
Have the Mega-Impact the EPA Desired?, 24 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. REV. 345, 347 (2000)
(describing PCBs' history-how they were viewed as a great technology in the thirties but
have now become an environmental nightmare).
481. Shu-Feng Hsieh et al., A Cohort Study on Mortality and Exposure to Polychlori-
nated Biphenyls, 51 ARCHIVES OF ENVTL. HEALTH 417 (1996).
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PCBs had caused, the federal government responded by passing laws
(specifically the TSCA482) that imposed a ban on the manufacture, use,
and introduction of these harmful products into the environment.483
In the case of PCBs, the discovery of toxicity and tumors in animals
was the event that incited legislative action.4u In the case of our water-
ways, many believe that we waited until the Cuyahoga, an otherwise
free-flowing river, caught fire before taking notice of the problem of wa-
ter contamination and passing legislation like the Clean Water Act.4 85 The
burning Cuyahoga became a pop-culture cause cjl~bre at the time, as
songs were written and the story became something of an urban leg-
end.486 To solve the problem, the government did not take over the
administration of the factories that spewed flammable substance into the
river, but instead (admittedly, this is a somewhat brutal simplification)
passed science-intensive laws requiring filtering487 and imposing crimi-
nal488 and civil liability (often strict liability)4 89 upon those who violate
emissions standards. This approach is what this Article advocates-
regulating the industry and mechanisms that use the natural resource
rather than the resource itself.
Just as the hazard of PCBs and the Cuyahoga River fire created pub-
lic awareness of the need to defend our environment, a number of recent
developments have created awareness of the need for change in spectrum
482. In 1976 Congress enacted the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e)
(1998). The TSCA is probably best known for its burden of proof, which places responsibility
for safety on manufacturers. See RODGERS, supra note 164, at 493.
483. See MacLanahan, supra note 480, at 346.
484. See Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc., v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 636 F.2d 1267, 1270 (C.A.D.C.
1980).
485. See Jonathan H. Adler, Fables of the Cuyahoga: Reconstructing a History of Envi-
ronmental Protection, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 89, 93-97 (2002) (describing in detail the
history of the 1969 Cuyahoga River burning and the ensuing legislation that was created in its
wake).
486. Id. at 89 (citing Randy Newman, "Burn On, on Sail Away" (Warner Bros. Records
1972), and also averring that the Cuyahoga River burning inspired R.E.M.'s "Cuyahoga, on
Life's Rich Pageant" (EMD/Capitol 1986) ("Underneath the river bed we burned the river
down.... Cuyahoga; Cuyahoga gone.")).
487. The Clean Water Act limits the amounts of various pollutants that can be discharged
into the water by, among other sources, wastewater treatment plants. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311
(1988). In order to meet those discharge limits, wastewater treatment plants use a variety of
chemical and biological technologies to remove pollutants from the water to be discharged. 56
Fed. Reg. 7849, 7853 (1991).
488. See United States v. Law, 979 F.2d 977, 978 (4th Cir. 1992). Defendants were found
guilty on sixteen counts for violating the Clean Water Act. One defendant was sentenced to
twenty-four months in prison, and the corporation was fined.
489. Section 309 of the Clean Water Act addresses federal enforcement. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319 (2000). The civil section of the Act imposes strict liability, stating that "any person"
who violates specific provisions of the Act may be subject to an enforcement action. Id.
§ 1319(a).
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policy: a presidential memorandum has been issued, a new spectrum-
policy task force has been created, UWB and SDR technologies are
swiftly passing from development to deployment, and the bankruptcies
of companies that overpaid in spectrum auctions have altered the tele-
communications industry. Since waiting for governmental evolution is
not the best means of effecting change in spectrum regulation, some al-
ternatives should be considered:
A communications company that is being prevented by spectrum li-
censing from deploying a cost-saving, spectrum-efficient service-such
as one using UWB or SDR technology-could sue under the public-trust
doctrine to be permitted to use unavailable frequencies that are con-
trolled by large broadcasters. The plaintiff could rely upon the age-old
principles set forth in New Jersey's Arnold v. Mundy and demand "fish-
ing, fowling, and navigation" rights within the electromagnetic
spectrum, having first established that (a) the spectrum is owned by the
public, (b) it is a natural resource, and (c) the new technology would not
interfere with licensed broadcasters as it "navigates" for its users. This
argument is, of course, premised on a showing that UWB and SDR are
ready for commercial usage. The companies should be able to make
these arguments fairly easily with support from filings that they have
submitted in connection with the many FCC rulemaking procedures re-
lated to the deployment of these technologies.
A more ambitious way of revising the way the spectrum is regulated
would be for a citizens' group to attempt to reverse one or both of the
spectrum "giveaways" (described previously), based on the prohibition-
on-conveyance concept set forth in Illinois Central. The first giveaways
might be difficult to undo, since they have taken place over the past 75
years (although as stated, Mono Lake required a state government to re-
consider allocation decisions made 40 years earlier). But an attempt to
reverse the second giveaway-which consisted of providing additional
channels for digital use to numerous broadcasting companies-might be
more likely to succeed if citizens could show that the broadcasters will
not use the channels that they received for free, or that those broadcast-
ers will never use the spectrum in accordance with the public trust with
which the spectrum is impressed.
People whose free-speech rights have been abridged by being pre-
vented from broadcasting their views may be able to use the public-trust
doctrine as an alternative argument to bolster their First Amendment
rights. The low-power FM radio stations that have essentially been pro-
hibited from broadcasting in urban areas, for example, could be plaintiffs
in such an action.
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CONCLUSION
Nineteenth-century French economist Frdd6ric Bastiat sarcastically
suggested that one way of parceling out the limited number of jobs to the
most people would be to handicap them, either by requiring that they
work with one hand or by having a hand chopped off.' 90 This is, in a
sense, what is happening today with the allocation of electromagnetic
spectrum: the public is prevented from navigating within most of the
spectrum due to a legacy policy dating back to the 1920s, not because
the spectrum is inaccessible, but because of the FCC's unique brand of
command and control. However, this handicapping could be removed by
introducing aspects of environmental law into electromagnetic spectrum
policy. Specifically, the public-trust doctrine, invoked in combination
with environmental law's alternative notion of command and control-
which relies more heavily on science and technology deployed at the
device level rather than at the resource level-could serve as a useful
model for improving public access and enjoyment of the spectrum.
The role of the FCC is evolving, just as government's role has
evolved, in the management of other natural resources, and this evolution
is likely to take time. As Justice Broussard explained when the Califor-
nia Supreme Court made the (then very controversial) decision to apply
the public-trust doctrine retroactively to government's water-allocation
actions in Mono Lake:
[T]he function of the Water Board has steadily evolved from the
narrow role of deciding priorities between competing appropria-
tors to the charge of comprehensive planning and allocation of
waters. This change necessarily affects the board's responsibility
with respect to the public trust. The board of limited powers of
1913 had neither the power nor duty to consider interests pro-
tected by the public trust; the present board, in undertaking
planning and allocation of water resources, is required by statute
to take those interests into account.'
In a similar vein, the FCC is already required by statute to take the
"public interest" into account,92 and it is not an unreasonable leap to ask
legislatures and courts to apply the public-trust doctrine to their
490. Frederic Bastiat, Bastiat, THE ECONOMIST, July 19, 2001, at 64.
491. 658 P.2d 709, 726 (Cal. 1983).
492. The standard for practically all decision making in the FCC is "public interest,
convenience and necessity." See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 309 (2000) (relying on "public interest,
convenience and necessity" for the initial granting of licenses); 47 U.S.C. § 310 (2000) (rely-
ing on "public interest, convenience and necessity" when reviewing assignment and transfer of
licenses); 47 U.S.C. § 307 (2000) (relying on "public interest, convenience and necessity" for
the renewal and extension of licenses).
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interpretation of the public interest. New technologies like UWB and
SDR, which will allow the public to access and use electromagnetic
spectrum in ways never before possible, should provide an additional
impetus for the FCC to invoke the public-trust doctrine, in this case to
authorize purveyors of UWB and SDR technologies to use frequencies at
the same time that broadcasters use them.
At present, thousands of pages of rules regulate use of the electro-
magnetic spectrum, and most of them are the product of an outdated
understanding of science and economics. These rules assume analog
transmissions to be the norm, regulate transmitters rather than receivers,
and they are based on (in nearly every case) the disfavored notion that
interference is the unavoidable result of a "cacophony of competing
voices." Happily, change is slowly under way: a rulemaking procedure
has recently authorized some market propertization mechanisms 4 93 and a
recent presidential memorandum has been issued on spectrum policy.
494
The FCC, however, continues to retain its monopoly power to determine
491which frequencies go to whom. Indeed, much of the intellectual energy
expended on the spectrum over the past few years has focused on how
best to allocate spectrum, rather than on how best to provide the public
access to it. Better spectrum-allocation mechanisms, such as auctions
instead of hearings, will theoretically improve public access, but a better
centralized-allocation system will still entail centralized allocation with
government retaining full control. Indeed, almost all methods of revising
spectrum regulation that are under consideration would preserve the
government's right to determine who should speak when. Although there
has recently been a general consensus that giving spectrum away for free
no longer makes sense, since auctioning brings in revenue while hear-
ings do not, it does not necessarily follow that auctioning or propertizing
the spectrum will improve the public's access to it. Billions of dollars
may change hands, but if areas of the spectrum remain idle, government
will have failed in its main purpose of letting the public use the spec-
trum.
That creating public access is the most important goal of regulating
the spectrum is implied by propertization advocate Thomas Hazlett's
observation that "[lt]he license 'giveaway' has been studied by econo-
mists for decades. Repeatedly the conclusion has been reached that the
system was not merely inefficient but illogical, error-prone, a mere acci-
493. See Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 03-113,
supra note 216.
494. Presidential Memo on Spectrum Policy, supra note 32. The memo describes the
president's intention to make electromagnetic spectrum, a "vital and limited national resource"
more available for use.
495. Id. (discussing multiple notice and administrative requirements retained by the FCC).
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dent of history.'4 96 In the same sense (i.e., considering access to be regula-
tion's primary goal), the massive amounts of money generated by the PCS
and 3G auctions may in 20 years also be viewed as an accident. If new
technologies like UWB and SDR function better in an undivided spec-
trum, then auctioning off parts of spectrum separately may prevent UWB
and SDR from being deployed. Auctioning slices of spectrum with clearly
defined electromagnetic "borders" assumes that technology works better if
participants are, like cars, relegated to operating within specific lanes; it
assumes that spectrum is like a piece of property that is best harnessed
when in private hands, rather than its being subject to the "tragedy" of the
commons. It is far too early in our technological development to come to
this conclusion, and indeed, if the proponents of UWB and SDR are right,
the exact opposite is true. If so, there is a great danger in granting property
rights-which are difficult to revoke-before we know how best to exploit
electromagnetic spectrum, one of our largest and most valuable natural
resources.
The Next Wave case provides another example of regulations dimin-
ishing access, for it shows that allocating electromagnetic spectrum
through auctions can make frequencies unavailable for years. There an
auction turned out to be just as inefficient as the giveaways, comparative
hearings, and lotteries that had preceded it, since it led to frequencies be-
ing left unused for a long time, and idle spectrum is always a problem for
the public regardless of how the party who keeps the frequencies idle ac-
quired them. The relative benefit of creating auction-generated
government revenue is in many cases offset by the public harm caused by
unused spectrum, and by the financial instability and bankruptcies of the
"winning" licensees.
It must be acknowledged that applying the public-trust doctrine to
electromagnetic spectrum could be complicated in the short term because
it could upset many quasi-private property arrangements that exist today:
cellular, PCS, and television and radio broadcasters (along with their
investors) have all made long-term business plans based on the assumption
that they will have enduring monopolistic control over the slices of
spectrum to which they hold licenses. Even though FCC regulations do
not allow private ownership,497 the tradition of automatically renewing
496. Hazlett, supra note 163, at 569.
497. See 47 U.S.C. § 301 (2000).
It is the purpose of this Act to maintain the control of the United States over all the
channels of radio transmission; and to provide for the use of such channels, but not
the ownership thereof, by persons for limited periods of time, under licenses
granted by Federal authority, and no such license shall be construed to create any
right, beyond the terms, conditions and period of the license.
Id. (emphasis added)).
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broadcasting licenses has created de facto property interests in numerous
frequencies. Upsetting those "property rights" is understandably a concern
to incumbents, as well as to free-market proponents who believe that
predictability in property rights is necessary for a stable economy. And it
has implications for spectrum deregulation, too, that commentators have
counseled restraint in extending the public-trust doctrine to certain other
resources, such as the sky, suggesting that government should avoid
changing too much too fast, because "to do so would risk unsettling a
variety of arrangements upon which people have organized their lives and
their enterprises.
'4 8
While extending the public-trust doctrine to electromagnetic spectrum
could unsettle a variety of arrangements-such as the existing monopolies
over the spectrum that FCC licenses confer-it is not clear that freeing up
access to the spectrum would cause a problem for anyone other than those
incumbents and their investors. The "public interest" is, after all, the pub-
lic's interest. As Justice Scalia said when he strictly construed § 525 of the
Bankruptcy code in Next Wave, "a debt is a debt, even when the obligation
to pay is also a regulatory condition; 499 it could just as easily be said that
"a public resource is still a public resource, even when the right to its
temporary use is given to a private company." To be clear, the proposi-
tion here is not that the public should have unbridled access to the
spectrum at all times, but that the public, armed with new technologies
(such as UWB and SDR), should have access rights to navigate within
the natural resource as long as its navigation does not harm others. This
does little more than restate many other long-accepted principles of
property law in which private interests are subordinated to public ones.
And new technologies can now-or will soon-allow policymakers to
import the public trust into the electromagnetic spectrum and allow pub-
lic interests such as free speech to have priority over private-property
interests.
This Article has demonstrated that there is an emerging consensus
that the present system of electromagnetic spectrum command and con-
trol must be changed.5 ° In keeping with that trend, recent reports
indicate that there is not much of a philosophical gap between academic
theorists at all (though a more basic debate about categorizing terms may
498. Torres, supra note 74, at 522.
499. F.C.C. v. NextWave Pers. Comm., 123 S. Ct. 836, at 839 (2003).
500. See LESSIG, supra note 45; see also FAULHABER & FARBER, SPECTRUM MANAGE-
MENT: PROPERTY RIGHTS, MARKETS, AND THE COMMONS 6, available at http://
rider.wharton.upenn.edu/-Faulhabe/SPECTRUMMANAGEMENTv5 l.pdf (analogizing the
FCC allocation method to the Soviet "Gosplan"); Freeing the airwaves, THE ECONOMIST, May
31, 2003, at 76 (evaluating the privatization vs. commons approaches to spectrum, noting that
both sides believe that there is not enough data available today to bet everything on a single
regime, and also discussing the Faulhaber/Farber "big-bang" theory).
Application of the Public-Trust Document
still be underway).'O° Promising new technologies have been partially
proven. Most experts now agree that the electromagnetic spectrum is
owned by the public and that new technologies will help the public use
and enjoy it. And while citizens may not be individually interested in
how their spectrum property is managed,02 this Article argues that they
are indeed individually interested in maintaining access to their property.
The public-trust doctrine, as well as other principles like environmental
law's version of command and control, can help the public fully realize
the potential of this vital natural resource.
Ironically, in environmental law, one of the underlying policy theo-
ries is also called command and control. Here, however, it acts more as a
mechanism for attaching liability to devices, manufacturers, and pollut-
ants than it does to impose control upon a resource itself. For example,
the Clean Air Act °3 has been described as a comprehensive "command
and control regime of strict technology and health based standards.
'' 4
Could command and control, as defined by environmental law princi-
ples, become the new method of management of electromagnetic
spectrum by replacing the antiquated command and control of the entire
resource as currently practiced by the FCC? This shift from one type of
command and control regime to another makes sense. As professor
James Huffman explains:
The dominant approach to environmental protection over the
past thirty years has been command and control regulation. The
basic idea has been that private decision makers, particularly
those acting pursuant to market incentives, will fail to take ac-
count of the environmental consequences of their actions. It is
therefore necessary that government establish acceptable levels
of environmental impact and command that these levels not be
exceeded."5
501. See Lawrence Lessig, Lessig Blog Archives for May, 2003, at http://
www.lessig.orgfblog/archives/2003_05.shtml (citing the Economist article, Lessig says that
"[a]s Yochai Benkler is increasingly pushing the point, the problem with the "commons"
metaphor is that it itself is a 'property' metaphor-just a form of 'property' where everyone
has a right to access").
502. See Hazlett, supra note 68, at 400 ("Members of the general public are the nominal
spectrum owners, but they are individually uninterested in the management of 'their' prop-
erty.").
503. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub.L. 101-549. 101st Cong., 2d Sess.,
104 Stat. 2399 (Nov. 15, 1990).
504. Richard J. Lazarus, The Greening of America and the Graying of United States
Environmental Law: Reflections on Environmental Law's First Three Decades in the United
States, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 75, 87 (2001).
505. James L. Huffman, The Past and Future of Environmental Law, 30 ENVTL. L. 23,
25 (2000).
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The management paradigm of electromagnetic spectrum is evolving,
and a natural progression would be to move from the present brute force,
centrally planned command and control system °6 to a more specific, tar-
geted form of command and control.
506. LESSIG, supra note 45, at 182 (comparing the history of broadcasting regulation in
the U.S. to centralized planning in the former Soviet Union).
